Les systemes industriels, souvent appeles SCADA (pour Systeme d’acquisition et decontrole de donnees) sont la cible d’attaques informatiques depuis Stuxnet en 2010.Du a la criticite de leurs interactions avec le monde reel, ils peuvent representer unemenace pour l’environnement et les humains. Comme ces systemes ont par le passe etephysiquement isoles du reste du monde, ils ont ete majoritairement proteges contre despannes et des erreurs (ce qu’on appelle la surete). La securite informatique differe de lasurete dans le sens ou un attaquant cherchera activement a mettre en defaut le systemeet gagnera en puissance au cours du temps. L’un des challenges dans le cadre de lasecurite des systemes industriels est de faire cohabiter des proprietes de securite avecles contraintes metier du systeme. Nous repondons a cette question par trois axes derecherche.Tout d’abord, nous proposons un filtre dedie aux communications des systemes industriels,permettant d’exprimer des proprietes au niveau applicatif. Ensuite, nous nousinteressons a la verification de protocoles cryptographiques appliquee a des protocolesindustriels comme MODBUS ou OPC-UA. A l’aide d’outils classiques du domaine, nousmodelisons les protocoles afin de verifier s’ils garantissent des propriete de confidentialite,d’authentification et d’integrite. Enfin, nous proposons une approche, nommeeASPICS (pour Applicative Attack Scenarios Production for Industrial Control Systems),permettant de verifier si des proprietes de surete (similaires a celles verifiees par le filtre)peuvent etre mises en defaut par des attaquants en fonction de leur position et de leurcapacite. Nous implementons cette analyse dans le model-checker UPPAAL et l’appliquons sur un exemple.

https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01827270/document

Sécurité des systèmes industriels : filtrage applicatif et recherche de scénarios d'attaques

When trying to prove the security of a protocol, one usually analyzes the protocol in isolation, i.e., in a network with no other protocols. But in reality, there will be many protocols operating on the same network, maybe even sharing data including keys, and an intruder may use messages of one protocol to break another. We call that a multi-protocol attack. In this paper, we try to find such attacks using the Tamarin prover. We analyze both examples that were previously analyzed by hand or using other tools, and find novel attacks.

/pdf/formal-analysis-of-combinations-of-secure-protocols-3900h4gtfh.pdf

Formal Analysis of Combinations of Secure Protocols

Protocol security in a composition protocol environment has always been an open problem in the field of formal analysis and verification of security protocols. As a well-known tool to analyze and verify the logical consistency of concurrent systems, SPIN (Simple Promela Interpreter) has been widely used in the analysis and verification of the security of a single protocol. There is no special research on the verification of protocol security in a composition protocol environment. To solve this problem, firstly, a formal analysis method for composition protocol based on SPIN is proposed, and a formal description of protocol operation semantics is given. Then the attacker model is formalized, and a message specification method based on field detection and component recognition is presented to alleviate the state explosion problem. Finally, the NSB protocol and the NSL protocol are used as examples for compositional analysis. It is demonstrated that the proposed method can effectively verify the security of the protocol in a composition protocol environment and enhance the efficiency of composition protocol verification. 

/pdf/a-formal-analysis-method-for-composition-protocol-based-on-15mvthgp.pdf

A formal analysis method for composition protocol based on model checking

When trying to prove the security of a protocol, one usually analyzes the protocol in isolation, i.e., in a network with no other protocols. But in reality, there will be many protocols operating on the same network, maybe even sharing data including keys, and an intruder may use messages of one protocol to break another. We call that a multi-protocol attack.
In this paper, we try to find such attacks using the Tamarin prover. We analyze both examples that were previously analyzed by hand or using other tools, and find novel attacks.

Formal Analysis of Combinations of Secure Protocols (Extended Version)

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. COnfECt : Une Méthode Pour Inférer Les Modèles De Composants D’un Système Elliott Blot, Patrice Laurencot, Sébastien Salva

Elliott Blot

Papers

Formal Analysis of Combinations of Secure Protocols

Formal Analysis of Combinations of Secure Protocols (Extended Version)

COnfECt : Une Méthode Pour Inférer Les Modèles De Composants D'un Système