Showing papers by "Gang He published in 2010"
TL;DR: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the leading international carbon market and a driving force for sustainable development globally as discussed by the authors. But the controversy over offsets from Chinese wind power has exposed cracks at the core of how carbon credits are verified in developing economies.
Abstract: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the leading international carbon market and a driving force for sustainable development globally. But the eruption of controversy over offsets from Chinese wind power has exposed cracks at the core of how carbon credits are verified in developing economies. It has become almost impossible to determine whether offsets from Chinese wind are "additional" and that they in fact represent "real" reductions beyond business as usual. Unless this problem can be resolved, it threatens to spread beyond wind in China and could threaten the ability of carbon markets to deliver the mitigation demanded by international climate policy.In 2009 the CDM Executive Board (EB) shocked the carbon market by forcing an unprecedented review of whether multiple Chinese wind projects satisfied UNFCCC additionality requirements. CDM investors reeled as the safest CDM bet became the riskiest; the Chinese government publicly criticized the UN's oversight of carbon markets; and the CDM EB prepared itself for an unprecedented fight over how carbon offsets could be verified in the world's largest CDM market.When the EB observed decreases over time in power tariffs granted by China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to wind projects, it became concerned that China might be manipulating power tariffs in order to guarantee additionality and subsidize its domestic wind development with international finance. If the Chinese government were controlling additionality, then the CDM's ability to validate carbon offsets would be dealt a near‐lethal blow because the problems posed by Chinese wind extend to nearly all power sector projects in almost every developing country. If offsets cannot be credibly verified, then the integrity of emissions caps set by the Kyoto Protocol is directly threatened.The Chinese wind controversy therefore has direct implications for the design and negotiation of any successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Despite largely failed negotiations in Copenhagen, the design of reliable, efficient carbon markets remains the world's most serious prospect for international cooperation. The developed world has committed USD 30 billion in climate aid by 2012, but the majority of these funds will likely have to be private capital delivered through markets. In order for carbon markets to avoid controversy and function effectively, the lessons from the Chinese wind controversy must be used to implement key reforms.This report examines the application of additionality in the Chinese wind power market and draws implications for the design of effective global carbon offset policy. It demonstrates the causes of the wind power controversy, highlights underlying structural flaws in how additionality is applied in China, and charts a reform path that can strengthen the credibility of global carbon markets.
44 citations
TL;DR: Morse and He as discussed by the authors proposed a model that explains Chinese coal import patterns and that can allow the coal market to understand, and to some degree predict, China's coal import behavior.
Abstract: In 2009 the global coal market witnessed one of the most dramatic realignments it has ever seen – China, long a net exporter of coal, suddenly imported a record-smashing 126 Mt tons (103 Mt net). This inversion of China’s role in global coal markets meant that Chinese imports accounted for nearly 15% of all globally traded coal, and China became the focal point of global demand as traditional import markets like Europe and Japan stagnated in the wake of the financial crisis. The middle kingdom's appetite for imported coal seems insatiable, and the “China Factor” appears to have ushered in a new paradigm for the global coal market.But China doesn’t ”need” the coal. The world's largest coal producer cranked out 2.96 Bt of production in 2009, backed up by 114.5 Bt of reserves. While the world’s other fastest growing importer, India, is plagued by a growing gap between coal supply and power demand that it is unable to fill domestically, this is not the case in China. The spike in Chinese demand for imported coal is therefore a more complex (and less easily predictable) phenomenon that requires careful examination if the world is to understand what impact China might have on global energy markets in the coming decade.In this paper Richard Morse and Gang He devise a model that explains Chinese coal import patterns and that can allow the coal market to understand, and to some degree predict, China’s coal import behavior. They argue that the unique structure of the Chinese coal market creates a series of key arbitrage relationships between Chinese domestic coal markets and international coal markets that determine Chinese import patterns.The implications of this argument are significant for the development of the global coal trade in the coming decade. The arbitrage relationships that Morse and He describe directly link the domestic price of coal in China to the global price of coal. Developments in China‘s domestic coal market will be a dominant factor determining global coal prices and trade flows (and by implication power prices in many regions). This makes understanding the domestic Chinese coal market, which operates according to a unique economic and political logic, crucial for any participant in the global markets.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the coal market is now in the midst of a radical restructuring that has the potential to change how coal is produced, traded and consumed both in China and the rest of the world.
Abstract: China's coal market is now in the midst of a radical restructuring that has the potential to change how coal is produced, traded and consumed both in China and the rest of the world. The restructuring aims to integrate the coal and power sectors at giant "coal-power bases" that combined would churn out more coal annually than all the coal produced in the entire United States. Coal-power integration is now a focal point of the Chinese government's energy policy, driven by the dramatic "coal-power conflict." Coal prices are market-based, but power prices are tightly controlled by the government. This has caused massive losses for Chinese power generators in 2008 and 2010 and triggered government intervention in the coal market with attempts to cap the price of coal. The pervasive conflict between coal and power is now driving the Chinese government to remake these markets.Coal-power base policy aims to establish upwards of 14 major coal-power bases, each producing over 100 mt of coal with consuming industries on-site. The plan envisions that roughly half of China's coal production would be produced at a handful major coal-power base sites that are controlled by key state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the central government. PESD's new research analyzes China's coal-power base reforms and how they will impact Chinese and global coal markets. Several key findings are:First, the implementation of coal-power bases would enhance central government's control over the coal sector and over coal prices. The government could control coal pricing in a large share of the market and mitigate power sector losses by mandating lower coal transaction prices within integrated SOEs. Using this kind of internal transfer pricing at below market prices for up to half of China's coal would represent a meaningful shift in how coal is priced in China. If a large share of China's coal were transacted in this manner, it might create an unofficial two-tiered pricing structure in the coal market.Second, coal-power base policy would bring about modernization and mechanization of a larger share of China's coal production, in theory bringing larger economies of scale to the sector. While up-front capital investment per ton produced will certainly increase, the marginal cost of coal production should decrease, all other things equal. Third, the massive rebalancing of China's coal market implied by coal-power bases is poised to have important impacts on the globally traded coal market. Since 2009, China's import behavior has become a dominant factor determining the price of globally traded coal. In simple terms, when Chinese domestic prices are higher than global prices, the country imports. The development of coal-power bases could radically alter coal price formation in China and directly impact China's appetite for imports, and therefore has the potential to alter coal price formation globally.
15 citations
01 Aug 2010
TL;DR: Morse and He as discussed by the authors proposed a model that explains Chinese coal import patterns and that can allow the coal market to understand, and to some degree predict, China's coal import behavior.
Abstract: In 2009 the global coal market witnessed one of the most dramatic realignments it has ever seen – China, long a net exporter of coal, suddenly imported a record-smashing 126 Mt tons (103 Mt net). This inversion of China’s role in global coal markets meant that Chinese imports accounted for nearly 15% of all globally traded coal, and China became the focal point of global demand as traditional import markets like Europe and Japan stagnated in the wake of the financial crisis. The middle kingdom's appetite for imported coal seems insatiable, and the “China Factor” appears to have ushered in a new paradigm for the global coal market.But China doesn’t ”need” the coal. The world's largest coal producer cranked out 2.96 Bt of production in 2009, backed up by 114.5 Bt of reserves. While the world’s other fastest growing importer, India, is plagued by a growing gap between coal supply and power demand that it is unable to fill domestically, this is not the case in China. The spike in Chinese demand for imported coal is therefore a more complex (and less easily predictable) phenomenon that requires careful examination if the world is to understand what impact China might have on global energy markets in the coming decade.In this paper Richard Morse and Gang He devise a model that explains Chinese coal import patterns and that can allow the coal market to understand, and to some degree predict, China’s coal import behavior. They argue that the unique structure of the Chinese coal market creates a series of key arbitrage relationships between Chinese domestic coal markets and international coal markets that determine Chinese import patterns.The implications of this argument are significant for the development of the global coal trade in the coming decade. The arbitrage relationships that Morse and He describe directly link the domestic price of coal in China to the global price of coal. Developments in China‘s domestic coal market will be a dominant factor determining global coal prices and trade flows (and by implication power prices in many regions). This makes understanding the domestic Chinese coal market, which operates according to a unique economic and political logic, crucial for any participant in the global markets.
2 citations