Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

Статья посвящена вопросам влияния власти на поведение человека. Авторы рассматривают данные различных источников, в которых увеличение власти связывается с напористостью, а ее уменьшение - с подавленностью. Конкретно, власть ассоциируется с: а) позитивным аффектом; б) вниманием к вознаграждению и к свойствам других, удовлетворяющим личные цели; в) автоматической переработкой информации и резкими суждениями; г) расторможенным социальным поведением. Уменьшение власти, напротив, ассоциируется с: а) негативным аффектом; б) вниманием к угрозам и наказаниям, к интересам других и к тем характеристикам я, которые отвечают целям других; в) контролируемой переработкой информации и совещательным типом рассуждений; г) подавленным социальным поведением. Обсуждаются также последствия этих паттернов поведения, связанных с властью, и потенциальные модераторы.

Power, approach, and inhibition. Власть, напористость и подавленность

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Measuring Organizational Performance: Towards Methodological Best Practice

(1991). Applied Linear Regression Models. Journal of Quality Technology: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 76-77.

Applied Linear Regression Models

Review A coherent alternative to an economic approach of corporate governance is missing. In this paper we take steps towards developing a behavioral theory of boards and corporate governance. Building upon concepts such as political bargaining, routinization of decision making, satisficing, and problemistic search, a behavioral theory of boards and corporate governance will focus more on (1) interactions and processes inside and outside the boardroom; (2) the fact that decision making is made by coalitions of actors and objectives are results of political bargaining; and (3) the notion that not only conflicting, but also cooperating, interests are parts of the boards' decision making and control over firm resources. The consequences are a new research agenda for boards and corporate governance. The agenda will focus on actual instead of stylized descriptions of board behavior. In a behavioral perspective the emphasis on problems of coordination, exploration, and knowledge creation may dominate over problems of conflict of interest, exploitation, and the distribution of value. A future research agenda based on a behavioral framework calls for novel and adventurous research designs. A behavioral theory of boards and corporate governance will be closer to actual board behavior than the traditional economic approach and research about boards and corporate governance may thus become more actionable for practitioners.

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Toward a Behavioral Theory of Boards and Corporate Governance

Although agreement on the positive sign of the relationship between corporate social and financial performance is observed in the literature, the mechanisms that constitute this relationship are not yet well-known. We address this issue by extending management’s stakeholder theory by adding insights from psychology’s prospect decision theory and sociology’s resource dependence theory. Empirically, we analyze an extensive panel dataset, including information on disaggregated measures of social performance for the S&P 500 in the 1997–2002 period. In so doing, we enrich the extant literature by focusing on stakeholder heterogeneity, perceptional framing, and disaggregated measures of corporate social performance.

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Corporate Social and Financial Performance: An Extended Stakeholder Theory, and Empirical Test with Accounting Measures

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Board Diversity: Moving the Field Forward

Extending earlier literature on diffusion of codes of good governance (CGGs) by integrating the effect of national culture, this study offers a novel perspective on cross-national diversity in the worldwide diffusion of corporate governance best practices. We argue that particular cultural dimensions affect the indicators (i.e., total number of codes per country and identity of issuing organizations) of such diffusion. For a sample of 67 countries our analysis reveals that individualist cultures have a stronger tendency to develop CGGs. In cultures with a high receptivity to power differences there is a higher probability that the first issuers are the government, directors’ or professional associations; whereas with low receptivity, the stock exchange and investors’ groups of issuers are more likely to initiate the first code. The effects of culture remain significant even after accounting for differences in legal systems and economic institutions, indicating that national culture may serve as a comprehensive indicator of the regulatory stance with respect to good governance. Indeed, the effect size is large enough to give pause (e.g., to a location choice), and possibly has relevance for strategic decision-making by international companies.

Explaining diversity in the worldwide diffusion of codes of good governance

This article investigates whether bribery in emerging economies matters and whether such bribery has a diminishing return to performance. Bribery allows entrepreneurs to develop and foster a network of informal relationships with public officials, and reap the accompanying benefits; but it may also have disadvantages, such as an inefficient allocation of resources. The relationship between bribery and performance was estimated using unique data derived from a survey of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs. We controlled for various entrepreneurial, organizational, and industrial characteristics. The exploratory results provide support for a hill-shaped non-monotonic relationship between bribery and revenues.

Hans van Ees

Papers

Toward a Behavioral Theory of Boards and Corporate Governance

Corporate Social and Financial Performance: An Extended Stakeholder Theory, and Empirical Test with Accounting Measures

Board Diversity: Moving the Field Forward

Explaining diversity in the worldwide diffusion of codes of good governance

Which Entrepreneurs Bribe and What Do They Get From It? Exploratory Evidence From Vietnam