Arguments about Europe’s democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’ is democratically justified.

The expression ‘democratic deficit,’ however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the ‘regulatory model’ of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers.

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Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards

When a vacancy occurs on the Supreme Court, the president can attempt to use his power of nomination strategically in order to bring the Court in line with his own policy preferences. However, the president faces two constraints when attempting to do so. First, he may be constrained by the presence of continuing justices and the existing Court median. Second, he may be constrained by the Senate, which must approve his nominee. In this paper we develop and test a theory that examines the conditions under which a president is constrained in his choice of a nominee. Our results show that presidents can, and do, behave strategically with respect to Supreme Court nominations.

http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/ajmadonn/Moraski.pdf

The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices

The prevailing view among students of judicial politics is that judges' background characteristics or personal attributes cannot provide satisfactory explanations for variation in their decision-making behavior. Parsimonious attribute models reported here account for 70 to 90 percent of the variance in the voting of postwar Supreme Court justices in split decisions concerning civil rights and liberties, and economics. Seven variables representing six meaningful and easily interpretable concepts achieve this success. The concepts are Judge's Party Identification, Appointing President, Prestige of Prelaw Education (economics only), Appointed from Elective Office, Appointment Region (civil liberties only), Extensiveness of Judicial Experience, and Type of Prosecutorial Experience. The impressive performance of these models is attributed to superior measurement, operationalization, and model building; to a greater similarity between personal attribute models and more fully specified ones than has been assumed; and to the possibility that the attitudes which intervene between the personal attributes and the voting of judges are causally very closely linked to voting.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400172120

Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978

Throughout the world, truth commissions have been (and are being) constructed under the hope that discovering the ‘truth’ about a country's past conflicts will somehow contribute to ‘reconciliation’ Most of such efforts point to South Africa's truth and reconciliation process as an exemplar of the powerful influence of truth finding But has truth actually contributed to reconciliation in South Africa? At present, no‐one can answer this question since no rigorous and systematic assessment of the success of the truth and reconciliation process has ever been conducted This paper directly investigates the hypothesis that truth leads to reconciliation Based on a survey of 3,700 South Africans in 2001, it begins by giving both ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ clear conceptual and operational meaning Empirical evidence, is then given, that the ‘truth’ as promulgated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is fairly widely accepted by South Africans, of all races; that at least some degree of reconcilia

/pdf/overcoming-apartheid-can-truth-reconcile-a-divided-nation-2sh65vf9mr.pdf

Overcoming apartheid: can truth reconcile a divided nation?

This case study of late-nineteenth century federal courts in the United States sheds light on two seemingly unrelated questions of general interest to political scientists: What tools are available to party leaders who seek to institutionalize their policy agendas or insulate those agendas from electoral politics? and How do we account for expansions of judicial power? Using an historical–interpretive analysis of partisan agendas, party control of national institutions, congressional initiatives relating to federal courts, the appointment of federal judges, judicial decision making, and litigation patterns, I demonstrate that the increased power, jurisdiction, and conservatism of federal courts during this period was a by-product of Republican Party efforts to promote and entrench a policy of economic nationalism during a time when that agenda was vulnerable to electoral politics. In addition to offering an innovative interpretation of these developments, I discuss the implications arising from this case study for our standard accounts of partisan politics, political development, and the determinants of judicial decision making.

How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891

Chapter 1 1. Introductory Reflections: Of Criteria, Evaluations, and Judgements Chapter 2 2. The Nixon Era: A Turbulent Case Study Chapter 3 3. How They Get There: Appointing Supreme Court Justices Chapter 4 4. Why They Get There: Qualifications and Rationalizations Chapter 5 5. The First Forty Years: From George Washington to John Quincy Adams, 1789-1829 Chapter 6 6. The Next Forty Years: From Andrew Jackson to Andrew Johnson, 1829-1869 Chapter 7 7. The Balance of the Nineteenth Century: From Ulysses S. Grant to William McKinley, 1869-1901 Chapter 8 8. Into the Twentieth Century: From Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert Hoover, 1901-1933 Chapter 9 9. The Court Alters Course: FDR and Truman, 1933-1953 Chapter 10 10. The Warren Court: From Ike to LBJ, 1953-1969 Chapter 11 11. The Burger Court: From Nixon to Reagan, 1969-1986 Chapter 12 12. The Rehnquist Court: Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton, 1986-2005 Chapter 13 13. The Roberts Court: 2005- Chapter 14 14. Epilogue Chapter 15 Appendix A: Rating Supreme Court Justices Chapter 16 Appendix B: Rating Presidents Chapter 17 Appendix C: Statistical Data on Supreme Court Justices

Justices, presidents, and senators : a history of the U.S. Supreme Court appointments from Washington to Clinton

The judicial process

Written by one of the nation's most astute observers of the court, this classic text examines the theory, practice, and people behind the judicial process in the United States, England, and France. It illuminates the judiciary's political, legal, and governmental roles and closely examines the much debated, but little understood line between "judicial activism" and "judicial restraint." Completely updated throughout, this seventh edition examines all important developments and structural changes in the three nation's judicial systems through the end of 1996.

The Judicial process : an introductory analysis of the courts of the United States, England, and France

Shaping America : the politics of Supreme Court appointments

Traces the life and career of the great Supreme Court justice and discusses his involvement with labor unions, trust busting, women's suffrage, unemployment legislation, and Zionism.

Henry J. Abraham

Papers

Justices, presidents, and senators : a history of the U.S. Supreme Court appointments from Washington to Clinton

The judicial process

The Judicial process : an introductory analysis of the courts of the United States, England, and France

Shaping America : the politics of Supreme Court appointments

Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People