Elizabeth David-Barrett

TL;DR: The authors argue that EITI serves as a reputational intermediary, whereby reformers can signal good intentions and international actors can reward achievement, and international and domestic actors can diffuse the norm of resource transparency and advance reformist aims in a highly problematic policy area.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify three spheres of political influence over government contracting and show how elites can manipulate two of those spheres to increase their opportunities to influence the procurement process and minimize external accountability, facilitating the corrupt allocation of contracts to partisan allies.

TL;DR: The authors explored how realism in political theory can inform our understanding of political corruption and found that realists see corruption as posing a more fundamental problem, challenging the very nature of politics and undermining the attempt to establish and exercise authority in the ordering of conflict and the allocation of resources.

TL;DR: The authors investigate why top-down directives aimed at eradicating corruption are ineffective at altering on-the-ground practices for organizations that have adopted industrywide "gold standards" to prevent bribery and corruption.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyse data points from World Bank-funded development aid tenders over 12 years in >100 developing countries, and observe the heterogeneous effects of a 2003 anti-corruption reform aimed at increasing oversight and opening up competition.