People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. As proposed herein, these construals are even more powerful than previously imagined. Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of the self as independent and a construal of the self as interdependent. Each of these divergent construals should have a set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation; these consequences are proposed and relevant empirical literature is reviewed. Focusing on differences in self-construals enables apparently inconsistent empirical findings to be reconciled, and raises questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation.

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Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.

New developments in the science of learning science of learning overview mind and brain how experts differ from novices how children learn learning and transfer the learning environment curriculum, instruction and commnity effective teaching - examples in history, mathematics and science teacher learning technology to support learning conclusions from new developments in the science of learning.

How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, and school.

Preface Chapter 1 The challenge Chapter 2 The nature of the evidence: A synthesis of meta-analyses Chapter 3 The argument: Visible teaching and visible learning Chapter 4: The contributions from the student Chapter 5 The contributions from the home Chapter 6 The contributions from the school Chapter 7 The contributions from the teacher Chapter 8 The contributions from the curricula Chapter 9 The contributions from teaching approaches - I Chapter 10 The contributions from teaching approaches - II Chapter 11: Bringing it all together Appendix A: The 800 meta-analyses Appendix B: The meta-analyses by rank order References

Visible Learning: A Synthesis of Over 800 Meta-Analyses Relating to Achievement

Miller (1956) summarized evidence that people can remember about seven chunks in short-term memory (STM) tasks. How- ever, that number was meant more as a rough estimate and a rhetorical device than as a real capacity limit. Others have since suggested that there is a more precise capacity limit, but that it is only three to five chunks. The present target article brings together a wide vari- ety of data on capacity limits suggesting that the smaller capacity limit is real. Capacity limits will be useful in analyses of information processing only if the boundary conditions for observing them can be carefully described. Four basic conditions in which chunks can be identified and capacity limits can accordingly be observed are: (1) when information overload limits chunks to individual stimulus items, (2) when other steps are taken specifically to block the recoding of stimulus items into larger chunks, (3) in performance discontinuities caused by the capacity limit, and (4) in various indirect effects of the capacity limit. Under these conditions, rehearsal and long-term memory cannot be used to combine stimulus items into chunks of an unknown size; nor can storage mechanisms that are not capacity- limited, such as sensory memory, allow the capacity-limited storage mechanism to be refilled during recall. A single, central capacity limit averaging about four chunks is implicated along with other, noncapacity-limited sources. The pure STM capacity limit expressed in chunks is distinguished from compound STM limits obtained when the number of separately held chunks is unclear. Reasons why pure capacity estimates fall within a narrow range are discussed and a capacity limit for the focus of attention is proposed.

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The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental storage capacity.

1 On behalf of NASA’s Mars Exploration Program, this lesson was prepared by Arizona State University’s Mars Education Program, under contract to NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a division of the California Institute of Technology. These materials may be distributed freely for non-commercial purposes. Copyright 2014; 2012; 2010; 2000. Last edited: April 24, 2014 Marsbound! Mission to the Red Planet

A Framework for K-12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts, and Core Ideas

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Two courses of expertise

A experiments investigated children's understanding of the mind-body distinction. Children of ages 4 and 5 recognized not only the differential modifiability of changeable versus unchangeable human properties and bodily versus mental properties, but also the independence of activities of bodily organs from a person's intention (Experiment 1). When presented 3 types of causal explanations (i.e., intentional, vitalistic, mechanical), 6-year-olds chose most often as most plausible for bodily functions vitalistic explanations (i.e., those ascribing the phenomena to a relevant bodily organ's initiative and effortful engagement in activity); 8-year-olds chose the vitalistic explanations second most often, following mechanical ones (Experiment 2). However, 6-year-olds, as well as 8-year-olds and adults, did not always choose vitalistic explanations over intentional explanations (Experiment 3); whereas they tended to prefer vitalistic explanations for biological phenomena, they predominantly accepted intentional ones for psychological phenomena (Experiment 3A). These results suggest that children as young as 6 years of age have acquired a form of biology as an autonomous domain which is separate from that of psychology.

Young children's understanding of the mind-body distinction.

INAGAKI, KAYOKO, and HATANO, GIYoo. Young Children's Spontaneous Personification as Analogy. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1987, 58, 1013-1020. 80 kindergarten children were questioned regarding attributes of a rabbit, tulip, and person as well as about their reactions to novel situations. Most children gave correct answers for the observable attributes but overextended human characteristics for the unobservable ones. About two-thirds of the children sometimes gave explicit personification (i.e., described the target's reaction in person-relevant terms) or implicit personification (i.e., made essentially the same predictions and explanations for the target and person). These personifications tended to be associated with reasonable predictions. When another group of 47 kindergarten children were asked about a rabbit or tulip for other unfamiliar situations in which personification did not work, very few of them used it to generate unreasonable predictions. It is claimed that even children as young as 5-6 years of age can and often do apply personification as an analogy to animate objects to generate a reasonable prediction and that they try to constrain the personification by using their additional knowledge.

Young Children's Spontaneous Personification as Analogy.

Performance of expert abacus operators

What are the components of children's biological-knowledge system before systematic teaching at school? Can this knowledge system be called naive biology? We propose that young children's biological-knowledge system has at least two essential components—(a) the knowledge needed to identify biological entities and phenomena and (b) teleological and vitalistic causality—and that these components constitute a form of biology. We discuss how this naive biology serves as the basis for performance and learning in socially and culturally important practices, such as health practices and biology instruction.

Giyoo Hatano

Papers

Two courses of expertise

Young children's understanding of the mind-body distinction.

Young Children's Spontaneous Personification as Analogy.

Performance of expert abacus operators

Young Children's Conception of the Biological World