This paper investigates whether and how individual managers affect corporate behavior and performance. We construct a manager-e rm matched panel data set which enables us to track the top managers across different e rms over time. We e nd that manager e xed effects matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. A signie cant extent of the heterogeneity in investment, e nancial, and organizational practices of e rms can be explained by the presence of manager e xed effects. We identify specie c patterns in managerial decision-making that appear to indicate general differences in “ style” across managers. Moreover, we show that management style is signie cantly related to manager e xed effects in performance and that managers with higher performance e xed effects receive higher compensation and are more likely to be found in better governed e rms. In a e nal step, we tie back these e ndings to observable managerial characteristics. We e nd that executives from earlier birth cohorts appear on average to be more conservative; on the other hand, managers who hold an MBA degree seem to follow on average more aggressive strategies.

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Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies

We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.

/pdf/ceo-overconfidence-and-corporate-investment-3ty0i8z0sv.pdf

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We model a firm’s demand for liquidity to develop a new test of the effect of financial constraints on corporate policies. The effect of financial constraints is captured by the firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash flows (the cash flow sensitivity of cash). We hypothesize that constrained firms should have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, while unconstrained firms’ cash savings should not be systematically related to cash flows. We empirically estimate the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a large sample of manufacturing firms over the 1971 to 2000 period and find robust support for our theory. TWO IMPORTANT AREAS OF RESEARCH in corporate finance are the effects of financial constraints on firm behavior and the manner in which firms perform financial management. These two issues, although often studied separately, are fundamentally linked. As originally proposed by Keynes (1936), a major advantage of a liquid balance sheet is that it allows firms to undertake valuable projects when they arise. However, Keynes also argued that the importance of balance sheet liquidity is influenced by the extent to which firms have access to external capital markets (p. 196). If a firm has unrestricted access to external capital— that is, if a firm is financially unconstrained—there is no need to safeguard against future investment needs and corporate liquidity becomes irrelevant. In contrast, when the firm faces financing frictions, liquidity management may become a key issue for corporate policy. Despite the link between financial constraints and corporate liquidity demand, the literature that examines the effects of financial constraints on firm behavior has traditionally focused on corporate investment demand. 1 In an influential paper, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) propose that when firms face financing constraints, investment spending will vary with the availability of internal funds, rather than just with the availability of positive net present

http://people.stern.nyu.edu/eofek/PhD/papers/ACW_Cashflow.pdf

The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash

We investigate whether differences in individuals’ experiences of macro-economic shocks affect longterm risk attitudes, as is often suggested for the generation that experienced the Great Depression. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1964-2004, we find that birth-cohorts that have experienced high stock market returns throughout their life report lower risk aversion, are more likely to be stock market participants, and, if they participate, invest a higher fraction of liquid wealth in stocks. We also find that cohorts that have experience high inflation are less likely to hold bonds. These results are estimated controlling for age, year effects, and a broad set of household characteristics. Our estimates indicate that stock market returns and inflation early in life affect risk-taking several decades later. However, more recent returns have a stronger effect, which fades away slowly as time progresses. Thus, the experience of risky asset payoffs over the course of an individuals’ life affects subsequent risk-taking. Our results explain, for example, the relatively low rates of stock market participation among young households in the early 1980s (following the disappointing stock market returns in the 1970s depression) and the relatively high participation rates of young investors in the late 1990s (following the boom years in the 1990s).

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Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk Taking?*

We document differences in human-capital deployment between diversified and focused firms. We find that diversified firms have higher labor productivity and that they redeploy labor to industries with better prospects in response to changing opportunities. The opportunities and incentives provided in internal labor markets in turn affect the development of workers' human capital. We find that workers more frequently transition to other industries in which their diversified firms operate and with smaller wage losses compared with workers in the open market, even when they leave their original firms. Overall, internal labor markets provide a bright side to corporate diversification.

/pdf/the-bright-side-of-corporate-diversification-evidence-from-1d2ixtw340.pdf

The Bright Side of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Internal Labor Markets.

Does rating analyst subjectivity affect corporate debt pricing

Many financing choices of US corporations remain puzzling even after accounting for standard determinants such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information. We propose that managerial beliefs help to explain the remaining variation across and within firms, including variation in debt conservatism and in pecking-order behavior. Managers who believe that their company is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity financing. As a result, they display pecking-order preferences for internal financing over debt and for debt over equity. They may also exhibit debt conservatism: While they prefer debt to equity, they still underutilize debt relative to its tax benefits. We test these hypotheses empirically, using late option exercise by the CEO as a measure of overconfidence. We find that, conditional on accessing public markets, CEOs who personally overinvest in their companies are significantly less likely to issue equity. They raise 33 cents more debt to cover an additional dollar of financing deficit than their peers. Moreover, the frequency with which they access any external finance (debt or equity) is significantly lower, resulting in debt conservatism. The results replicate when identifying managerial overconfidence based on press portrayal as confident or optimistic. We conclude that managerial overconfidence helps to explain variation in corporate financial policies.

Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers

Using unique data on employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs), we examine the influence of networks on investment decisions. Comparing employees within a firm during the same election window with metro area fixed effects, we find that the choices of coworkers in the firm's ESPP exert a significant influence on employees’ own decisions to participate and trade. Moreover, we find that the presence of high‐information employees magnifies the effects of peer networks. Given participation in an ESPP is value‐maximizing, our analysis suggests the potential of networks and targeted investor education to improve financial decision‐making.

/pdf/learning-from-coworkers-peer-effects-on-individual-50w9yklrjj.pdf

Learning from Coworkers: Peer Effects on Individual Investment Decisions

Internal labor markets facilitate cross-industry worker reallocation and collaboration, and the resulting benefits are largest when the markets include industries that utilize similar worker skills. We construct a matrix of industry pair-wise human capital transferability using information obtained from more than 11 million job changes. We show that diversifying acquisitions occur more frequently among industry pairs with higher human capital transferability. Such acquisitions result in larger labor productivity gains and are less often undone in subsequent divestitures. Moreover, acquirers retain more high skill workers and they exploit the real option to move workers from the target firm to jobs in other industries inside the merged firm. Overall, our results identify human capital as a source of value from corporate diversification and provide an explanation for seemingly unrelated acquisitions.

Geoffrey Tate

Papers

The Bright Side of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Internal Labor Markets.

Does rating analyst subjectivity affect corporate debt pricing

Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers

Learning from Coworkers: Peer Effects on Individual Investment Decisions

The Human Factor in Acquisitions: Cross-Industry Labor Mobility and Corporate Diversification