MKT 6009 Marketing Internship (0 semester credit hours) Student gains experience and improves skills through appropriate developmental work assignments in a real business environment. Student must identify and submit specific business learning objectives at the beginning of the semester. The student must demonstrate exposure to the managerial perspective via involvement or observation. At semester end, student prepares an oral or poster presentation, or a written paper reflecting on the work experience. Student performance is evaluated by the work supervisor. Pass/Fail only. Prerequisites: (MAS 6102 or MBA major) and department consent required. (0-0) S MKT 6244 Digital Marketing Strategy (2 semester credit hours) Executive Education Course. The course explores three distinct areas within marketing and sales namely, digital marketing, traditional sales prospecting, and executive sales organization and strategy. The continuing convergence of the digital marketing and sales funnels has created a strategic continuum from digital lead generation to digital sales. The course identifies the current composition of this digital continuum while providing opportunities to evaluate sales and marketing digital strategies. Prerequisites: MKT 6301 and instructor consent required. (2-0) Y MKT 6301 (SYSM 6318) Marketing Management (3 semester credit hours) Overview of marketing management methods, principles and concepts including product, pricing, promotion and distribution decisions as well as segmentation, targeting and positioning. (3-0) S MKT 6309 Marketing Data Analysis and Research (3 semester credit hours) Methods employed in market research and data analysis to understand consumer behavior, customer journeys, and markets so as to enable better decision-making. Topics include understanding different sources of data, survey design, experiments, and sampling plans. The course will cover the techniques used for market sizing estimation and forecasting. In addition, the course will cover the foundational concepts and techniques used in data visualization and \"story-telling\" for clients and management. Corequisites: MKT 6301 and OPRE 6301. (3-0) Y MKT 6310 Consumer Behavior (3 semester credit hours) An exposition of the theoretical perspectives of consumer behavior along with practical marketing implication. Study of psychological, sociological and behavioral findings and frameworks with reference to consumer decision-making. Topics will include the consumer decision-making model, individual determinants of consumer behavior and environmental influences on consumer behavior and their impact on marketing. Prerequisite: MKT 6301. (3-0) Y MKT 6321 Interactive and Digital Marketing (3 semester credit hours) Introduction to the theory and practice of interactive and digital marketing. Topics covered include: online-market research, consumer behavior, conversion metrics, and segmentation considerations; ecommerce, search and display advertising, audiences, search engine marketing, email, mobile, video, social networks, and the Internet of Things. (3-0) T MKT 6322 Internet Business Models (3 semester credit hours) Topics to be covered are: consumer behavior on the Internet, advertising on the Internet, competitive strategies, market research using the Internet, brand management, managing distribution and supply chains, pricing strategies, electronic payment systems, and developing virtual organizations. Further, students learn auction theory, web content design, and clickstream analysis. Prerequisite: MKT 6301. (3-0) Y MKT 6323 Database Marketing (3 semester credit hours) Techniques to analyze, interpret, and utilize marketing databases of customers to identify a firm's best customers, understanding their needs, and targeting communications and promotions to retain such customers. Topics

Marketing for management.

This article develops and discusses the concept of customer engagement behaviors (CEB), which we define as the customers’ behavioral manifestation toward a brand or firm, beyond purchase, resulting from motivational drivers. CEBs include a vast array of behaviors including word-of-mouth (WOM) activity, recommendations, helping other customers, blogging, writing reviews, and even engaging in legal action. The authors develop a conceptual model of the antecedents and consequences — customer, firm, and societal — of CEBs. The authors suggest that firms can manage CEBs by taking a more integrative and comprehensive approach that acknowledges their evolution and impact over time.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2340164_code1783641.pdf?abstractid=2340164&mirid=1&type=2

Customer Engagement Behavior: Theoretical Foundations and Research Directions

This article develops and discusses the concept of customer engagement behaviors (CEB), which we define as the customers’ behavioral manifestation toward a brand or firm, beyond purchase, resulting from motivational drivers. CEBs include a vast array of behaviors including word-of-mouth (WOM) activity, recommendations, helping other customers, blogging, writing reviews, and even engaging in legal action. The authors develop a conceptual model of the antecedents and consequences—customer, firm, and societal—of CEBs. The authors suggest that firms can manage CEBs by taking a more integrative and comprehensive approach that acknowledges their evolution and impact over time.

