THIS paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the far' ory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economics of Welfare. The conclusions to which this kind of analyris seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other

闡釋《社會成本問題》[The Problem of Social Cost]

Much effort goes into building markets as a tool for economic and social development, often overlooking that in too many places social exclusion and poverty prevent many, especially women, from participating in and accessing markets. Building on data from rural Bangladesh and analyzing the work of a prominent intermediary organization, we uncover institutional voids as the source of market exclusion and identify two sets of activities – redefining market architecture and legitimating new actors – as critical for building ‘inclusive' markets. We expose voids as ‘analytical spaces' and illustrate how they result from conflict and contradiction among institutional ‘bits and pieces' from local political, community, and religious spheres. Our findings put forward a perspective on market building that highlights the ‘on the ground' dynamics and attends to the ‘institutions at play', to their consequences, and to a more diverse set of ‘inhabitants' of institutions.

Building Inclusive Markets in Rural Bangladesh : How Intermediaries Work Institutional Voids

Interest in studying the relationship between economic institutions and economic phenomena has been increasing. Indeed, economists point to property rights as constituting one of the most interesting fields of study. Developing countries generally have a weak property rights system, and it is thought that such a system can function like a set of shackles that cripples economic progress. In contrast, developed countries have a strong property rights system, especially in the case of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and this encourages firms to invest in research and development (R&D). In the first two chapters, we study agents’ behavior and economic performance in a developing country. The developing country shares a common capital that everyone can access, and is not secured property. The common-pool problem is widely used to analyze such an economy. It is well known that excess use of the commons can be observed in the economy. This is called the tragedy of the commons. Excess use of the commons is also a cause of the voracity effect. This is defined as a positive technology shock in the common sector that leads to an increase in appropriation, thus stagnating the economy. In chapter 2, we explore a new interpretation of what causes voraciousness and investigate the effects of voracious behavior on a developing country. For this purpose, we introduce a new direction of capital flow. A government mandates that all groups invest their private capital in the common sector to mitigate the effects of excess use of the commons. We show that, while there is no standard voracity effect, an increase in the contribution of the private sector to the common sector causes more voracious behavior and thus slows economic growth. This implies that policies designed to preserve the commons can lead to harmful effects on the economy. Chapter 3 relaxes the assumption imposed in the existing literature to consider situations in which each interest group can observe and take an interest in opponents’ private capital stocks. Here, we find a new Markovian Nash equilibrium that shows the following: the opponents’

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Economic Analysis of Property Rights

In the near century since Hohfeld published the second of his two papers on fundamental legal conceptions, his thought has been generally regarded as a bulwark of the ‘bundle of rights’ picture of property. This chapter shows (1) that the synthesis of Hohfeld’s thought with that of Tony Honoré’s theory of ownership to underpin this picture does not work; (2) that property reveals a coherent tripartite structure of title—the right to immediate exclusive possession, the power to license what would otherwise be a trespass, and the power to transfer; and (3) that the numerus clausas principle integrates property and contractual relations.

The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property Revisited

Purpose – This paper aims to analyse how processes of institutional change in environments of institutional ’voids’ affect smallholder farmer market access in Zambia and Malawi, and explores the role of different dis/enabling institutional agents and logics. The authors examine this in the context of two divergent routes of institutional change – one externally imposed and the second driven from within the ecosystem itself. The authors consider how these different institutional processes impact upon smallholder farmers and how they are able to adapt to these changes. 
Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative research approach is used which lends itself to an analysis of multiple institutional logics that is based upon the multiple positions of market actors. It uses a comparative case study design methodology focused on two broad cases of smallholder farmers in Zambia and Malawi. 
Findings – The research demonstrates the tension that multiple institutional logics can create especially amongst those most vulnerable particularly where these are not embedded in local realities and mindful of social settings. 
Originality/value – It contributes to the understanding of poverty alleviation in rural developing regions, on overcoming institutional voids, market inclusivity and the role of social entrepreneurs and intermediaries, and builds on the perspective of markets as social spaces for economic exchange.

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Negotiating new institutional logics: market access amongst smallholder farmers in Zambia and Malawi

We explore whether there is evidence of property rights amongst the homeless, and if so, how these rights are governed. By conducting interviews with 52 homeless people in Cape Town, we show that although the homeless are able to derive some value from assets, and can exclude other members of their community, these rights are precarious and dependent upon state agents not seizing the ‘property’ and overriding the community’s rules of the game. We demonstrate the intersectionality of claims with respect to the same physical property from the varying perspectives of the claimants involved and how this differs depending on the property. Homeless people rely on a community logic to develop rules of the game which results in the appearance of a market logic. In the absence of formal institutions effectively operating in their spaces, they have constituted social norms which provide some semblance of property rights respected intra-group.

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James Rycroft

Papers

Homelessness, social relations and institutional logics: property rights without property?