Does the autistic child have a theory of mind

An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, and so forth. To determine whether or not the chimpanzee infers states of this kind, we showed an adult chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with a variety of problems. Some problems were simple, involving inaccessible food – bananas vertically or horizontally out of reach, behind a box, and so forth – as in the original Kohler problems; others were more complex, involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because of a malfunctioning heater, or unable to play a phonograph because it was unplugged. With each videotape the chimpanzee was given several photographs, one a solution to the problem, such as a stick for the inaccessible bananas, a key for the locked up actor, a lit wick for the malfunctioning heater. The chimpanzee's consistent choice of the correct photographs can be understood by assuming that the animal recognized the videotape as representing a problem, understood the actor's purpose, and chose alternatives compatible with that purpose.

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Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.

In 1997 in this Journal we published the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’’ Test, as a measure of adult ‘‘mentalising’’. Whilst that test succeeded in discriminating a group of adults with Asperger syndrome (AS) or high-functioning autism (HFA) from controls, it suered from several psychometric problems. In this paper these limitations are rectified by revising the test. The Revised Eyes Test was administered to a group of adults with AS or HFA (N fl 15) and again discriminated these from a large number of normal controls (N fl 239) drawn from dierent samples. In both the clinical and control groups the Eyes Test was inversely correlated with the Autism Spectrum Quotient (the AQ), a measure of autistic traits in adults of normal intelligence. The Revised Eyes Test has improved power to detect subtle individual dierences in social sensitivity.

https://depts.washington.edu/uwcssc/sites/default/files/hw00/d40/uwcssc/sites/default/files/Mind%20in%20the%20Eyes%20Scale_0.pdf

The ''Reading the Mind in the Eyes'' Test Revised Version: A Study with Normal Adults, and Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-functioning Autism

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

The Intentional Stance

Intentional communication in the chimpanzee: The development of deception

An adult chimpanzee was shown videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with one of eight problems and was then shown two photographs, one of which depicted an action or an object (or both) that could constitute a solution to the problem. On seven of the eight problems, the animal consistently chose the correct photograph. This test problem-solving comprehension permits the animal9s knowledge about problem-solving--its ability to infer the nature of problems and to recognize potential solutions to them--to be examined.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/202/4367/532.full.pdf

Chimpanzee problem-solving: a test for comprehension

Comparison of quantitative reasoning in nonhuman animals has suffered, on the one hand, from the methodological failure to do properly controlled studies of number (for review, recent examples and exceptions see refs 1, 2; 3, 4; and 5, 6 respectively), and on the other, from the conceptual failure to consider forms of quantitative reasoning other than number. An approach to mathematical reasoning may profit from the study of proportion, a continuous quantity, in addition to number, a discrete quantity. In the experiments reported here, an adult chimpanzee and four juveniles were tested for their knowledge of ‘proportion’ and ‘number’ with conceptual match-to-sample tasks. The juveniles failed but the adult successfully matched exemplars of the proportions 1/4, 1/2, 3/4 and 1, and the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4, when the sample and alternatives were highly dissimilar physically (such as in shape, colour) and in other quantitative (for example mass, area, length) dimensions. The results reveal the presence of simple ‘proportion’ and ‘number’ concepts in a nonhuman primate.

Primative mathematical concepts in the chimpanzee: proportionality and numerosity

where same was Sarah's plastic symbol for \"same.\" Sarah solved analogy problems with two types of displays: (a) forced choice, in which she had to complete an analogy by choosing the correct B' from a set of alternatives (Experiments I A , In , and 3A) and (b) same-different, in which she had to complete an analogy by choosing the correct predicate, Same or Different (Experiments 2 and JB). In addition, she correctly solved both figural analogy problems, in which the stimuli were geometric figures and the relations among them were differences in size, color, or marking (Experiments I A , I n , and 2), and conceptual analogy problems, in which the stimuli were household objects and the relations were functional and spatial (Experiments 3A and 3n). Simple mechanisms for problem solution, e.g., physical matching, feature combination, and choice on the basis of association, were ruled out. The data strongly indicate that Sarah used the relation between A and A' to solve the analogy problems (Experiment IB). The implications for theories of human and animal cognition are discussed.

Guy Woodruff

Papers

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind

Intentional communication in the chimpanzee: The development of deception

Chimpanzee problem-solving: a test for comprehension

Primative mathematical concepts in the chimpanzee: proportionality and numerosity

Reasoning in the Chimpanzee: I. Analogical Reasoning