机构投资者作为证券市场中的重要力量,越来越受到理论界和实务界的关注。论文对宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院会计学教授布赖恩-布希（Brian Bushee）的论文＂The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior＂（机构投资者对企业短视研发投资行为的影响,以下简称Bushee（1998））进行评价并提出相关的建议和研究方向。

《The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior》述评

From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance

Here is a short fragment of a new book that will be published in the summer 2003 with the title of: “The basics of the institutional dynamics: to the new sociology of markets”. The book will include a big theoretical part and the part devoted to empirical studies of the market that were held during the last two years. The provided text is the theoretical part of the book. The author analyzes the notion of competition and compares several basic approaches to its definition.

What is the Competition

Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model

The high levels of CEO pay are controversial and widely resented. The academic literature on executive compensation has mainly focused on the incentive structure of CEO pay, while its levels have received much less attention. The average pay of a CEO in the largest 100 firms has hovered between $16 and $30 million in recent years. Could anything resembling competition for talent be able to explain such pay levels—or are they prima facie evidence of wrongdoing, or at least of market imperfections? This paper argues that purely competitive models have not been taken as far as they could, and that observed pay levels are consistent with competition for small differences in talent. We develop a simple assignment model and show how it can be used to infer the unobserved distribu tion of ability from the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value, assuming it is the competitive equilibrium of a market where heterogeneous firms and individuals match. The model is then calibrated to measure the social value of scarce executive ability and to gauge the extent to which observed levels of CEO pay can be explained by differences in talent, and to what extent by variation of firm size.

/pdf/the-difference-that-ceos-make-an-assignment-model-approach-ydrewk5xhe.pdf

The difference that CEOs make: an assignment model approach

A method and apparatus are disclosed for analyzing the dynamic resistance of a resistance spot welding process to determine the time of an expulsion event and use that time as the weld completion time for controlling weld termination via a weld feedback signal, controlling automatic current stepping, and identifying maintenance needs. A preconditioning pulse is used to stabilize the weld process and aid in obtaining interpretable resistance information. After an initial blanking period the resistance curve is analyzed by calculating first and second derivative values and applying several algorithms that make possible the computer recognition of characteristic resistance curve shapes resulting from weld expulsion under good geometry, bad geometry and edge weld conditions.

Method and apparatus for monitoring and controlling resistance spot welding

During a weld period in the formation of a resistance spot weld the weld parameters are monitored. and data representIng the weld resistance curve and the power curve are acquired and stored for analysis by a suitably programmed computer. A prediction of the quality of a weld, and specifically as to whether a weld is a nugget or a sticker is made by calculating the ratio of weld energy after the onset of melting to the total weld energy, and also the ratio of the resistance drop afterthe resistance peak to the peak resistance, and then utilising the weighted sum of the energy ratio and the resistance drop ratio, as a weld quality indicator.

Method of predicting the quality of a resistance spot weld

We examine the impact of institutional investors on REIT performance. The mere presence of institutional investors does not positively affect firm operations and value. However, the presence of motivated institutional investors does. The results show that firms with shares held by motivated institutional investors have higher future values, improved future funds from operations, retention of these funds, better cash management, reduced regression to the mean following superior performance, and fewer agency problems. The results also suggest that existing measures of institutional monitoring used in the literature may not fully capture effects related to institutional investment.

Institutional Monitoring, Motivated Investors, and Firm Performance

We document a positive relation between shareholder monitoring and total payout to shareholders using two monitoring proxies that jointly consider an investor's ability and incentive to monitor. We find that this relation is even stronger for firms with poor growth options and with greater potential for agency problems. Unlike traditional proxies, our two proxies do not exhibit any endogeneity with payout policy. We further show that monitoring is positively associated with future improvements in payout and operating performance. These findings are consistent with the prediction that shareholder monitoring leads to higher payout through increased efficiency and reduced agency costs.

Do motivated institutional investors monitor firm payout and performance

Two sheet metal panels are joined together to form a closed box section structure. The two panels are individually stamped from a blank and each has a flange along one edge and a toothed edge of alternating notches and tabs along the opposite edge. The two panels are assembled in box section forming relationship with the flanges of the two panels abutting with one another and the toothed edges abutting with one another with the tabs of the one panel interdigitating with the tabs of the other panel. Clamps are applied to the panels and urge the interdigitating tabs into tight fitting relationship. Then the panels are welded together at the interdigitating tabs and also at the abutting flanges to form the closed box section structure. The toothed edges of the panels preferably extend generally normal to one another and the length of the tab is not substantially less than the length of the notch which receives the tab so that the interlocking tabs and notches align the panels longitudinally relative one another pending the welding together of the panels. The weld may be a single sided spot resistance weld, an arc weld, or a laser weld.

Gregory Leo Nagel

Papers

Method and apparatus for monitoring and controlling resistance spot welding

Method of predicting the quality of a resistance spot weld

Institutional Monitoring, Motivated Investors, and Firm Performance

Do motivated institutional investors monitor firm payout and performance

Joint for single side welding and self-fixturing of closed steel sections