scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers by "George Sher published in 1980"


Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1980-Noûs
TL;DR: The principle behind these intuitions is not nearly as clear as the intuitions themselves as mentioned in this paper, and it is not clear how coin tosses or straw drawings can offer genuine chances to any but their eventual winners.
Abstract: It is generally agreed that when two or more people have equal claims to a good that cannot be divided among them, the morally preferable way of allocating that good is through a tie-breaking device, or lottery, which is fair. Intuitively, we have little difficulty recognizing which lotteries are fair. Tossing ordinary coins, drawing straws, and picking numbers from one to ten are all clearly fair, whereas awarding goods on the basis of personal preference, of flips of "loaded" coins, or of racial or religious characteristics, are generally not. However, the principle behind these intuitions is not nearly as clear as the intuitions themselves. When one is asked about this principle, one is apt to reply that a lottery is fair provided that it affords each claimant an equal chance of obtaining the contested good; but this is helpful only to the extent that the relevant notion of equal chances can then be specified in its turn. Failing such specification, it will not be clear why lotteries based on personal preference or racial characteristics do not afford their entrants equal chances; and neither, conversely, will it be clear how coin tosses or straw drawings can offer genuine chances to any but their eventual winners. In this paper, I shall try to develop an adequate account of the principle that underlies our intuitions about fair lotteries. This will involve asking (a) exactly what conditions are necessary and sufficient for a lottery to be fair, and (b) why it should be morally preferable to allocate indivisible contested goods through lotteries which satisfy these conditions.

33 citations