Course Description In this course, we will explore the question of the actual and potential connections between democracy and education. Our focus of attention will be placed on a critical examination of democratic theory and its implications for the civic education roles and contributions of teachers, adult educators, community development practitioners, and community organizers. We will survey and deal critically with a range of competing conceptions of democracy, variously described as classical, republican, liberal, radical, marxist, neomarxist, pragmatist, feminist, populist, pluralist, postmodern, and/or participatory. Using narrative inquiry as a means for illuminating and interpreting contemporary practice, we will analyze the implications of different conceptions of democracy for the practical work of civic education.

Democracy and education.

Reconstruction in Philosophy

ionist strategies, 24 commitments, 181–182; normative, Accidentally true beliefs, 114 187–189, 197 Acknowledgments, 173–175, 177–179, 181 Assimilation, 2–3, 11 Acquired beliefs, 106–107, 121 Assimilationalism, 34 Action, 15, 24, 37–38, 79–96. See also Assimilation theories, 3, 6 Commitment(s); Practical Associationist strategies, 24 reasoningM Asymmetric substitution inferences, Adverbs, 206n14 135–136, 142–143, 144–146, 149, 151–154 Analysis of meanings, 31. See also Atomism, 15–16, 29, 31 Concepts Attributions, 168–169, 173–175, 178, Anscombe, G. E. M., 82 180–181 Articulation: inferential, 17, 22, 26, 28, Authority, 11, 31, 44, 76, 165 39, 44, 47, 52, 63, 108, 129, 161–166, 173, Awareness, 2, 7, 16–17, 20, 22, 24–25, 31, 178, 183, 193, 195, 220n4; conceptual, 35, 48, 157, 160 32; logical, 52; social, 158–159, 163 Ascriptions, 175–178, 183 Belief (s), 4–6, 12, 16–17, 37, 43, 53, 69, Assertibilism, 64, 185–189 82–84, 187, 210n2, 211n6; true, 39, Assertibility conditions, 196–198, 97–101, 106–108, 111–112, 114, 118–119; 201–202 and reliabilism, 97–121; acquired, Assertional commitments, 179 106–107, 121; perceptual, 108–109, 121; Assertional contents, 192, 194, 196 and reasons, 158–161, 165–166, 168, Assertional practices, 189, 193, 197 174–177, 180–182, 189, 191–192; Assertion(s): pragmatic nature of, collateral, 219n3. See also Commit11–12, 17, 40; and inferences, 15, 17, 43; ment(s) and singular terms, 125, 129, 145–147, Belnap, Nuel D., Jr., 68 152–153; and reasons, 161, 165, 189–195. Bennett, Jonathan, 70 See also Commitment(s); Language; Blindsight, super, 102–106 Copyright © 2000 The President and Fellows of Harvard College Blindspots, 39, 97–122 Boole, George, 58 Boolean logic, 58–59 Bottom-up semantic explanation, 12–15 Bradley, F. H., 140 Brandom, Robert B.: Making It Explicit, 10, 35–36, 80–81, 119, 205n7, 209n4 Carnap, Rudolph, 7, 23, 118; The Logical Syntax of Language, 50 Causal chains, 113–115. See also Reliabilism Causal functionalism, 95 Causes, 45–46, 53, 84, 94 Certainty, 210n1 Ceteris paribus clauses, 88–89 Charged words, 69–71 Chomsky, Noam, 126–127 Circumstances, 62–66, 69, 72, 74–75, 221n7. See also Assertion(s); Consequences Claims, 43–44, 48, 56–57, 64, 81–82, 86, 196–197; assertion of, 11–12, 125, 194; in semantic explanations, 12–15; expressive nature of, 16–19; conditional, 21–22, 86–87; inferentially articulated, 26, 28–29; knowledge, 39; and objects, 40; conceptual content of, 50; reliable, 107; counter-, 149; and reasons, 158–162, 164–169, 174–175, 180–183, 193; understanding, 189, 191; undertaking, 192; quantificational, 214n13 Classification, conceptual, 17, 48 Cognitive activity, 46, 157, 160 Cognitive responsibility, 105–106 Collateral beliefs, 219n3 Commitment-preserving inferences, 43–44, 195, 201. See also Inference(s) Commitment(s), 31, 73, 220nn5–6, 221n7; inferential, 30, 64, 69–79, 91, ◆ Index 223 147–149, 178; and reasons, 43, 163–168, 174–175, 177–178, 183, 189–196; incompatible, 44; explicit/implicit, 56–57; and practical reasoning, 80–85, 91–96; practical, 93–96; discursive, 94, 164–165; consequential, 108–109, 191–192; and reliabilism, 108–109, 118–120; SMSICs, 136–141; and singular terms, 151–153; substitutional, 178–182; assertional, 179; normative, 189–196, 198–203. See also Action; Assertion(s); Belief(s); Entitlement Committive inferences, 194 Communication: and representation, 165–169, 183; and beliefs, 180 Concepts, 1–22, 80, 108–109, 160 Conceptual articulation, 32 Conceptual assimilationalism, 34 Conceptual Blindspot, 39, 109, 117–118,

Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism

Phänomenologie des Geistes

WHETHER we like it or not a new order is coming. By this I do not mean the curious political philosophy paraded under that name but the changes brought about by the strong acid solvent of a great war. The Napoleonic wars spread throughout Europe the principles of the French Revolution ; Alexander left Greek culture behind in India. The very violence of this present conflict will eat away the dry rot of many an old privilege and outworn allegiance. Mankind learns quicker to-day ; the higher intelligence quotient of the average man gives a better spring-board for the start off. While admittedly the human animal would seem slow at its lessons it is not altogether a dullard, and war, as I have said, acts as a powerful tonic. Return to Reason ! An Essay in Political Diagnosis. By Geoffrey Bourne. (Hutchinson's Booklover's Library.) Pp. 64. (London, New York and Melbourne: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers), Ltd., 1942.) 2s. 6d. net.

Return to Reason

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality.

Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to Social Reality

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of "second nature" and "recognition". To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post-Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is significant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of "space of reasons" that stems from the Hegelian concept of "Spirit". I thus broach the notion of "second nature" as a bridge-concept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the "space of reasons" within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novel ties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between first and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribu...

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Second Nature and Recognition: Hegel and the Social Space

/pdf/hegel-s-naturalism-or-soul-and-body-in-the-encyclopedia-rqv4abitly.pdf

Hegel’s Naturalism or Soul and Body in the Encyclopedia

Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a dialectical concept which connects “impulse” and “habit,” “original” or “native” and “acquired” nature, “first” and “second nature.” Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing “routine” and “art” as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies.

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Dewey, Second Nature, Social Criticism, and the Hegelian Heritage

I tackle the definition of the relation between first and second nature while examining some problems with McDowell's conception. This, in the first place, will bring out the need to extend the not...

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Italo Testa

Papers

Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to Social Reality

Second Nature and Recognition: Hegel and the Social Space

Hegel’s Naturalism or Soul and Body in the Encyclopedia

Dewey, Second Nature, Social Criticism, and the Hegelian Heritage

Criticism from within nature The dialectic between first and second nature from McDowell to Adorno