This paper considers whether all trading in a listed security should be required to go through an exchange. To this end, the incentives for a brokerage firm to offer in-house execution services are discussed, and an analytical framework is developed which shows that, under idealized conditions, fragmentation of the market through in-house execution services would not result in any overall deterioration of market performance characteristics. However, when some of the idealized conditions are relaxed, the market fragmentation arising from in-house execution causes the gains to some customers to be more than overcome by the losses to others. The analysis, which also takes account of the desirability of enforcing reasonable trading priority rules (such as priority by price and time) across all traders, yields several public policy implications. For some unlikely scenarios, it would be possible, through appropriate commission sharing and a perfectly operating intermarket trading system, for optimal overall market performance to be consistent with the market fragmentation inherent in in-house execution services. However, for most realistic scenarios, fragmentation would cause a deterioration in the quality of the market. Thus it seems desirable to require that all trading go through a central exchange with a consolidated limit order book.

An analysis of the economic justification for consolidation in a secondary security market

This paper is divided into two distinct parts. Part I, Empirical Evidence, tests a previously formulated variance, thinness relationship for security returns. First quarter 1972 daily returns variance is regressed on market value of shares, share price, trading activity, sales variance, and institutional holdings for 178 firms selected by stratified random sampling from AMEX and NYSE (specialist exchanges), and from Tokyo and Rio de Janeiro (non-specialist exchanges). The principal finding is that returns variance and market value are inversely related on non-specialist exchanges, but not on specialist exchanges; this difference is attributed to specialists' impact. Part II, Policy Proposals, discusses the manner in which designated market makers may be effectively incorporated into a continuous auction exchange. Issues discussed include: desirability of price stabilization, transfers implicit in the existing U.S. specialist system, consolidation and public availability of the limit order book, number of designated market makers for a security, competitive bidding, and compensation for performing the price stabilization function. Stabilization is modeled as an external economy, and specific policy proposals for internalizing it are advanced.

The impact of designated market makers on security prices

In this paper we investigate the effect of warning announcements on the price behaviour of stocks. We also study the effects of various corrective treatments (trading halts, call trading and 100% payment/delivery with order) on the performance of stocks in the Taiwan stock market. It is found that warning announcements serve to improve the performance of stocks, except in the case of consecutive warnings. Generally speaking, the corrective measures taken after the consecutive warnings are able to reduce the volatility, the abnormal returns and the excess liquidity of the stocks.

Stock market surveillance and market performance: The case of Taiwan

: A discussion is made of the stock exchange system in relation to the society, market criteria, investments, and speculation.

Jack Hirshleifer

Papers

Reflections on the Role and Functioning of the Organized Exchanges