All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Two Treatises of Government.

The End of History and the Last Man

Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in their foreign policy. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant, a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state.

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Liberalism and world politics

1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

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A Cultural Theory of International Relations

What does "ideology" mean? As a preliminary step to answering this muchasked question, I collected what seemed to be the most thoughtful and/or influential definitions circulating within the social sciences in the postwar decades. 1 A quick perusal of these definitions reveals the extent to which ideology remains a highly flexible conceptual tool (see Table 1). One is struck not only by the cumulative number of different attributes that writers find essential, but by their more than occasional contradictions. To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others it carries connotations of political sophistication; to some it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others it refers primarily to those most alienated by the status quo (e.g., revolutionary movements and parties). To some it is based in the concrete interests of a social class, while to others it is characterized by an absence of economic self-interest. One could continue, but the point is already apparent: not only is ideology farflung, it also encompasses a good many definitional traits which are directly at odds with one another. Indeed, it has become customary to begin any discussion of ideology with some observation concerning its semantic promiscuity.2 Few concepts in the social science lexicon have occasioned so much discussion, so much disagreement, and so much selfconscious discussion of the disagreement, as "ideology." Condemned time and again for its semantic excesses, for its bulbous unclarity, the concept of ideology remains, against all odds, a central term of social science discourse. How, then, are we to understand this semantic confusion, and how are we to deal with it? Five common approaches can be identified among writers in the social sciences: operationalization, terminological reshuffling, intellectual history, etiology and multivocality. In the following section, I outline each of these endeavors and demonstrate their limitations. I then proceed to a new approach which comprehensively maps the meanings of ideology onto a single, reasonably concise, semantic grid. I conclude with a brief discussion of "core" meanings for ideology, and a plea for context-dependent methods of definition. COMMON APPROACHES 1. Operationalization Among those who study "behavior" in American politics, discussion of ideology has centered on a single empirical question: how ideological is the mass public (compared, that is, with political elites)? There have been a good many twists and turns in this debate since it was introduced by Campbell et al. (1960), McClosky et al. (1960), Converse (1964), and McClosky (1964). But the debate over the ideological proclivities of the mass public does not seem much closer to resolution today than it did in the 1960s.3 The reason for this lack of resolution has something to do with problems of data incommensurability through time and differing methods of operationalizing variables, as generally recognized. Less often recognized are the various problems of definition inherent in the concept of ideology. Is an "ideological" mode of thought characterized by abstraction, internal consistency, external contrast, endurance through time, rationality, sophistication, a hierarchical ordering of idea-elements, parsimony-or some combination of these characteristics? Is it separate from group affiliation and/or party affiliation? Such questions, which merely scratch the surface of scholarly debate among behavioralists, are "definitional" in the sense that no answer can claim a priori precedence over another. Each definitional attribute may, of course, be operationalized in different ways, raising a second tier of disputes. Indeed, some writers take the position that definitional tasks are contained within-and rightfully subservient to-tasks of operationalization. "It matters primarily not what you call it, but how you measure it," is the implicit approach of many behavioralists. Although there is surely much to be said for a pragmatic/ empirical approach to concept definition, this has not proven an entirely successful strategy in the instant case. …

Ideology: A Definitional Analysis:

Kant's Political Philosophy

Kant is not often regarded as a major political philosopher. In comparison with the works of his fellow German Idealist, Hegel, his political writings have received but scant attention. This is not a fate that is entirely deserved. Kant deals more briefly, it is true, with politics than does Hegel, but this is not to say that what he does write is any the less profound. Indeed he has, as I shall try to show, an important contribution to make to the understanding of the Modern State. This contribution is particularly apparent, I believe, in his analysis of property in the Metaphysical Elements of Right (Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre). What interests Kant most about property is its possibility in general or, as he says, "the mode of having something external to myself as my own" (353/51).1 To him it is a highly problematical notion whose appropriateness to the affairs of men has to be fully explained. Kant begins by distinguishing the two ways in which we can be said to possess (besitzen) an object. The first mode of possession is what he calls the sensible, or physical possession of an object; and the second is the "intelligible" possession of an object. It is the second meaning of 'possession' which is, according to Kant, by far the most important. The "sensible possession" of an object simply signifies its bodily appropriation whereas "intelligible possession" signifies a possession which is not dependent on actual physical appropriation. Intelligible possession therefore means that a thing will be mine even though I do not happen to have it with me (ibid.). It is this Kant defines as de jure possession, or the legal possession of an object. We are perhaps more fortunate than Kant here in that the English language, unlike the German, has a word which specifically refers to this kind of possession: 'ownership'. Ownership, as Kant wants to point out, is quite distinct from the actual physical possession of a thing. But both ownership and possession are essential for an external thing to be properly mine. An external object is not mine, as Kant says, unless I both own it and am able to have it physically in my power; only then is it my property. Kant now applies this analysis to the three kinds of objects which in his view may become a person's property. These three kinds of object are, first of all, a corporeal thing external to me; secondly, what he calls the will of another with respect to a particular act (gained by a contract); and,

Kant's Concept of Property

As a political philosopher, Kant has until recently been overshadowed by his compatriots Hegel and Marx. With his strong defense of the rights of the person and his deep insight into the strengths and weaknesses of modern society Kant, possibly more than any other political thinker, anticipated the problems of the late twentieth century. Kant's political philosophy, wedded as it is to rights, reform and gradual progress, is emerging from the shadows cast by Hegelian and Marxist thinking about the state. In this volume, thirteen distinguished contributors from the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany cast light on important aspects of Kant's liberal thinking. Key topics covered include Kant's liberal reformism, his relation with Hegel, his attitude to women, the use of reason, revolution, Kant's optimism and his moral and legal rigorism. Howard Williams is a reader in political theory in the Department of International Politics, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. His previous publications include "Kant's Political Philosophy," "Concepts of Ideology," and "Hegel, Heraclitus, and Marx's Dialectic."

Essays on Kant's political philosophy

Introduction The Motif of War in Kant's Critical Philosophy Kant and Just War Theory: The Problem Outlined Perpetual Peace and the Case against Just War Theory The Metaphysics of Morals and the Case for a Just War Theory Bringing the Argument Together: How to Avoid being a Sorry Comforter whilst Dealing with the International State of Nature Kantian Perspectives on Foreign Intervention The Hegelian Premises of Contemporary Just War Theory and their Kantian Critique Conclusion: The Critique of Just War Theory

Howard Williams

Papers

Kant's Political Philosophy

Kant's Concept of Property

Essays on Kant's political philosophy

Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory

Hegel, Heraclitus, and Marx's dialectic