Customer engagement behavior : Theoretical foundations and research directions

The authors examine the implications of electronic shopping for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers. They assume that near-term technological developments will offer consumers unparalleled opportunities to locate and compare product offerings. They examine these advantages as a function of typical consumer goals and the types of products and services being sought and offer conclusions regarding consumer incentives and disincentives to purchase through interactive home shopping vis-à-vis traditional retail formats. The authors discuss implications for industry structure as they pertain to competition among retailers, competition among manufacturers, and retailer-manufacturer relationships.

Interactive home shopping: Consumer, retailer, and manufacturer incentives to participate in

Though word-of-mouth (w-o-m) communications is a pervasive and intriguing phenomenon, little is known on its underlying process of personal communications. Moreover as marketers are getting more interested in harnessing the power of w-o-m, for e-business and other net related activities, the effects of the different communications types on macro level marketing is becoming critical. In particular we are interested in the breakdown of the personal communication between closer and stronger communications that are within an individual's own personal group (strong ties) and weaker and less personal communications that an individual makes with a wide set of other acquaintances and colleagues (weak ties). We use a technique borrowed from Complex Systems Analysis called stochastic cellular automata in order to generate data and analyze the results so that answers to our main research issues could be ascertained. The following summarizes the impact of strong and weak ties on the speed of acceptance of a new product: ••The influence of weak ties is at least as strong as the influence of strong ties. Despite the relative inferiority of the weak tie parameter in the model's assumptions, their effect approximates or exceeds that of strong ties, in all stages of the product life cycle. ••External marketing efforts (e.g., advertising) are effective. However, beyond a relatively early stage of the growth cycle of the new product, their efficacy quickly diminishes and strong and weak ties become the main forces propelling growth. The results clearly indicate that information dissemination is dominated by both weak and strong w-o-m, rather than by advertising. ••The effect of strong ties diminishes as personal network size decreases. Market attributes were also found to mediate the effects of weak and strong ties. When personal networks are small, weak ties were found to have a stronger impact on information dissemination than strong ties.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40216600.pdf

Talk of the Network: A Complex Systems Look at the Underlying Process of Word-of-Mouth

Sellers who plan to capitalize on the lifetime value of customers need to manage the sales potential from customer referrals proactively. To encourage existing customers to generate referrals, a seller can offer exceptional value to current customers through either excellent quality or a very attractive price. Rewards to customers for referring other customers can also encourage referrals. We investigate when referral rewards should be offered to motivate referrals and derive the optimal combination of reward and price that will lead to the most profitable referrals.

We define a delighted customer as one who obtains a positive level of surplus above a threshold level and, consequently, recommends the product to another customer. We show that the use of referral rewards depends on how demanding consumers are before they are willing to recommend i.e., on the delight threshold level. The optimal mix of price and referral reward falls into three regions: 1 When customers are easy to delight, the optimal strategy is to lower the price below that of a seller who ignores the referral effect but not to offer rewards. 2 In an intermediate level of customer delight threshold, a seller should use a reward to complement a low-price strategy. As the delight threshold gets higher in this region, price should be higher and the rewards should be raised. 3 When the delight threshold is even higher, the seller should forsake the referral strategy all together. No rewards should be given, and price reverts back to that of a seller who ignores referrals. These results are consistent with the fact that referral rewards are not offered in all markets.

Our analysis highlights the differences between lowering price and offering rewards as tools to motivate referrals. Lowering price is attractive because the seller "kills two birds with one stone": a lower price increases the probability of an initial purchase and the likelihood of referral. Unfortunately, a low price also creates a "free-riding" problem, because some customers benefit from the low price but do not refer other customers. Free riding becomes more severe with an increasing delight threshold; therefore, motivating referrals through low price is less attractive at high threshold levels. A referral reward helps to alleviate this problem, because of its "pay for performance" incentive only actual referrals are rewarded. Unfortunately, rewards can sometimes be given to customers who would have recommended anyway, causing a waste of company resources. The lower the delight threshold level, the bigger the waste and, therefore, motivating referrals through rewards loses attractiveness.

