combinatorial auctions What to say and what to do when mostly your friends love reading? Are you the one that don't have such hobby? So, it's important for you to start having that hobby. You know, reading is not the force. We're sure that reading will lead you to join in better concept of life. Reading will be a positive activity to do every time. And do you know our friends become fans of combinatorial auctions as the best book to read? Yeah, it's neither an obligation nor order. It is the referred book that will not make you feel disappointed.

Combinatorial Auctions

Operational Research in education

Income growth alone cannot solve the problem of malnutrition and may in fact create problems linked to overweight and obesity. The challenge from the nutrition perspective is how to sustainably improve the quality of diets, as well as other health-nutrition related behaviours, across different populations and age groups? In nutrition debates in developing countries there is growing interest in the capacity of the private sector to contribute to improved nutrition outcomes. Discussions have incorporated thinking around value chain frameworks, which emerged in the late 1990s to help development actors design interventions that responded to the needs of the private sector and contributed to development outcomes.Value chain approaches can provide useful frameworks to examine the food system and the potential to achieve improved nutritional outcomes by leveraging market-based systems. However, understanding the links between value chains, the overall business environment in which they operate, and nutrition among targeted populations is complex, involving actors and activities working across agriculture, health and nutrition, and very little evidence exists on the potential or the trade-offs involved.In this paper we explore how a value chain framework can inform the design of interventions for achieving improved nutrition. Conceptually, there are three main channels for value chains to improve nutrition: (1) through increased consumption of nutritious foods (a demand side pathway); or (2) through increased incomes from value chain transactions (a supply side pathway) or (3) through increased nutrition value-addition in the chain transactions. These three pathways are interlinked and involve complex dynamics that are not straightforward to understand.We also highlight how these pathways are context specific, and introduce typologies based on supply and demand profile of the specific value chain. Where adequate supply and demand for a specific food exists, interventions would focus on optimising the efficiency and flow of nutrition added-value along the chain. Where demand is constrained or overconsumption is a problem, interventions would work primarily to change consumption patterns, either directly (for example, food transfers) or indirectly (such as, social marketing) shaping market demand. Where supply is constrained, interventions would focus on enhancing supply-side capacity by improving production practices, organising production and post-harvest activities to increase efficiency, and facilitating the expansion of market opportunities. We conclude with a summary of key research areas in this emerging field.

/pdf/value-chains-and-nutrition-a-framework-to-support-the-19n5sd1056.pdf

Value Chains and Nutrition: A Framework to Support the Identification, Design, and Evaluation of Interventions

In this paper I study two methods often used in public procurement to deal with the risk that the winning bidder may default on his bid: augmenting the standard first price auction with an ex-post verification of the responsiveness of the bids and using an average bid auction. I show that when penalties for defaulting are asymmetric across bidders and when their valuations are characterized by a predominant common component, the average bid auction is preferred over the standard first price by an auctioneer when the costs due to the winner's bankruptcy are high enough. Depending on the cost of the ex-post verification, the average bid auction can be dominated by the first price with monitoring. I use a new dataset of Italian public procurement auctions, run alternately using a form of the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to structurally estimate the bids' verification cost, the firms' mark up and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1523216_code606534.pdf?abstractid=1523216&mirid=1

Francisco Espejo

Papers

A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries