The study examines arbitrator behaviour in the uniquely context of investment treaty arbitration. It employs the method of content analysis to test hypotheses of systemic bias in the resolution of jurisdictional issues in investment treaty law. Unlike earlier studies, the study examines trends in legal interpretation instead of case outcomes and finds statistically significant evidence that arbitrators favour (1) the position of claimants over respondent states and (2) the position of claimants from major Western capital-exporting states over claimants from other states. There is a range of possible explanations for the results and further inferences are required to connect the observed trends to rationales for systemic bias. The key finding is that the observed trends exist and that they are unlikely to be explained by chance. This gives tentative empirical evidence of cause for concern about the use of arbitration in this context.

Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration

L’analyse de la pratique et de la jurisprudence demontre qu’independamment de l’existence ou non d’un acteinstrumentaire, certaines obligations dont le contenu n’est pas retranscrit par ecrit et qui ne relevent pas de lacategorie des obligations imposees contraignent les parties. L’identification d’une double condition de qualificationrevele l’existence d’une categorie obligationnelle particuliere qui, n’etant pas envisagee en tant que telle par le droitpositif, invite a l’analyse. L’etude des obligations non materialisees se revele necessaire afin de comprendre tant leur mecanique de fonctionnement que les fondements de leur effet contraignant. Les unes, qualifiees d’obligations non materialisees par renvoi explicite, s’identifient par la stipulation, par les parties, d’une clause par reference dans l’instrumentum qui fait expressement reference a leur caractere obligatoire. Si leur effet contraignant est, donc, justifie par la forceobligatoire du contrat dans lequel la stipulation contractuelle est prevue, le contenu imposable a la relationcontractuelle n’est, toutefois, pas retranscrit dans l’ecrit principal. Les autres, qualifiees d’obligations non materialiseespar renvoi implicite, sont celles qui s’ordonnent aux contractants sans que ces derniers ne justifient d’une volonteexplicite de s’y soumettre. Si cette definition est similaire a celle des obligations imposees en ce qu’elles ne sont pasnecessairement rattachables a la commune intention des parties, ces obligations non materialisees s’en distinguent parleur fondement. Lorsque les obligations imposees se justifient par la lettre ou la mise en oeuvre d’une dispositionlegale, les obligations non materialisees par renvoi implicite s’expliquent par la notion d’utilite. La revelation des obligations non materialisees dans les contrats s’attache a un interet pratique puisqu’au terme decette demarche, une visibilite relative a leurs effets permet d’identifier les lacunes que leur effet obligatoire suscite et,partant, les solutions qu’il apparait opportun d’appliquer. La nature et l’importance des difficultes revelees justifient,alors, la necessite d’etablir un traitement juridique, mais egalement, de deceler les elements indispensables a uneproposition qui leur est adaptee. Il se constate que les insuffisances liees au caractere obligatoire des obligations non materialisees ne leur sont pas specifiques en ce qu’elles peuvent, du fait de leur caractere general, etre decelees dans d’autres situations contractuelles. Les traitements proposes dans la presente etude ont, ainsi, vocation a s’appliquer a l’ensemble de la matiere contractuelle.

https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01342592/document

Les obligations non matérialisées dans les contrats

Access to water is a critical component in advancing the human rights of women. Although privatisation of water services continues to be pushed by donors such as The World Bank, the available information shows that privatisations are not increasing access to water for poor women. This paper examines the human right to water and why this right is critical for women and girls. It then discusses privatisation, and the tension between contractual obligations and respect for human rights. Finally, it explores some strategies and successes from women's involvement in the struggle against water privatisation in Tanzania.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25758880.pdf

Unequal burden: water privatisation and women's human rights in Tanzania

It is argued that the successive regimes for restructuring sovereign debts, since the early 20th century have been shaped by the articulation of three institutional functions: information gathering and economic expertise, then third-party mediation, lastly policy enforcement, also called conditionality. Whereas these functions where integrated within the Fund during the 1980s’ debt crisis, mediation has now been outsourced, under the pressure of the demand by the private sector for a thorough judicialisation of the restructuring process. That is, its inscription within rather rigid procedural rules which would provide much more protection against the interests and the intervention of the sovereigns, especially G7 governments. Two responses to this demand have been formulated: the creation of a supra-national “bankruptcy court”, as envisaged in the SDRM proposal put forward by the IMF in 2001; and the reliance upon national courts, specifically those in which jurisdiction the initial debt contracts had been signed. This latter option corresponds to the contract-based approach to sovereign defaults based on Collective Action Clauses, which was eventually adopted in spring 2003. It is defended that outsourcing third-party mediation makes the IMF considerably much weaker, as it remains with only two functions and no consistent rules of interaction with its traditional partners – private investors and the government of debtor countries.

IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialisation and Multilateralism

Most efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement on the liberalization and protection of investment have failed despite the fact that there are more than 2,400 bilateral investment treaties in existence. We have coined this phenomenon the "lateralism paradox." Within this article, we consider five hypotheses that focus respectively on power asymmetries, incentives for defection, strategic linkages, domestic constraints, and ongoing adaptation. We found that the first four explanations are not supported by empirical evidence from the post-NAFTA period. We conclude that bilateralism appears to be the only feasible approach for negotiating investment rules, as well as the most sensible process to ensure continuous and dynamic adaptation.

The Lateralism Paradox: What Can Best Explain the Prevalence of Bilateralism in the Investment Regime?

/pdf/international-centre-for-settlement-of-investment-disputes-4cnctvcgaz.pdf

Gita Gopal

Papers

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes