I examine the phenomenon of implicit learning, the process by which knowledge about the ralegoverned complexities of the stimulus environment is acquired independently of conscious attempts to do so. Our research with the two, seemingly disparate experimental paradigms of synthetic grammar learning and probability learning is reviewed and integrated with other approaches to the general problem of unconscious cognition. The conclusions reached are as follows: (a) Implicit learning produces a tacit knowledge base that is abstract and representative of the structure of the environment; (b) such knowledge is optimally acquired independently of conscious efforts to learn; and (c) it can be used implicitly to solve problems and make accurate decisions about novel stimulus circumstances. Various epistemological issues and related prob1 lems such as intuition, neuroclinical disorders of learning and memory, and the relationship of evolutionary processes to cognitive science are also discussed. Some two decades ago the term implicit learning was first used to characterize how one develops intuitive knowledge about the underlying structure of a complex stimulus environment (Reber, 1965, 1967). In those early writings, I argued that implicit learning is characterized by two critical features: (a) It is an unconscious process and (b) it yields abstract knowledge. Implicit knowledge results from the induction of an abstract representation of the structure that the stimulus environment displays, and this knowledge is acquired in the absence of conscious, reflective strategies to learn. Since then, the evidence in support of this theory has been abundant, and many of the details of the process have been sharpened. This article is an overview of this evidence and an attempt to extend the general concepts to provide some insight into a variety of related processes such as arriving at intuitive judgments, complex decision making, and, in a broad sense, learning about the complex covariations among events that characterize the environment. Put simply, this is an article about learning. It seems curious, given the pattern of psychological investigation of the middle decades of this century, that the topic of learning should be so poorly represented in the contemporary literature in cognitive psychology. The energies of cognitive scientists have been invested largely in the analysis and modeling of existing knowledge rather than in investigations of how it was acquired. For example, in an important recent article on the general topic of unconscious memorial systems, Schacter (1987) never came to grips with the distinction between implicit learning and implicit memory. The latter, the focus of his review, was dealt with historically, characterized, out

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Implicit learning and tacit knowledge

Clonal Heterogeneity and Tumor Evolution: Past, Present, and the Future.

Overview: The Dynamics of Complex Systems-Examples, Questions, Methods and Concepts Introduction and Preliminaries Neural Networks I: Subdivision and Hierarchy Neural Networks II: Models of Mind Protein Folding I: Size Scaling of Time Protein Folding II: Kinetic Pathways Life I: Evolution-Origin of Complex Organisms Life II: Developmental Biology-Complex by Design Human Civilization I: Defining Complexity Human Civilization II: A Complex(ity) Transition.

Dynamics Of Complex Systems

In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.

/pdf/the-evolution-of-foresight-what-is-mental-time-travel-and-is-4i9wwln8os.pdf

The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans?

Epidemiology and the web of causation: Has anyone seen the spider?

Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, Stephen Jay Gould. W. W. Norton, New York (1989), 347, Price $19.95 (U.S.A.), $27.95 (Canada)

Two species of forest birds, the least flycatcher and the red-eyed vireo, when breeding in the same season in the same habitat, adjust their temporal pattern of singing to avoid the overlapping of songs. The avoidance of acoustic interference is more marked in the flycatcher, which has a briefer song than the vireo.

http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/183/4126/762.full.pdf

Temporal pattern shifts to avoid acoustic interference in singing birds.

“Chick-a-dee” calls of the black-capped chickadee (Parus atricapillus) constitute a combinatorial system of animal communication, apparently the only such system yet described. Four note-types, which may be omitted or repeated a variable number of times, occur in a fixed sequence (A–B–C–D) to constitute calls. Quantitative analyses determining the nature of departures from first-order transitional probabilities between successive notes revealed a variety of results that point consistently to two underlying features of calls. (1) Some constraint operates to limit the length of calls, as manifest in shortening of repetition-strings and omitting of note-types expected to follow. (2) There is an opposing tendency to include at least one or two D-notes at the end of a call, regardless of the overall length. The second feature suggests important semantic properties of D-notes, especially the ratio of D s to other note-types and the flock-specific acoustical structure of D-notes. The constraint on length of call does not appear intimately related to semantic causes, but may instead be determined by the maximum duration of continuous phonation, in parallel with the fundamental breath-group of human speech. In this respect, a “chick-a-dee” call resembles an entire “natural sentence” of spoken human language.

Constraints on the Structure of Combinatorial “Chick-a-dee” Calls

Combinatorial animal communication with computable syntax: Chick-a-dee calling qualifies as ‘Language’ by structural linguistics

https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article-pdf/31/6/458/586188/31-6-458a.pdf

Jack P. Hailman

Papers

Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, Stephen Jay Gould. W. W. Norton, New York (1989), 347, Price $19.95 (U.S.A.), $27.95 (Canada)

Temporal pattern shifts to avoid acoustic interference in singing birds.

Constraints on the Structure of Combinatorial “Chick-a-dee” Calls

Combinatorial animal communication with computable syntax: Chick-a-dee calling qualifies as ‘Language’ by structural linguistics

Ecology of Vision