This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocol. IKE is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual
authentication and establishing and maintaining security associations
(SAs). This version of the IKE specification combines the contents of
what were previously separate documents, including Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP, RFC 2408), IKE (RFC
2409), the Internet Domain of Interpretation (DOI, RFC 2407), Network
Address Translation (NAT) Traversal, Legacy authentication, and remote
address acquisition. Version 2 of IKE does not interoperate with
version 1, but it has enough of the header format in common that both
versions can unambiguously run over the same UDP port. [STANDARDS-
TRACK]

Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol

Security is an essential service for wired and wireless network communications. The success of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) will depend on people ’s confidence in its security. However, the characteristics of MANET pose both challenges and opportunities in achieving security goals, such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, access control, and non-repudiation. We provide a survey of attacks and countermeasures in MANET in this chapter. The countermeasures are features or functions that reduce or eliminate security vulnerabilities and attacks. First, we give an overview of attacks according to the protocol layers, and to security attributes and mechanisms. Then we present preventive approaches following the order of the layered protocol layers. We also put forward an overview of MANET intrusion detection systems (IDS), which are reactive approaches to thwart attacks and used as a second line of defense.

A Survey of Attacks and Countermeasures in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

This document describes new key exchange algorithms based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol. In particular, it specifies the use of Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the use of
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as a new
authentication mechanism. This memo provides information for the
Internet community.

/pdf/elliptic-curve-cryptography-ecc-cipher-suites-for-transport-55anzlbd6t.pdf

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

A practical technique is proposed to authenticate civil GPS signals. The technique combines cryptographic authentication of the GPS navigation message with signal timing authentication based on statistical hypothesis tests to secure civil GPS receivers against spoofing attacks. The notion of GNSS signal authentication is defined in probabilistic terms. Candidate GPS signal authentication schemes are evaluated in terms of effectiveness and practicality leading to a proposal for incorporating digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation (CNAV) message. The proposal is sufficiently detailed to facilitate near-term implementation of security-hardened civil GPS. Copyright © 2012 Institute of Navigation.

/pdf/practical-cryptographic-civil-gps-signal-authentication-58fbcotbcm.pdf

Practical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication

In the 1970s researchers noticed that radioactive particles produced by elements naturally present in packaging material could cause bits to flip in sensitive areas of electronic chips Research into the effect of cosmic rays on semiconductors, an area of particular interest in the aerospace industry, led to methods of hardening electronic devices designed for harsh environments Ultimately various mechanisms for fault creation and propagation were discovered, and in particular it was noted that many cryptographic algorithms succumb to so-called fault attacks Preventing fault attacks without sacrificing performance is nontrivial and this is the subject of this book Part I deals with side-channel analysis and its relevance to fault attacks The chapters in Part II cover fault analysis in secret key cryptography, with chapters on block ciphers, fault analysis of DES and AES, countermeasures for symmetric-key ciphers, and countermeasures against attacks on AES Part III deals with fault analysis in public key cryptography, with chapters dedicated to classical RSA and RSA-CRT implementations, elliptic curve cryptosystems and countermeasures using fault detection, devices resilient to fault injection attacks, lattice-based fault attacks on signatures, and fault attacks on pairing-based cryptography Part IV examines fault attacks on stream ciphers and how faults interact with countermeasures used to prevent power analysis attacks Finally, Part V contains chapters that explain how fault attacks are implemented, with chapters on fault injection technologies for microprocessors, and fault injection and key retrieval experiments on a widely used evaluation board This is the first book on this topic and will be of interest to researchers and practitioners engaged with cryptographic engineering

Elaine B. Barker

Papers

Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [includes Change Notice 1 from 12/30/1996] | NIST