Preface 1. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Mind? Metaphysical Preliminaries Mind-Body Supervenience Materialism and Physicalism Varieties of Mental Phenomena Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? For Further Reading Notes 2. Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument Immaterial Minds in Space? Substance Dualism and Property Dualism For Further Reading Notes 3. Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism The Cartesian Theater and the "Beetle in the Box" What Is Behavior? Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist Argument A Behavioral Translation of "Paul Has a Toothache" Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? Ontological Behaviorism The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior Behaviorism in Psychology Why Behavior Matters to Mind For Further Reading Notes 4. Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory Mind-Brain Correlations Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations The Argument from Simplicity Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity An Argument from Mental Causation Against Psychoneural Identity Theory Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism For Further Reading Notes 5. Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions Functionalism and Behaviorism Turing Machines Physical Realizers of Turing Machines Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims Machine Functionalism: Further Issues Can Machines Think? The Turing Test Computationalism and the "Chinese Room" For Further Reading Notes 6. Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism The Ramsey-Lewis Method Choosing an Underlying Psychology Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality Objections and Difficulties Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science For Further Reading Notes 7. Mental Causation Agency and Mental Causation Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism Psychophysical Laws and "Anomalous Monism" Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? Counterfactuals to the Rescue? Physical Causal Closure and the "Exclusion Argument" The "Supervenience Argument" and Epiphenomenalism Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States For Further Reading Notes 8. Mental Content Interpretation Theory The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism The Metaphysics of Wide Content States Is Narrow Content Possible? Two Problems for Content Externalism For Further Reading Notes 9. What Is Consciousness? Some Views on Consciousness Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness Consciousness and Subjectivity Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought? Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism For Further Reading Notes 10. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem The "Explanatory Gap" and the "Hard Problem" Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? Closing the Explanatory Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation Consciousness and Brain Science What Mary, the Super Vision Scientist, Didn't Know The Limits of Physicalism For Further Reading Notes References Index

Philosophy of Mind

The handbook of pragmatics , The handbook of pragmatics , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز

Handbook of Pragmatics

The formal semantics that we have proposed for definite and indefinite descriptions analyzes them both as variable-binding operators and as referring terms. It is the referential analysis which makes it possible to account for the facts outlined in Section 2, e.g. for the purely ‘instrumental’ role of the descriptive content; for the appearance of unusually wide scope readings relative to other quantifiers, higher predicates, and island boundaries; for the fact that the island-escaping readings are always equivalent to maximally wide scope quantifiers; and for the appearance of violations of the identity conditions on variables in deleted constituents. We would emphasize that this is not a random collection of observations. They cohere naturally with each other, and with facts about other phrases that are unambigously referential. We conceded at the outset of this paper that the referential use of an indefinite noun phrase does not, by itself, motivate the postulation of a referential interpretation. Our argument has been that the behavior of indefinites in complex sentences cannot be economically described, and certainly cannot be explained, unless a referential interpretation is assumed. It could be accounted for in pragmatic terms only if the whole theory of scope relations and of conditions on deletion could be eliminated from the semantics and incorporated into a purely pragmatic theory. But this seems unlikely.

Referential and quantificational indefinites

This article presents a theoretical framework of how people explain behavior. The framework, based on the folk concept of intentionality, distinguishes two major modes of explanation—reason explanation and cause explanation—as well as two minor modes and identifies conditions under which they occur. Three studies provide empirical support for these distinctions. As part of the framework, a detailed model of people's reason explanations is developed, which emphasizes the unique conceptual and linguistic features of reasons. This model points to limitations of traditional attribution concepts, which are examined theoretically and empirically. Finally, the theoretical framework incorporates attribution concepts, which apply to some but not all modes of explanation. Several paths for future research are outlined—on novel topics such as the roles of rationality and subjectivity in explanations and on classic topics such as the actor-observer asymmetry and the self-serving bias.

/pdf/how-people-explain-behavior-a-new-theoretical-framework-9lhswqvlum.pdf

How People Explain Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework

1Above all, I’d like to thank Paul Kay for hours of discussion and useful feedback at every stage in the seemingly endless process of writing this chapter. I’m also grateful to Chuck Fillmore and Laura Michaelis for many useful discussions of both content and exposition and for comments on an earlier draft, which was also been improved by the comments of Rui Chaves, Adele Goldberg, Bill Croft, Adam Przepiorkowski, Russell Lee-Goldman, and Hans Boas. In addition, discussions with the following people have been quite helpful: Farrell Ackerman, Emily Bender, Dan Flickinger, Mark Gawron, Andreas Kathol, Beth Levin, Bob Levine, Stefan Muller, Frank Van Eynde, Tom Wasow, Gert Webelhuth, and Steve Wechsler. None of the views expressed here should be attributed to any of these individuals; nor should they be held responsible for any remaining errors. 2 SBCG owes a considerable debt to the implementation work carried out within CSLI’s LinGO Lab and the DELPHIN consortium, whose grammar development efforts have proceeded in parallel with the evolution of SBCG. See Copestake 2001, Flickinger 2000, Uszkoreit et al. 2000, and the online resources available at http://lingo.stanford.edu/ and http://www.delph-in.net/. 3See Pollard and Sag 1987 Pollard and Sag 1994, Ginzburg and Sag 2000, and Richter 2004, inter alia.

