scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers by "James Andreoni published in 1994"


Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the standard linear public goods game under two experimental conditions: the positive-frame condition and the negative frame condition, and they find that subjects in the positive frame condition are much more cooperative than those in the negativeframe condition, indicating that much of the cooperation observed in public goods experiments is due to framing.
Abstract: This paper considers the standard linear public goods game under two experimental conditions. The positive-frame condition is the regular public goods game that experimental economists have studied in the past. This frames the subject's choice as contributing to a public good, which will have a positive benefit to other subjects. The second condition is the negative-frame condition. The incentives of this game are identical to the positive-frame condition. However, this time a subject's choice is framed as purchasing a private good which, since the opportunity cost is the purchase of the public good, makes the other subjects worse off. The result is that subjects in the positive-frame condition are much more cooperative than subjects in the negative-frame condition. This indicates that much of the cooperation observed in public goods experiments is due to framing, and that the warm-glow of creating a positive externality appears to be stronger than the cold-prickle of creating a negative externality.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

65 citations