Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

The Evolution of Cooperation

The growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult. If decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem, how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions? What factors shape their behavior? Under conditions of uncertainty, what are the origins of international institutions? And how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge? While a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation, the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights. At its core, the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed. Among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system-level factors, unit-level factors, or some complex interplay between the two; whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent; and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create, defend, or expand their own wealth and power, to enhance collective material benefits, or to promote nonmaterial values.' A related question of

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Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination

Past analysis of social movements and social movement organizations has normally assumed a close link between the frustrations or grievances of a collectivity of actors and the growth and decline of movement activity. Questioning the theoretical centrality of this assumption directs social movement analysis away from its heavy emphasis upon the social psychology of social movement participants; it can then be more easily integrated with structural theories of social process. This essay presents a set of concepts and related propositions drawn from a resource mobilization perspective. It emphasizes the variety and sources of resources; the relationship of social movements to the media, authorities, and other parties; and the interaction among movement organizations. Propositions are developed to explain social movement activity at several levels of inclusiveness-the social movement sector, the social movement industry, and social movement organization.

Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory

A vast amount of literature uses cross-country regressions to find empirical links between policy indicators and long-run average growth rates. The authors study whether the conclusions from existing studies are robust or fragile when small changes in the list of independent variables occur. They find that although"policy"appears to be importantly related to growth, there is no strong independent relationship between growth and almost every existing policy indicator. They also find that very few macroeconomic variables are robustly correlated with cross-country growth rates. They clarify the conditions under which one finds convergence of per capita output levels and confirm the positive correlation between the share of investment in GDP and long-run growth. They conclude that all findings using the share of exports in GDP could be obtained almost identically using the total trade or import share and also that few commonly used fiscal indicators are robustly correlated with growth. Finally, the authors highlight the importance of considering alternative specifications in cross-country growth regressions.

A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions

One strand of endogenous-growth models assumes constant returns to a broad concept of capital. I extend these models to include tax- financed government services that affect production or utility. Growth and saving rates fall with an increase in utility-type expenditures; the two rates rise initially with productive government expenditures but subsequently decline. With an income tax, the decentralized choices of growth and saving are "too low," but if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the optimizing government still satisfies a natural condition for productive efficiency. Empirical evidence across countries supports some of the hypotheses about government and growth.

Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth

THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D Tollison states in the foreword: (this book) is a radical departure from the way democracies conduct their business. The 'Calculus' is already a book for the ages. This classic work analyses the political organisation of a free society through the lens of the economic organisation of society. The authors acknowledge their unease as economists in analysing the political organisation, but they take the risk of forging into unfamiliar territory because they believe the benefits of their perspective will bear much fruit. As the authors state, their objective in this book is "to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice...We examine the (choice) process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules." The authors describe their approach as 'economic individualism'. They believe that economists have explored individual choice extensively in the market sector while social scientists have largely ignored the dynamics of individual decision-making in the dynamics of forming group action in the public sector. Written in the early 1960s, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT has become a bulwark of the public choice movement for which James M Buchanan is so justly famous.

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The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy

The Calculus of Consent.

MOST of the papers in this volume* implicitly or explicitly assume that rent-seeking activity discounts the entire rent to be derived. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true; the reality is much more complicated. The problem here is that the average cost and marginal cost are not necessarily identical.

Efficient Rent Seeking

Evaluates the methods to measure the welfare costs of monopolies and tariffs in the United States. Concerns of the economists; Presentation of equation; Validity of measurements. (Из Ebsco)

Gordon Tullock

Papers

The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy

The Calculus of Consent.

Efficient Rent Seeking

The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft

Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society