H
Henry L. Friedman
Researcher at University of California, Los Angeles
Publications - 37
Citations - 699
Henry L. Friedman is an academic researcher from University of California, Los Angeles. The author has contributed to research in topics: Earnings & Incentive. The author has an hindex of 12, co-authored 35 publications receiving 513 citations. Previous affiliations of Henry L. Friedman include University of Pennsylvania & University of California.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Does self-efficacy affect entrepreneurial investment?
Gavin Cassar,Henry L. Friedman +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors empirically examine the effect of self-efficacy on entrepreneurial investment choices and argue that higher selfefficacy is associated with more aggressive entrepreneurial investment decisions, and show that selfefficacies increases the likelihood of being a nascent entrepreneur and creating an operating business, and also increases the proportion of personal wealth invested in the venture and the amount of hours per week the entrepreneur devotes to the venture.
Posted Content
Implications of Power: When the CEO Can Pressure the CFO to Bias Reports
TL;DR: This paper developed an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO's power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings, which has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents.
Journal ArticleDOI
Taste, Information, and Asset Prices: Implications for the Valuation of CSR
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model to capture the asset-pricing implications of differences in investors' tastes for firms' activities and outputs and showed that investor taste differences provide a basis for investor clientele effects that are endogenously determined by the shares demanded by different types of investors.
Journal ArticleDOI
Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports
TL;DR: This paper developed an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO's power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings, which has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents.
Journal ArticleDOI
Taste, Information, and Asset Prices: Implications for the Valuation of CSR
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model to capture the asset-pricing implications of differences in investors' tastes for firms' activities and outputs and showed that investor taste differences provide a basis for investor clientele effects that are endogenously determined by the shares demanded by different types of investors.