计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

We examine the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the cost of equity capital for a large sample of US firms. Using several approaches to estimate firms’ ex ante cost of equity, we find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit cheaper equity financing. In particular, our findings suggest that investment in improving responsible employee relations, environmental policies, and product strategies contributes substantially to reducing firms’ cost of equity. Our results also show that participation in two “sin” industries, namely, tobacco and nuclear power, increases firms’ cost of equity. These findings support arguments in the literature that firms with socially responsible practices have higher valuation and lower risk.

/pdf/does-corporate-social-responsibility-affect-the-cost-of-1l8602mes2.pdf

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Cost of Capital

Foundations Of Statistics

We investigate the effect of corporate sustainability on organizational processes and performance. Using a matched sample of 180 US companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted sustainability policies by 1993 - termed as High Sustainability companies - exhibit by 2009 distinct organizational processes compared to a matched sample of companies that adopted almost none of these policies - termed as Low Sustainability companies. The boards of directors of High Sustainability companies are more likely to be formally responsible for sustainability and top executive compensation incentives are more likely to be a function of sustainability metrics. High Sustainability companies are more likely to have established processes for stakeholder engagement, to be more long-term oriented, and to exhibit higher measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Finally, High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance.

The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/31432/1/50865033X.pdf

Corporate philanthropic practices

Targeting is the practice of inspecting firms most likely to violate a regulation. This paper provides empirical evidence on the role of targeting in regulatory compliance. I propose that self-reporting by a firm is used to demonstrate that firms are willing to cooperate. The results indicate that there is a one-quarter penalty period following a violation. Inspections are also determined by the economic situation of the surrounding community, demonstrating that targeting opens the door to interest-group influence. Inspections that detect violations encourage self-reporting, showing that firms demonstrate their desire to cooperate with regulators by disclosing violations.

The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-Reporting

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/31434/1/366362011.pdf

Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: evidence from the TRI

If private securities class actions alleging fraudulent behavior by officers or directors of a company are meritorious, directors and officers should pay a reputational penalty when they sit on a board of a company whose officers and directors are accused of fraud. I find little evidence of a negative effect associated with allegations of fraud. Using various definitions of board positions as a proxy for the reputation of directors who are accused of fraud, I find that the net number of board positions is consistently increased. Only in shareholder class actions in the top quartile of settlements or in which the Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated a case do directors appear to suffer a reputational penalty when a board they serve on is accused of fraud. The results call into question the merits of private securities class actions.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/505371

Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class‐Action Securities Litigation*

We take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to provide a novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of incapacitation. We compare the post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without three-strikes laws. The identification strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect nonparametrically using data solely from the three-strikes era. We find that California’s three-strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17–20 percent.

/pdf/does-three-strikes-deter-a-nonparametric-estimation-10r3x5inhx.pdf

Eric Helland

Papers

Corporate philanthropic practices

The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-Reporting

Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: evidence from the TRI

Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class‐Action Securities Litigation*

Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric Estimation