A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

This paper investigates how Amartya Sen's capability approach can be applied to conceptualize and assess gender inequality in Western societies. I first argue against the endorsement of a definitive list of capabilities and instead defend a procedural approach to the selection of capabilities by proposing five criteria. This procedural account is then used to generate a list of capabilities for conceptualizing gender inequality in Western societies. A survey of empirical studies shows that women are worse off than men on some dimensions, better off on a few others, and similarly placed on yet others, while for some dimensions the evaluation is unclear. I then outline why, for group inequalities, inequalities in achieved functionings can be taken to reflect inequalities in capabilities, and how an overall evaluation could be arrived at by weighting the different capabilities.

Sen's capability approach and gender inequality: selecting relevant capabilities

Sharing: Table 1

Research on welfare states and inequality has tended to be bifurcated, focusing either on class or on gender This paper combines gender and class in an analysis of patterns of inequalities in different types of welfare states in 18 countries Whereas a major dimension of class inequality can be described in terms of material standards of living, in the advanced Western countries it is fruitful to conceptualize gender inequality in terms of agency In analyses of gender as well as of class inequalities, welfare states have been seen as significant intervening variables However, major problems have emerged in attempts to devise typologies of welfare states that are of heuristic value in analyses of gender inequality as well as of class inequality This paper describes the development of gendered agency inequality during the period after the Second World War in 18 OECD countries in the arenas of democratic politics, tertiary education, and labor force participation Class inequality is measured in terms of disposable house income based on LIS data The paper develops a new typology of welfare states based on institutional structures of relevance for gender inequality as well as class inequality The combination of gender and class throws new light on the driving forces behind inequalities and on the role of welfare states in this context Gender inequality is conceptualized in terms of agency The paper presents a new typology of welfare states based on institutional structures of relevance for gender inequality as well as class inequality The combination of gender and class throws new light on the driving forces behind inequalities and on the role of welfare states in this context

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Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States

A new empirical study of the relation between money, nominal income, prices, and real output in postwar quarterly U.S. data rejects virtually all of the conclusions reached by Families provide individuals with risk sharing opportunities which may not otherwise be available. Within the family there is a degree of trust and a level of information which alleviates three key problems in the provision of insurance by markets open to the general public, namely, moral hazard, adverse selection, and deception. The informational advantages of pooling risk within families must be set against the inability of families to provide complete insurance because of the small size of the risk pooling group. This paper demonstrates how families can provide insurance against uncertain dates of death. Death risk sharing family arrangements effectively constitute an incomplete annuities market. Our analysis indicates that these arrangements even in small families can substitute by more than70% for complete annuities. Given the adverse selection problem and transactions costs in public annuity markets, risk pooling in families may well be preferred to purchasing market annuities. In the absence of organized public markets in annuities, these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful economic incentives for marriage and family formation. The paper suggests that inter-family transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings; rather, they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of thi(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market

This paper develops a model of two person family. Each family member attempts to maximize his or her own utility. Yet they are interdependent in two respects. Family members are interdependent, first of all, because they care about each other. Second, there are local public goods or household expenditures within the family, such as housing. The presence of household expenditures means that one family member's consumption choices affect the other family member's level of well-being. The two family members' interdependent utility maximization problems are first solved using a non-cooperative, or Cournot-Nash, game theoretic framework then the model is extended to take the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as a threat point in a bargaining game. The model's predictions differ substantially from the "unitary" framework usually used in economic analysis, in which households maximize a single household utility function. When the spouses are relatively equal in income, or when one spouse is much wealthier than the other and the wealthier spouse has all the bargaining power in the family, the equilibrium depends, as in the unitary model, on household income but not on the division of income between spouses. In the intermediate case between equality and substantial inequality or in the case where one spouse is much wealthier than the other but the wealthier spouse does not have all the bargaining power, the distribution of income does shape expenditure patterns, contrary to the predictions of the unitary model. The contribution of the paper is to provide a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands in the Cournot-Nash setting, a full analysis of the determinants of intra-household resource allocation, including the effect of varying household bargaining power, and an explication of the model’s implications for policy analysis.

A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making

This paper models a two-person family. Each family member is utility maximising, yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family. The two family members’ interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non-cooperative, or Cournot–Nash, game theoretic framework. The Cournot–Nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game. The paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands, a full analysis of the determinants of intra-household resource allocation, including the effect of varying household bargaining power, and consideration of policy implications.

This paper describes a feminist research agenda within economics, how some of the research priorities have been accommodated within neoclassical economics, and how others fundamentally challenge the neoclassical economic paradigm. There are three major challenges to neoclassical economics raised by feminists. First, women are invisible in much economic analysis and this situation needs to be remedied. Second, tests may be affected by educational, social, and economic institutions. We need a feminist model of endogenous preferences and to incorporate the endogeneity of preferences into welfare economic analysis and policy recommendations. Finally, institutional structures matter and deserve careful analysis. (c) 1993 Academic Press, Inc. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

The feminist challenge to neoclassical economics

The purpose of this paper is to explore a number of measures of inequality within households. We focus primarily on two types of inequality, first, inequality in money incomes, second, inequality in control over household resources. Control is measured in two ways: first, as control over the management of household finances and, second, as influence over household decision-making. We discuss arguments for and against each of the measures of inequality, and compare the measures against one another in terms of the level of inequality each measure finds. The paper does not attempt to explain inequality; instead, its aim is to discuss the question "What is it that we wish to explain?"

Measuring Inequality within the Household

The purpose of this paper is to explore a number of measures of inequality within households. We focus primarily on two types of inequality, first, inequality in money incomes, second, inequality in control over household resources. Control is measured in two ways: first, as control over the management of household finances and, second, as influence over household decision-making. We discuss arguments for and against each of the measures of inequality, and compare the measures against one another in terms of the level of inequality each measure finds. The paper does not attempt to explain inequality; instead, its aim is to discuss the question “What is it that we wish to explain?”

Perhaps less important, but also revealing, within the 21–34 age group, 90 percent of the males and 80 percent of the females felt that the other partner had more closet space. (“Poll suggests young marriages in big trouble.” The Ottawa Citizen, August 19, 1990.)

Frances Woolley

Papers

A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making

A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making

The feminist challenge to neoclassical economics

Measuring Inequality within the Household

Measuring inequality within the household