Introduction Ben Eggleston and Dale E. Miller 1. Utilitarianism before Bentham Colin Heydt 2. Bentham and utilitarianism in the early nineteenth century James E. Crimmins 3. Mill and utilitarianism in the mid nineteenth century Henry R. West 4. Sidgwick and utilitarianism in the late nineteenth century Roger Crisp 5. Utilitarianism in the twentieth century Krister Bykvist 6. Act utilitarianism Ben Eggleston 7. Rule utilitarianism Dale E. Miller 8. Global utilitarianism Julia Driver 9. Objectivism, subjectivism, and prospectivism Elinor Mason 10. Subjective theories of well-being Chris Heathwood 11. Objective theories of well-being Ben Bradley 12. Kantian ethics and utilitarianism Jens Timmermann 13. What virtue ethics can learn from utilitarianism Daniel C. Russell 14. Utilitarianism and fairness Brad Hooker 15. Utilitarianism and the ethics of war William H. Shaw 16. Utilitarianism and our obligations to future people Tim Mulgan.

The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.

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Deontic morality and control

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/cogs.12136

Are thoughtful people more utilitarian? CRT as a unique predictor of moral minimalism in the dilemmatic context.

Utilitarianism and fairness

Soulignant l'incompatibilite du determinisme et de la liberte avec ce que l'A. appelle les ancrages moraux concernant le bien, le mal et l'obligation, l'A. examine deux versions (stricte et moderee) du principe deontique selon lequel devoir, c'est pouvoir (principe K), d'une part, et analyse le processus de controle que les agents doivent appliquer dans leurs actions, d'autre part. A partir de la critique de la conception indeterministe du controle et de la causation de l'agent chez R. Kane et R. Clarke, l'A. montre que la version faible du principe K est compatible avec les ancrages moraux dans des mondes indeterministes

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/40232052

H. J. McCloskey

Papers

Utilitarianism: Two difficulties