Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

http://web.nchu.edu.tw/pweb/users/arborfish/lesson/8682.pdf

A survey of variants and extensions of the resource-constrained project scheduling problem

Application of planning models in the agri-food supply chain: A review

In this paper, we review decision support models for the design of global supply chains, and assess the fit between the research literature in this area and the practical issues of global supply chain design The classification scheme for this review is based on ongoing and emerging issues in global supply chain management and includes review dimensions for (1) decisions addressed in the model, (2) performance metrics, (3) the degree to which the model supports integrated decision processes, and (4) globalization considerations We conclude that although most models resolve a difficult feature associated with globalization, few models address the practical global supply chain design problem in its entirety We close the paper with recommendations for future research in global supply chain modeling that is both forward-looking and practically oriented

/pdf/global-supply-chain-design-a-literature-review-and-critique-3dpjfatwar.pdf

Global supply chain design: A literature review and critique

http://cepac.cheme.cmu.edu/pasi2011/library/maravelias/Stadtler.2005.EurOR.SCMOverview.pdf

Supply chain management and advanced planning : basics, overview and challenges

A ceramic fiber mat attached to the interior wall or surface of a high temperature chamber or furnace or adapted to overlie an intermediate insulating member positioned between the mat and a furnace wall, the fibers in the mat lying in planes generally perpendicular to the wall, the mat constituting an improved insulation for the wall where the interior of the chamber or furnace will be operating at temperatures in excess of 1600 DEG F.

/pdf/supply-chain-management-and-advanced-planning-4hlprtgyax.pdf

Supply Chain Management and Advanced Planning

With a wealth of updated material, rewritten chapters and additional case studies, this fourth edition of a hugely important work gives a broad and up-to-date overview of the concepts underlying APS. Special emphasis is given to modeling supply chains and implementing APS successfully in industrial contexts. Whats more, readers understanding is enhanced by several case studies covering a wide range of industrial sectors. What makes this book so crucial is that Supply Chain Management, Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP), and Advanced Planning Systems (APS) are concepts that must be mastered in order to organize and optimize the flow of goods, materials, information and funds. Here, leading experts provide insights into the concepts underlying APS.

Supply Chain Management and Advanced Planning: Concepts, Models, Software, and Case Studies

Negotiation-based collaborative planning between supply chains partners

What is the essence of Supply Chain Management (SCM)? How does it relate to Advanced Planning? In which sense are the underlying planning concepts “advanced”? What are the origins of SCM? These as well as related questions will be answered in this chapter.

Hartmut Stadtler

Papers

Supply Chain Management and Advanced Planning

Supply chain management and advanced planning : basics, overview and challenges

Supply Chain Management and Advanced Planning: Concepts, Models, Software, and Case Studies

Negotiation-based collaborative planning between supply chains partners

Supply Chain Management: An Overview