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Jaemin Jeung

Researcher at Ajou University

Publications -  8
Citations -  41

Jaemin Jeung is an academic researcher from Ajou University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Jamming & Wireless network. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 8 publications receiving 36 citations.

Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI

Adaptive rapid channel-hopping scheme mitigating smart jammer attacks in secure WLAN

TL;DR: An adaptive rapid channel-hopping scheme using Dwell Window and a Deception Mechanism to mitigate smart jammer attacks and results show that the proposed scheme is more effective than prior studies.
Journal ArticleDOI

Measurement-based Channel Hopping Scheme against Jamming Attacks in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks

TL;DR: Simulation results show that proposed schemes make an immediate response right after a jammer detection since every device is aware of next hopping channel in advance and minimizes throughput degradation and keeps the advantages of DFS.
Book ChapterDOI

Anti jamming - based medium access control using adaptive rapid channel hopping in 802.11: AJ-MAC

TL;DR: An Adaptive Rapid Channel Hopping method using Dwell Window to adjust transmission time based on the jammer's ability and a Deception Mechanism that is another novel concept to make a jammer attack an unnecessary channel for a high throughput and a low probability of detection.
Book ChapterDOI

Authentication – based medium access control to prevent protocol jamming: A-MAC

TL;DR: This paper introduces Authentication-based Medium Access Control (A-MAC) to prevent Virtual Carrier Sense (VCS) Jamming attack and De-authentication / Disassociation Jamming Attack that are typical Protocol Jamming Attacks in 802.11 based wireless systems.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Control channel hopping for avoidance of scrambling attacks in IEEE 802.16 systems

TL;DR: Simulations show that the control channel of the proposed scheme survives against the scrambling attack and an additional random pulse jamming attack in the time domain.