https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/pdf/S1364-6613(00)01452-2.pdf

Inhibition of return.

Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) is an online crowdsourcing service where anonymous online workers complete web-based tasks for small sums of money. The service has attracted attention from experimental psychologists interested in gathering human subject data more efficiently. However, relative to traditional laboratory studies, many aspects of the testing environment are not under the experimenter's control. In this paper, we attempt to empirically evaluate the fidelity of the AMT system for use in cognitive behavioral experiments. These types of experiment differ from simple surveys in that they require multiple trials, sustained attention from participants, comprehension of complex instructions, and millisecond accuracy for response recording and stimulus presentation. We replicate a diverse body of tasks from experimental psychology including the Stroop, Switching, Flanker, Simon, Posner Cuing, attentional blink, subliminal priming, and category learning tasks using participants recruited using AMT. While most of replications were qualitatively successful and validated the approach of collecting data anonymously online using a web-browser, others revealed disparity between laboratory results and online results. A number of important lessons were encountered in the process of conducting these replications that should be of value to other researchers.

/pdf/evaluating-amazon-s-mechanical-turk-as-a-tool-for-1acmhyqzqj.pdf

Evaluating Amazon's Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Behavioral Research

This paper seeks to bring together two previously separate research traditions: research on spatial orienting within the visual cueing paradigm and research into social cognition, addressing our tendency to attend in the direction that another person looks. Cueing methodologies from mainstream attention research were adapted to test the automaticity of orienting in the direction of seen gaze. Three studies manipulated the direction of gaze in a computerized face, which appeared centrally in a frontal view during a peripheral letter-discrimination task. Experiments 1 and 2 found faster discrimination of peripheral target letters on the side the computerized face gazed towards, even though the seen gaze did not predict target side, and despite participants being asked to ignore the face. This suggests reflexive covert and/or overt orienting in the direction of seen gaze, arising even when the observer has no motivation to orient in this way. Experiment 3 found faster letter discrimination on the side the computerized face gazed towards even when participants knew that target letters were four times as likely on the opposite side. This suggests that orienting can arise in the direction of seen gaze even when counter to intentions. The experiments illustrate that methods from mainstream attention research can be usefully applied to social cognition, and that studies of spatial attention may profit from considering its social function.

/pdf/gaze-perception-triggers-reflexive-visuospatial-orienting-3rf2ow1396.pdf

Gaze Perception Triggers Reflexive Visuospatial Orienting

A clutch of '-isms' characterises the approach to consciousness which David Chalmers defends: dualism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, anti-reductionism, and -probably -panpsychism. (The author would no doubt want 'naturalism' included in the list as well, but as we shall see, Chalmers' predilection to describe his theory as 'scientific' stretches credibility.) While the book does not, as far as I can see, move consciousness research significantly forward, Chalmers succeeds admirably in clarifying the philosophical terrain around and within each of these '-isms' and in questioning the usual assumptions which suggest some of them are mutually exclusive. Because nearly all of what follows is highly critical, I want to be explicit about one thing: I do not think this is a bad book. Throughout, most discussions keep to a very high standard; it's just that they include fatal flaws.

The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory

The task-switching paradigm is being increasingly used as a tool for studying cognitive control and task coordination. Different procedural variations have been developed. They have in common that a comparison is made between transitions in which the previous task is repeated and transitions that involve a change toward another task. In general, a performance switch cost is observed such that switching to a new task results in a slower and more error-prone execution of the task. The present article reviews the theoretical explanations of the switch cost and the findings collected in support of those explanations. Resolution and protection from interference by previous events explain part of the switching cost, but processes related to task setting and task preparation also play a prominent role, as testified by faster execution and lower switch costs when the preparation time is longer. The authors discuss the evidence in favor of each of these sets of accounts and raise a number of questions that situate task switching in a broader context of cognitive control processes. The role of several aspects of the task set, including task variations, task-set overlap, and task-set structure, is addressed, as is the role of knowledge about probability of task changes and about the structure of task sequences.

Task switching: interplay of reconfiguration and interference control.

When a stimulus appears in a previously cued location several hundred milliseconds after the cue, the time required to detect that stimulus is greater than when it appears in an uncued location. This increase in detection time is known as inhibition of return (IOR). It has been suggested that IOR reflects the action of a general attentional mechanism that prevents attention from returning to previously explored loci. At the same time, the robustness of IOR has been recently disputed, given several failures to obtain the effect in tasks requiring discrimination rather than detection. In a series of eight experiments, we evaluated the differences between detection and discrimination tasks with regard to IOR. We found that IOR was consistently obtained with both tasks, although the temporal parameters required to observe IOR were different in detection and discrimination tasks. In our detection task, the effect appeared after a 400-msec delay between cue and target, and was still present after 1,300 msec. In our discrimination task, the effect appeared later and disappeared sooner. The implications of these data for theoretical accounts of IOR are discussed.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.3758%2FBF03214211.pdf

Does IOR occur in discrimination tasks? Yes, it does, but later

Three experiments are presented that compare the cost found when switching from one task to another in two different conditions. In one of them, the tasks switch in predictable sequences. In the other condition, the tasks alternate at random. A smaller time cost is found in the random-switch condition when enough preparation time is allowed. Such an effect is due to the random-switch cost continuing to decrease with preparation time after the predictable-switch cost has reached an asymptote. Although the relationship between number of repetitions of one task and time cost is different in the random- and the predictable-switch conditions, only the latter shows the presence of an “exogenous” component of cost. The implications of this finding are discussed in relationship with the usual distinction between an endogenous component of switch cost that is affected by preparation time and another exogenous, residual component (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995). It is proposed that a different kind of task-set prepa...

Francisco J. Tornay

Papers

Does IOR occur in discrimination tasks? Yes, it does, but later

A more complete task-set reconfiguration in random than in predictable task switch

Mental representations of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs

Exploring task-set reconfiguration with random task sequences.

Irrelevant stimuli produce a path deviation in a driving-simulation task