The study of strategic surprise can be rather disappointing for those who have
always assumed that a better theoretical understanding of the subject at hand
would logically lead to the discovery of more effective practical means to
anticipate strategic surprise and alleviate its impact. Thus far in its application to
the real world, improved insight into the causes and pattern of strategic surprise
has made only a negligible contribution to the search for ways to warn of a
sudden attack in an accurate and timely fashion. If anything, the scrutiny of this
phenomenon in recent years has chiefly served to explain why surprise is almost
always unavoidable-and will continue to be so in the foreseeable futuredespite all efforts to the contrary.

Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise

(1972). The Soviet response to surprise attack: Three directives, 22 June 1941. Soviet Studies: Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 519-553.

J. Erickson

Papers

The Soviet response to surprise attack: Three directives, 22 June 1941