From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis

The Unreality of Time

Philosophy and scientific realism

ion and general ideas.” Compare Meinong, Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, p. 178: “Besonders geeignet sind vielmehr Begriffsgegenstände, wie uns deren etwa durch Definitionen gegeben werden. Das Dreick z.B., darin hatte der sicher nicht überrationalistische Locke gegen Berkeley und gegen viele Spätere) am Ende doch recht, ist als solches weder gleichseitig noch gleichschenklig, weder rechtwinklig noch schiefwinklig, noch das Gegenteil davon: es ist in diesen Hinsichten und noch in vielen anderen eben unbestimmt. Gegenstände dieser Art stehen in deutlichen Gegensatz zu solchen, die, wie wir deren oben zuerst betrachtet haben, in bezug auf alle wie immer gearteten Gegenstände bestimmt sind. Man kann solche Gegenstände mit Recht vollständig bestimmte nennen, Blaues, Dreieck und ihresgleichen dagegen unvollständig bestimmte.” 15Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, [1739-40], edited by Selby-Bigge, second edition revised by Nidditch (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 17.

Handbook of the history of logic

https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/1/5690/235.2.full.pdf

The experience of time.

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

If, as the new tenseless theory of time maintains, there are no tensed facts, then why do our emotional lives seem to suggest that there are? This question originates with Prior's 'Thank Goodness That's Over' problem, and still presents a significant challenge to the new B-theory of time. We argue that this challenge has more dimensions to it than has been appreciated by those involved in the debate so far. We present an analysis of the challenge, showing the different questions that a B-theorist must answer in order to meet it. The debate has focused on the question of what is the object of my relief when an unpleasant experience is past. We outline the prevailing response to this question. The additional, and neglected, questions are, firstly - 'Why does the same event elicit different emotional responses from us depending on whether it is in the past, present, or future?' And secondly - 'Why do we care more about proximate future pain than about distant future pain?' We give B-theory answers to these questions, which appeal to evolutionary considerations.

/pdf/thank-goodness-that-s-over-the-evolutionary-story-101kcvbo27.pdf

‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’: The Evolutionary Story

The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination

Introduction 1. Metaphysics and the Origins of the Representational Fallacy 2. A New Metaphysical Strategy: Lessons Learned from the Philosophy of Time 3. The Representational Fallacy: Or How Not to do Ontology 4. The Relationship Between Language and Reality 5. The Methodological Map 6. The Overlooked Strategy in Practice: Moral Discourse 7. Some Further Applications of the Overlooked Strategy

Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy

We divide analytic metaphysics into naturalistic and non-naturalistic metaphysics. The latter we define as any philosophical theory that makes some ontological (as opposed to conceptual) claim, where that ontological claim has no observable consequences. We discuss further features of non-naturalistic metaphysics, including its methodology of appealing to intuition, and we explain the way in which we take it to be discontinuous with science. We outline and criticize Ladyman and Ross's 2007 epistemic argument against non-naturalistic metaphysics. We then present our own argument against it. We set out various ways in which intellectual endeavours can be of value, and we argue that, in so far as it claims to be an ontological enterprise, non-naturalistic metaphysics cannot be justified according to the same standards as science or naturalistic metaphysics. The lack of observable consequences explains why non-naturalistic metaphysics has, in general, failed to make progress, beyond increasing the standards o...

Heather Dyke

Papers

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’: The Evolutionary Story

The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination

Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy

What is Analytic Metaphysics For