Showing papers by "Filippo Fontanelli published in 2008"
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The Italian Constitutional Court's decisions No. 348 and 349, issued on 24 October 2007, were in contrast with the international obligations stated in Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the "ECvHR"), Article 1 as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: For the first time, national provisions governing the quantification of respective compensation amounts due for public purposes expropriation and for unlawful expropriation were declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court's decisions No. 348 and 349, issued on 24 October 2007, because they were in contrast with the international obligations stated in Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the "ECvHR"), Article 1. After these decisions were drawn, the relationship between European Courts on the protection of fundamental rights has undergone a significant evolution. Not only has the Italian Constitutional Court clarified, through Article 117 paragraph 1 of the Italian Constitution, the European Convention's actual efficacy in the domestic legal system, but it has interpreted international obligations as an interposed standard of review, on the basis of which the constitutionality of domestic law must be assessed. The aim of this article is to provide a complete overview of said two decisions, and of their innovatory implications.
11 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the techniques that both the Court of Justice and its national counterparts use to develop a hidden judicial dialogue, through which a non-legally bound harmonization is pursued, and mostly achieved.
Abstract: Legal scholars have regularly focused on the conflict episodes between the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts. We try instead to investigate the techniques that both the Court of Justice and its national counterparts use to develop a hidden judicial dialogue, through which a non-legally bound harmonization is pursued, and mostly achieved. Moreover, we understand these strategies in the light of the notion of comity, and we compare the opposite attitudes kept by the Court of Justice towards national courts and international tribunals to describe its shifting attitude, which is due to its interest in preserving a pre-eminent position in the interpretive competition over EC law.
11 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) accepted to raise a preliminary question to the European Court of justice (ECJ) for the first time in its history on April 15, 2008.
Abstract: On April 15, 2008, for the first time in its history, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) accepted to raise a preliminary question to the European Court of justice (ECJ). This decision (order no. 103/2008) represents a turning point in the ICC's case law. The aim of this paper is to provide a well-considered analysis of this order by exploring two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case-law as regards the role of EC Law and of the ECJ, and ii) the potential reading of the judicial relationship between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of "interpretive competition."
6 citations
TL;DR: The Italian Constitutional Court's decisions No. 348 and 349, issued on 24 October 2007, because they were in contrast with the international obligations stated in Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the “ECvHR”), Article 1.
Abstract: For the first time, national provisions governing the quantification of respective compensation amounts due for public purposes expropriation and for unlawful expropriation were declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court's decisions No. 348 and 349, issued on 24 October 2007, because they were in contrast with the international obligations stated in Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the “ECvHR”), Article 1.
5 citations
01 Jan 2008
4 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the techniques that both the Court of Justice and its national counterparts use to develop a hidden judicial dialogue, through which a non-legally bound harmonization is pursued, and mostly achieved.
Abstract: Legal scholars have regularly focused on the conflict episodes between the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts. We try instead to investigate the techniques that both the Court of Justice and its national counterparts use to develop a hidden judicial dialogue, through which a non-legally bound harmonization is pursued, and mostly achieved. Moreover, we understand these strategies in the light of the notion of comity, and we compare the opposite attitudes kept by the Court of Justice towards national courts and international tribunals to describe its shifting attitude, which is due to its interest in preserving a pre-eminent position in the interpretive competition over EC law.
1 citations