Often Bertrand Russell defends his view that names differ from descriptions in that names have meaning but descriptions do not by using a “proof.” Recently in this journal it has been debated whether Russell's “proof” fails or not. The familiar objection to Russell's argument is that it is circular or it involves a sense/reference equivocation. Avrum Stroll suggests a novel criticism by making use of a “mirror argument“ which attempts to show that Russell's argument can be used to conclude that \"Scott\" has no meaning, and that thus the argument proves too much or nothing. Robert Fahrnkopf defends Russell's argument, but, I believe, he does not go far enough in his defense. So it will be useful to carry this debate a few steps further.

Russell's “Proof”, Again

Широко известный «семантический треугольник» Г. Фреге (знак – смысл – референт) предполагал онтологические импликации платонизма, поскольку смысл знака здесь понимался в качестве идеальной, объективной сущности по аналогии с эйдосом Платона. Одним из наиболее принципиальных противников платонизма в традиции аналитической философии стал поздний Л. Витгенштейн, предложивший концепцию «значение как употребление», в которой полностью отрицалось представление о значении (смысле) как о некоторой устойчивой, неизменной, идеальной сущности. Однако в последние десятилетия в аналитической философии наблюдается возрождение интереса к метафизической проблематике. Причем представители неофрегеанства винят в провале платонистской онтологической программы в аналитической философии ХХ века самого Г. Фреге, утверждая, что он высказал верные интуиции, но не привел весомых аргументов в защиту своей позиции, что позволило его противникам занять доминирующее положение в современной философии языка. В статье рассматриваются аргументы концепции лингвистического платонизма современного американского философа Д. Катца против взглядов позднего Л. Витгенштейна на природу значения языкового выражения. Показано, что демонстрация этих новых аргументов способна сделать семантику фрегеанского типа более жизнеустойчивой по отношению к критике со стороны скептицизма позднего Л. Витгенштейна. Автор статьи приглашает включиться в дискуссию по данной теме современных отечественных философов-аналитиков, оценить весомость аргументации каждой из противоборствующих сторон и сделать собственные выводы на основании представленного материала.
 Frege’s well-known “semantic triangle” (sign – sense – reference) assumed ontological implications of Platonism, since the sense of the sign was understood here as an ideal, objective entity, by analogy with Plato’s eidos. One of the most fundamental opponents of Platonism in the tradition of analytic philosophy was the late Ludwig Wittgenstein, who proposed the concept of “meaning as use” in which the idea of sense (meaning) as some kind of stable, immutable, ideal essence was completely denied. However, in recent decades, analytic philosophy has shown a revival of attention to metaphysical problems. Moreover, the representatives of neo-Fregeanism blame Frege himself for the failure of the Platonist ontological program in the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century arguing that he expressed correct intuitions, but did not give weighty arguments in defense of his position. This allowed his opponents to take a dominant position in the modern philosophy of language. The article discusses the arguments of Jerrold Katz’s concept of linguistic Platonism against the views of the late Wittgenstein on the nature of the meaning of a linguistic expression. The author shows that the demonstration of these new arguments can make Frege’s semantics more viable in relation to criticism from the late Wittgenstein. The author invites modern Russian analytic philosophers to join the discussion on this topic, evaluate the weight of the arguments of each side, and draw their own conclusions based on the considerations presented in this article.

Gottlob frege’s semantics in modern analytic philosophy

The concept of information in the context of the ontology of scientific realism

In On Denoting Russell writes that Frege's distinction between sense and reference is an 'inextricable tangle'.' Russell had no misgivings in not postulating sense so long as there can be an adequate theory of meaning that does not suppose it, and Russell believed his theory of meaning was such a theory. Frege felt that any adequate account of meaning must include sense, and he provided some arguments why we need to postulate sense. His basic argument comes from his puzzle over identity. In this paper we argue that Russell's theory of meaning can deal with Frege's main reason for postulating sense. By Russell's theory of meaning we have in mind his view that the only intensional entity one need suppose is propositions. But though Russell's theory of meaning can handle the linguistic phenomena which prompted Frege to postulate sense, Russell's epistemology blocks his using his theory of meaning so as to avoid Frege's sense. Frege's basic reason for the postulation of sense is the puzzle over identity.2 Suppose that 'a' and 'b' are names for the same object. A statement of the form ra = a' is uninformative, while a statement of the form ra = b' can be informative. So the difference is the mode with which the denoted object is presented to the user of the name. Frege postulated sense to explain this difference. Thus sense is the mode of presentation associated with an expression which accounts for the informative value of statements. It is also, for Frege, the way of determining the reference of an expression and what an expression denotes in oblique contexts. For Frege the way to determine whether 'a' differs in sense from 'b' is to ask whether a statement of the form Fa = b' can be informative. It seems that the primitive way to determine whether such a statement is informative is to ask whether someone can believe that a is a and not believe that a is b. In other words, failure of substitution of coextensive names

G. W. Fitch

Papers

Can Russell avoid Frege's sense?