The authors examine the empirical evidence on currency crises and propose a specific early-warning system. This system involves monitoring the evolution of several indicators that tend to exhibit unusual behavior in the periods preceding a crisis. An indicator exceeding a certain threshold value should be interpreted as a warning"signal"that a currency crisis may take place within the following 24 months. The threshold values are calculated to strike a balance between the risk of having many false signals and the risk of missing many crises. Within this approach, the variables with the best track record include exports, deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, the ratio of broad money to gross international reserves, output, and equity prices. The evidence does not support some of the other indicators that were considered, including imports, bank deposits,the difference between foreign and domestic real deposit interest rates, and the ratio of lending to deposit interest rates.

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Leading Indicators of Currency Crises

Exchange market mayhem

The antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks

This paper evaluates the causes and consequences of episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets. Using data from 1959 through 1993 for twenty OECD countries, we consider the antecedents and aftermath of devaluations and revaluations, flotations, fixings and speculative attacks (which may not be successful). We find that realignments of fixed exchange rates are alike: devaluations are preceded by political instability, budget and current account deficits, and fast growth of money and prices. Revaluations are mirror images of devaluations. Speculative attacks resemble devaluations, but money growth and inflation are more endemic and there is no last-minute attempt to tighten monetary policy. In contrast, few consistent correlations link regime transitions like flotations or fixings to macroeconomic or political variables. Transitions between exchange rate regimes are largely idiosyncratic, and are neither consistently provoked ex ante by systematic imbalances, nor typically justified ex post by subsequent changes in policy. We conclude that there are no clear early warning signals of many speculative attacks, and no easy solutions for policy-makers.

— Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose and Charles Wyplosz

/pdf/exchange-market-mayhem-the-antecedents-and-aftermath-of-53i091vwgu.pdf

Exchange market mayhem: the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks

This paper examines the empirical evidence on currency crises and proposes a specific early warning system. This system involves monitoring the evolution of several indicators that tend to exhibit an unusual behavior in the periods preceding a crisis. When an indicator exceeds a certain threshold value, this is interpreted as a warning "signal" that a currency crisis may take place within the following 24 months. The variables that have the best track record within this approach include exports, deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, the ratio of broad money to gross international reserves, output, and equity prices.

/pdf/leading-indicators-of-currency-crises-uri2v2azuu.pdf

The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems to support the practical importance of these mechanisms.

Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features

1. The world of dictatorial institutions 2. Three illustrative cases 3. The use of institutions to co-opt 4. Institutions and policies under dictatorship 5. Institutions and outcomes under dictatorship 6. Institutions and the survival of dictators.

/pdf/political-institutions-under-dictatorship-4xbc4ndsl5.pdf

Political Institutions under Dictatorship

This paper considers a number of policy measures that may be used to preserve a fixed exchange rate. These are analyzed in a model where a switch of exchange-rate regime is triggered by an optimizing policymaker in response to extreme economic conditions. It is shown how a number of policy measures can be used to alter the balance between the costs and benefits of switching between regimes. These policy measures have both a direct effect on the policymaker's choice of regime switching point and an indirect effect through private-sector expectations of a regime switch. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2235508.pdf

Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis

Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies.

A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker

Existing models of exchange rate crises do not provide a good explanation for the breakdown of the ERM in 1992 3. This paper presents an alternative model which captures some of the important features of that period. The switch from a fixed to a floating rate is triggered by an optimizing government that wants to loosen monetary policy and boost aggregate demand. Agents in the foreign exchange market know the government's objective function and therefore build expectations of a regime switch into interest differentials. It is shown that this interaction between private sector expectations and government preferences can imply a breakdown of the fixed rate sooner than the government would like.

A Model of the ERM Crisis

This paper attempts to explore the underlying causes of twin crises experienced by Turkey in November 2000 and February 2001. We study an extensive set of leading indicators of crises that are drawn from the existing literature. Our results identify three sets of vulnerabilities in the Turkish economy in triggering the financial crisis and bringing about the collapse of the Turkish lira. These are: first, the weak external position caused by excessive debt burden combined with the loss of competitiveness; second, the weak fiscal position resulting from the record levels of interest payments on domestic borrowing; and most importantly, third, weaknesses in the financial and banking sector. Given these observations, we argue that the success of financial sector reform is instrumental not only for putting the economy on a sustainable recovery path but also for reducing the likelihood of similar crises in the future. The general lesson to be drawn from this experience is that a sound financial system is a pre-condition for the successful operation of a fixed exchange rate regime.

F. Gulcin Ozkan

Papers

Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis

Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies.

A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker

A Model of the ERM Crisis

Currency and Financial Crises in Turkey 2000 –2001: Bad Fundamentals or Bad Luck?