Scholars of the theory of the firm have begun to emphasize the sources and conditions of what has been described as “the organizational advantage,” rather than focus on the causes and consequences of market failure. Typically, researchers see such organizational advantage as accruing from the particular capabilities organizations have for creating and sharing knowledge. In this article we seek to contribute to this body of work by developing the following arguments: (1) social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital; (2) organizations, as institutional settings, are conducive to the development of high levels of social capital; and (3) it is because of their more dense social capital that firms, within certain limits, have an advantage over markets in creating and sharing intellectual capital. We present a model that incorporates this overall argument in the form of a series of hypothesized relationships between different dimensions of social capital and the main mechanisms and proces...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/259373.pdf

Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage

This paper reviews the origins and definitions of social capital in the writings of Bourdieu, Loury, and Coleman, among other authors. It distinguishes four sources of social capital and examines their dynamics. Applications of the concept in the sociological literature emphasize its role in social control, in family support, and in benefits mediated by extrafamilial networks. I provide examples of each of these positive functions. Negative consequences of the same processes also deserve attention for a balanced picture of the forces at play. I review four such consequences and illustrate them with relevant examples. Recent writings on social capital have extended the concept from an individual asset to a feature of communities and even nations. The final sections describe this conceptual stretch and examine its limitations. I argue that, as shorthand for the positive consequences of sociability, social capital has a definite place in sociological theory. However, excessive extensions of the concept may j...

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Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology

After briefly explaining why social capital (civil society) is important to democracy, Putnam devotes the bulk of this chapter to demonstrating social capital’s decline in the United States across the last quarter century. (See Putnam 1995 for a similar but more detailed argument.) While he acknowledges that the significance of a few countertrends is difficult to assess without further study, Putnam concludes that crucial factors such as social trust are eroding rapidly in the United States. He offers some possible explanations for this erosion and concludes by outlining the work needed to consider these possibilities more fully.

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“Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”

http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/assoc/bowling.html 5/28/2012 Copyright © 1995 The National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press. Registered users of a subscribed campus network may download, archive, and print as many copies of this work as desired for use within the subscribed institution as long as this header is not removed -no copies of the below work may be distributed electronically, in whole or in part, outside of your campus network without express permission (permissions@muse.jhu.edu). Contact your institution's library to discuss your rights and responsibilities within Project Muse, or send email to copyright@muse.jhu.edu. The Johns Hopkins University Press is committed to respecting the needs of scholars -return of that respect is requested.

Bowling alone, america's declining of social capital

This paper presents evidence that "social capital" matters for measurable economic performance, using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys for a sample of 29 market economies. Memberships in formal groups—Putnam's measure of social capital—is not associated with trust or with improved economic performance. We find trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain predatory actions of chief executives, and with better-educated and ethnically homogeneous populations.

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Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation

I. Introduction, 395.—II. The model, 397.—III. Competitive entry and long-run equilibrium, 402.—IV. Welfare analysis of industry equilibria, 405.—V. Conclusion, 408.

/pdf/market-structure-and-innovation-4647em1gz2.pdf

Market Structure and Innovation

A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences

/pdf/intergenerational-transfers-and-the-distribution-of-earnings-290ghcfzlr.pdf

Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings

A key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor-market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market. The authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers' beliefs about the productivity of minority workers. They study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments. The authors prove that, even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante, affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers (correctly) perceive the groups to be unequally productive, ex post. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?

This paper analyzes the economic role and performance of a type of financial institution which is observed worldwide: rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas). Using a model in which individuals save for an indivisible durable consumption good, we study Roscas which distribute funds using random allocation and bidding. Each type of Rosca allows individuals without access to credit markets to improve their welfare, but under a reasonable assumption on preferences, random allocation is preferred when individuals have identical tastes. This conclusion need not hold when individuals are heterogeneous. We also discuss the sustainability of Roscas given the possibility of default.

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Glenn C. Loury

Papers

Market Structure and Innovation

A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences

Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings

Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?

The economics of rotating savings and credit associations