The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language

Naming and necessity

1. Introducing the Puzzle 2. Contextualism and the Puzzle 3. Invariantist Treatments 4. Sensitive Moderate Invariantism Bibliography

Knowledge and lotteries

Naturalizing the Mind

THE distinguished author of “Why the Mind has a Body” is one of the most original and fearless philosophers of the school which labels itself “Critical Realism.” The present short volume, though it is written with all the freshness and vigour we associate with his work, is frankly disappointing. This is because, instead of stating his theory and advancing his argument from his own point of view, he develops it by means of a rather tedious criticism of Mr. Bradley, Mr. Russell, M. Bergson, and other philosophers. His own theory rests, he tells us, on two assumptions: first, that there is a world; second, that there is a self. Nature, he is convinced, is really what it appears to be, and the self is an outgrowth of nature, though in some of its manifestations rising above it. It seems to us that the primary difficulty of such assumptions is that they conflict with physical science and are irreconcilable with the scientific concepts of nature and self. In philosophy, assumptions in the premises have a curious knack of turning up in the conclusion so that no real progress can be made, but they are otherwise harmless enough. Scientific reality is a question of real metaphysical interest at the present time, but it finds no place in this theory, which is mainly concerned with the question of sense-data.A Theory of Knowledge.Charles AugustusStrongBy. Pp. xii+103. (London, Bombay and Sydney: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1923.) 6s. net.

Theory of Knowledge

Dans la cadre du debat sur la perception du monde exterieur qui oppose le scepticisme et le faillibilisme, l'A. defend une position dogmatique inspiree de l'epistemologie antisceptique de G. E. Moore. Adoptant un modele propositionnel de l'experience, l'A. developpe une approche positive de la justification de la perception.

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The Skeptic and the Dogmatist

1 Some Diagnoses Moore looked at his hands and argued: (1) Here are two hands. (2) If hands exist, then there is an external world. (3) So there is an external world. 1 Something about this argument sounds funny. As we'll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. I will assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but I won't. I'll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore's argument using Contextualist machinery. They'll say: In some contexts, it'd be true to count Moore as knowing he has hands and that there is an external world. In more restrictive contexts, it would not. Moore's argument sounds funny because Moore plays fast and loose with the context. His straightforward assertion ''Here are two hands'' invites us to occupy a lax context; but one would only be concerned to argue that there's an external world in a more restrictive context, where the existence of the external world is an open question. If these philosophers are right to count 'knows' as context-sensitive, 2 then they're probably right in their complaint that Moore's performance plays

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What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?

This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on (i) contextualism about knowledge attributions, (ii) modest forms of foundationalism, and (iii) the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.

Highlights of Recent Epistemology

Immunity to Error through Misidentification

I’ve defended views about the epistemology of perception that I call “dogmatist.” They are close to views defended by Michael Huemer and John Pollock, and somewhat more broadly to a range of views defended by others. These views have been criticized for being incompatible with Bayesianism. I will take Roger White’s “Problems for Dogmatism” (White 2006) as representing these criticisms. This essay will review and assess some central pieces of the criticisms. Doing so will reveal some limits of Bayesianism when it comes to representing undermining evidence.

James Pryor

Papers

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist

What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?

Highlights of Recent Epistemology

Immunity to Error through Misidentification

Problems for Credulism