Our theory highlights the advantage of using referral rewards in addition to lowering price to motivate referrals. It explains why referral programs are offered sometimes but not always and provides guidelines to managers on how to set the price and reward optimally.

Customer Referral Management: Optimal Reward Programs

Retailers did not immediately extend their business to the Internet environment, fearing that on-line activities could adversely impact their off-line sales To facilitate assessment of the impact of on-line activities on off-line sales, we develop a method that allows retailers to use readily available market data for making informed decisions The proposed method determines (1) the extent to which on-line sales cannibalize off-line sales, and (2) whether on-line activities build on-line equity for the firm We illustrate the method using data from Tower Records' Internet sales division We find that on-line sales do not significantly cannibalize retail sales and that the firm's web activities build long-term on-line equity While the proposed method can be used by any “clicks-and-mortar” firm, our firm-specific results indicate that Towers' fears regarding cannibalization due to its own Internet activities were unfounded

Clicks and Mortar: The Effect of On-line Activities on Off-line Sales

In this research, the authors examine the phenomenon of escalation bias in the context of managing new product introductions In particular, they identify three general paths—Decision Involvement Inertia, Decision Involvement Distortion, and Belief Inertia Distortion—that can lead managers to escalate their commitments The authors test the relative strength of these paths in driving observed escalation behavior The results show that involvement with the initial decision, a key construct in numerous explanations for escalation behavior (eg, agency theory, self-justification), is not a necessary condition to induce commitment to a losing course of action (ie, escalation bias) Rather, the authors find that the driving force behind escalation behavior is improper use of initial positive beliefs in the face of negative new information This insight has implications for the groundwork necessary for organizations to design systems, policies, and procedures to help them avoid the trap of escalatio

/pdf/stuck-in-the-past-why-managers-persist-with-new-product-2d7k2wm8fl.pdf

Stuck in the Past: Why Managers Persist with New Product Failures:

The price for a product may be set too low, causing the seller to leave money on the table, or too high, driving away potential buyers. Contingent pricing can be useful in mitigating these problems. In contingent pricing arrangements, price is contingent on whether the seller succeeds in obtaining a higher price within a specified period. We show that if the probability of obtaining the high price is not too high, sellers profit from using contingent pricing while economic efficiency increases. The optimal contingent pricing structure depends on the buyer's risk attitude-a deep discount is most profitable if buyers are risk prone. A consolation reward is most profitable if buyers are risk averse. To motivate buyers to participate in a contingent pricing arrangement, the seller must provide sufficient incentives. Consequently, buyers also benefit from contingent pricing. In addition, because the buyers with the highest willingness-to-pay get the product, contingent pricing increases the efficiency of resource allocation.

Contingent Pricing to Reduce Price Risks

Affiliate programs offer affiliates referral fees in return for directing potential customers into a merchant's Web site. Affiliates are commonly paid based on the number of leads converted by the merchant into customers (pay-per-conversion) or based on the number of leads referred to the merchant (pay-per-lead). Given the prevalence of both, interesting questions for research are as follows: Why do both formats prevail? Under what conditions is one format preferred over the other? The authors find that pay-per-lead is more profitable when a merchant negotiates a separate deal with an affiliate. In this case, pay-per-conversion is not optimal for the affiliation alliance because it leads to suboptimal pricing by the merchant. In contrast, pay-per-lead is less profitable than pay-per-conversion for a merchant that works with a large number of affiliates all under the same terms because it is susceptible to bogus referrals that cannot be converted into customers.

Eyal Biyalogorsky

Papers

Customer Referral Management: Optimal Reward Programs

Clicks and Mortar: The Effect of On-line Activities on Off-line Sales

Stuck in the Past: Why Managers Persist with New Product Failures:

Contingent Pricing to Reduce Price Risks

Setting Referral Fees in Affiliate Marketing