http://compling.hss.ntu.edu.sg/courses/hg4041/pdf/theo-syno.pdf

Sign-based construction grammar: An informal synopsis

The intentionality of human action

A full understanding and appreciation of narrative film, George Wilson argues, requires a concept of point of view necessarily distinct from, yet comparable to, contemporary theories of point of view in prose fiction. Now available in paperback, Narration in Light lays the foundations for a new account of cinematic point of view. Focusing on the special ways in which a film controls the access of its viewers to the events that constitute its narrative, Wilson offers close viewings of five classic Hollywood movies: You Only Live Once, North by Northwest, Letter from an Unknown Woman, The Devil Is a Woman, and Rebel without a Cause. His enlightening and entertaining interpretations reveal surprising power and complexity in popular, major-studio films. Their point-of-view strategies allow them to present both obvious and oblique perspectives on their subjects, providing subtle critiques of ideology within conventional drama and narrative.

Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View

One of the characteristic marks of classical narrative films is that their audio/visual narration is, in a certain sense, transparent.1 Very roughly, this means that (1) most of the shots in these movies are understood as providing the audience with "objective" or intersubjectively accessible views of the fictional characters, actions, and situations depicted in the film and that (2) where the shots or sequences are not to be construed as objective, there is a reasonably clear marking of the fact that they are, in one of several different ways, "subjective." Of course, "subjective shots and sequences" come in various modes. For instance, some shots and sequences depict the perceptual field of a particular character. Others depict a character's visual imaginings, memories, dreams, or hallucinations. Still others render in visual terms the content of something that some character is verbally reporting or describing. This short list of possibilities is obviously not exhaustive, and the individual "subjective" modes deserve lengthier discussion. Nevertheless, let us say that (1) and (2) give us, as a crude first approximation, a specification of the norm of "the transparency of narration" in classical narrative film. Although the conception that these conditions jointly express has a recognizable intuitive import, it is not easy to elaborate the conception more sharply. The concept of an objective shot or sequence in fiction films is problematic and, correlatively, so are the various concepts of subjective depiction. Moreover, the nature and functioning of the factors that contextually mark the epistemic status of a movie segment (that is, a shot or edited sequence) can be surprisingly elusive. These are among the issues I will address in this essay. However, my investigation is not simply motivated by an untrammeled analytic impulse. I have been struck by the fact that there are a number of fairly recent mainstream, commercial films-films that present an elaborate, detailed, and more or less coherent narrativethat depend on surprising, systematic violations of narrational transparency. The narration in the films I have in mind is significantly unreliable in particular ways, and its unreliability depends precisely on the audience's confounded expectation that the norm of narrational transparency will have been in place. These movies have come to be known as "twist movies," where the "twist" in question is predominately epistemological. The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1919) is a celebrated early example of the strategy, and there have been scattered instances throughout the history of film. But lately we have enjoyed (or deplored) a positive explosion of epistemically twisted movies. The films I am thinking of come in at least two broad kinds. First, there are movies in which the cinematic narration, as the audience eventually comes to realize, represents the narrative action through the subjective perspective of a particular character, although, in general, that action has not been represented from the perceptual point of view of the character in question. That is, the narration stands outside the "focalizing" character, regularly presenting him or her within the frame. Still, at the same time, the narration reflects the problematic way in which the character imagines the relevant fictional history to have transpired. Jacob's Ladder (Adriane Lyne, 1990) is one example of this strategy, appearing early in the recent cycle. David Fincher' s Fight Club (1999) and the framed core story of Secret Window (David Koepp, 2004) are

Transparency and Twist in Narrative Fiction Film

IN discussing Russell's theory of definite descriptions, it is tempting to reduce that whole theory to some fairly simple, encapsulating slogan. One says, for example, that Russell held that statements of the form (1) The (A is 4 have the logical form of (2) (Ex) (ox & (y) (0y -* y=x) & Ax). Having added to this, perhaps, a few supplementary remarks on the question of scope, one proceeds to attack or to defend the nutshell view. However, I wish to suggest that it is instructive to divide the theory into at least two distinct stages and to reflect somewhat more carefully on the content of each stage. One important and continuing strand in Russell's thought about these matters was the following idea: A. The logical behavior of definite descriptions is the same as the logical behavior of indefinite descriptions except that the former carry an implication of uniqueness that the latter do not. This claim is fully explicit in the discussion in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. "The only thing that distinguishes 'the so-and-so' from 'a so-and-so' is the implication of uniqueness."' Presumably, A may be understood as telling us that a sentence of form (1) is to be understood as equivalent to something like

George M. Wilson

Papers

The intentionality of human action

Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View

Transparency and Twist in Narrative Fiction Film

On Definite and Indefinite Descriptions

Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.