Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The stor- age and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual expe- riences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a com- mon frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspec- tion (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and ab- stract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinato- rially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a per- ceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal sym- bol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

/pdf/perceptual-symbol-systems-4spsk97r61.pdf

Perceptual symbol systems.

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

The Intentional Stance

/pdf/the-symbol-grounding-problem-2y3jwkqrl8.pdf

The symbol grounding problem

The Classical Field Theories

A type system is a syntactic method for automatically checking the absence of certain erroneous behaviors by classifying program phrases according to the kinds of values they compute. The study of type systems -- and of programming languages from a type-theoretic perspective -- has important applications in software engineering, language design, high-performance compilers, and security.This text provides a comprehensive introduction both to type systems in computer science and to the basic theory of programming languages. The approach is pragmatic and operational; each new concept is motivated by programming examples and the more theoretical sections are driven by the needs of implementations. Each chapter is accompanied by numerous exercises and solutions, as well as a running implementation, available via the Web. Dependencies between chapters are explicitly identified, allowing readers to choose a variety of paths through the material.The core topics include the untyped lambda-calculus, simple type systems, type reconstruction, universal and existential polymorphism, subtyping, bounded quantification, recursive types, kinds, and type operators. Extended case studies develop a variety of approaches to modeling the features of object-oriented languages.

https://www.seas.upenn.edu/~bcpierce/tapl/contents.pdf

Types and Programming Languages

Die Gleichheit fordert das Nachdenken heraus durch Fragen, die sich daran knupfen und nicht ganz leicht zu beantworten sind. Ist sie eine Beziehung? eine Beziehung zwischen Gegenstanden? oder zwischen Namen oder Zeichen fur Gegenstande? Das letzte hatte ich in meiner Begriffsschrift angenommen. Die Grunde, die dafur zu sprechen scheinen, sind folgende: a=a und a=b sind offenbar Satze von verschiedenem Erkenntniswerte: a=a gilt a priori und ist nach Kant analytisch zu nennen, wahrend Satze von der Form a=b oft sehr wertvolle Erweiterungen unserer Erkenntnis enthalten und a priori nicht immer zu begrunden sind. Die Entdeckung, das nicht jeden Morgen eine neue Sonne aufgeht, sondern immer dieselbe, ist wohl eine der folgenreichsten in der Astronomie gewesen. Noch jetzt ist die Wiedererkennung eines kleinen Planeten oder eines Kometen
nicht immer etwas Selbstverstandliches.

https://pure.mpg.de/pubman/item/item_2320751_3/component/file_2555768/Frege_1892_Ueber_Sinn_und_Bedeutung.pdf

Über Sinn und Bedeutung

On Sense and Reference

The foundations of arithmetic

Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens

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/pdf/i-the-thought-a-logical-inquiry-4ah9mou3q2.pdf

Gottlob Frege

Papers

Über Sinn und Bedeutung

On Sense and Reference

The foundations of arithmetic

Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens

I.—the thought: a logical inquiry