Introduction to coding theory (2nd edition), by J.H. van Lint. Pp.183 DM86. 1992. ISBN 0-387-54894-7 (Springer)

Blockchain 3.0 applications survey

We present an overview of the field of anonymous communications, from its establishment in 1981 from David Chaum to today. Key systems are presented categorized according to their underlying principles: semi-trusted relays, mix systems, remailers, onion routing, and systems to provide robust mixing. We include extended discussions of the threat models and usage models that different schemes provide, and the trade-offs between the security properties offered and the communication characteristics different systems support.

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A Survey of Anonymous Communication Channels

This book introduces the fundamental concepts of homomorphic encryption. From these foundations, applications are developed in the fields of private information retrieval, private searching on streaming data, privacy-preserving data mining, electronic voting and cloud computing. The content is presented in an instructional and practical style, with concrete examples to enhance the reader's understanding. This volume achieves a balance between the theoretical and the practical components of modern information security. Readers will learn key principles of homomorphic encryption as well as their application in solving real world problems.

Homomorphic Encryption and Applications

On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Maryland, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system--the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election. This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election--including the improved design and implementation of the voting system, streamlined procedures, agreements with the city, and assessments of the experiences of voters and poll workers.

The election, with 1728 voters from six wards, involved paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes, instant-runoff voting with write-ins, early and absentee (mail-in) voting, dual-language ballots, provisional ballots, privacy sleeves, any-which-way scanning with parallel conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end verifiability based on optional web-based voter verification of votes cast, a full hand recount, thresholded authorities, three independent outside auditors, fully-disclosed software, and exit surveys for voters and pollworkers.

Despite some glitches, the use of Scantegrity II was a success, demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting systems can be effectively used and accepted by the general public.

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Scantegrity II municipal election at Takoma Park: the first E2E binding governmental election with ballot privacy

We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software, or a corrupt election authority--two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.

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Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system

We analyze electronic voting schemes and show that in many cases it is quite easy to implement a kleptographic channel, which is a profound danger for electronic voting systems. We show serious problems with Neff's scheme. We present also attacks on Chaum's visual voting scheme and some related schemes, which work at least when implementation is not careful enough.

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Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes

We present Scratch, Click & Vote remote voting scheme. The scheme is end-to-end verifiable and allows for voting over the Internet. It guarantees security against malicious hardware and software used by a voter; a voter’s computer does not get any knowledge about the voter’s choice. Moreover, it can blindly change the voter’s ballot with a small probability only.

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Scratch, Click & Vote: E2E voting over the Internet.

We present Scratch, Click & Vote remote voting scheme. The scheme is end-to-end verifiable and allows for voting over the Internet. It guarantees security against malicious hardware and software used by a voter; a voter's computer does not get any knowledge about the voter's choice. Moreover, it can blindly change the voter's ballot with a small probability only.

Scratch, click & vote: e2e voting over the internet

We present a voter verifiable Internet voting scheme which provides anonymity and eliminates the danger of vote selling even if the computer used by the voter cannot be fully trusted. The ballots cast remain anonymous - even the machine does not know the choice of the voter. It makes no sense to buy votes - the voter can cheat the buyer even if his machine cooperates with the buyer. Nevertheless, the voter can verity that his vote has been counted.

Filip Zagórski

Papers

Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system

Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes

Scratch, Click & Vote: E2E voting over the Internet.

Scratch, click & vote: e2e voting over the internet

Verifiable internet voting solving secure platform problem