In this paper, we define an auction protocol and implementation of a decentralized and distributed auctioning platform for demand-supply matching of components and materials subject to recycling. Auctioning is the process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling the item to a winner according to preset rules. Some auction types relies on sealed-bids while others implement an open-bid procedure that allows for multiple bids before a known or unknown deadline. The English auction and its variants is most common type. It relies on that the current highest bid is always available to potential bidders. Online auction platforms are nowadays used to trade various services and goods. We address the iterative negotiations in form of auction bids aiming at signed contractual agreements stated in legal prose and captured by Ricardian contracts. We evaluate our model towards requirements including privacy, transparency and fairness in terms of acknowledged publishing of highest bids and the ordered arrival of individual bids. In addition, we demonstrate the mechanisms for distributed storage of cryptographically signed Ricardian contracts, omitting the need for trusting the auctioneer or relying on a trusted third party for this storage.

RAP: A Ricardian Auctioning Protocol for Demand-Supply Matching using Open Bids

We study the impact of information transparency in B2B auctions. Specifically, we measure the effect of concealing winners’ identities on auction outcomes using a large-scale, quasi-natural field experiment. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that “the more information, the better,” we find that concealing winners’ identities leads to a significant increase in price by approximately 6%, and such effect holds true across both online and offline channels as well as different types of bidders. We further explore the mechanism that drives the observed effect. The empirical analysis suggests that the price increase may primarily stem from the disruption of imitative bidding which relies on the identification of fellow competitors. Our findings have important implications for the design of auction markets, especially multi-channel B2B markets.

H.W.G.M. vanHeck

Papers

Information Transparency in B2B Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure