American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

This book explores the legal culture of the Parsis, or Zoroastrians, an ethnoreligious community unusually invested in the colonial legal system of British India and Burma. Rather than trying to maintain collective autonomy and integrity by avoiding interaction with the state, the Parsis sank deep into the colonial legal system itself. From the late eighteenth century until India's independence in 1947, they became heavy users of colonial law, acting as lawyers, judges, litigants, lobbyists, and legislators. They de-Anglicized the law that governed them and enshrined in law their own distinctive models of the family and community by two routes: frequent intra-group litigation often managed by Parsi legal professionals in the areas of marriage, inheritance, religious trusts, and libel, and the creation of legislation that would become Parsi personal law. Other South Asian communities also turned to law, but none seem to have done so earlier or in more pronounced ways than the Parsis.

Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture, 1772–1947

The U.S. Supreme Court and constitutional courts around the world regularly use the term human dignity when deciding cases about freedom of speech, reproductive rights, racial equality, gay marriage, and bioethics. Judges and scholars treat dignity as an important legal value, but they usually do not explain what it means and often imply that it has one obvious core meaning. A close review of constitutional decisions, however, demonstrates that courts do not have a singular conception of dignity, but rather different conceptions based on how they balance individual rights with the demands of social policy and community values. Using the insights of political theory and philosophy, this Article identifies three concepts of dignity used by constitutional courts and demonstrates how these concepts are fundamentally different in ways that matter for constitutional law. In contentious cases, the concepts of dignity will often conflict. If constitutional courts continue to rely on human dignity, judges must choose between different understandings of dignity. This Article provides the groundwork for making these choices and defending a concept of dignity consistent with American constitutional traditions.

Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law

This	   thesis	  offers	   a	   critical	  historical	   analysis	  of	   the	  discourses	  on	   sexual	   and	  gender diversity	   related	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   Islamic	   law,	   as	   well	   as	   an ethnographic	   account	   of	   contemporary	   Muslims	   in	   Lahore,	   Pakistan	   whose	   pluralist sexual	  and	  gender	  experience	  defies	  the	  punitive	  gaze	  of	  state	  law. The	  central	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  project	  is	  that	  critical	  –	  and	  parallel	  –	  examinations	  of	  the legal,	   social	   and	   political	   genealogies	   of	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   the	   Islamic	   legal tradition,	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  human	  sexual	  and	  gender	  difference,	  can	  reveal	  some	  salient patterns	  of	  insurrectionary	  vernacular	  discursive	  practices.	  It	  is,	  moreover,	  posited	  that sexually	  diverse	  and	  gender-­‐variant	  Muslims	  already	  engage	   in	   such	  practices,	  which help	  them	  to	  negotiate	  their	  legal,	  political	  and	  social	  positions.	  The	  ethnographic	  part of	   this	   thesis,	   then,	   documents	   and	   interrogates	   those	   practices,	   while	   the concomitantly	   pursued	   historical	   analysis	   provides	   a	   broader	   background	   for understanding	  their	  invaluable	  role. Thereby	  compiled	  and	  recounted,	  a	  history	  –	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  plurality	  amidst	  the umma1	  past	  and	  present	  –	  is	  always	  already	  in	  the	  making.	  Whilst	  its	  roots	  –	  and	  rites	  – run	   deep	   into	   the	   idiosyncratic	   forms	   of	   Muslim	   sociality,	   that	   narrative	   is	   now increasingly	   seen	   as	   a	   part	   of	   larger	   human	   rights	   and	   sexual/gender	   reforms.	   This thesis,	   thus,	   also	   endeavours	   to	   contextualise	   and	   historicise	   the	   treatment	   of sexual/gender	  diversity	  in	  international	  law	  –	  epitomised	  in	  the	  (legal)	  ascendance	  of the	   notions	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   gender	   identity	   –	   by	   retracing,	   inter	   alia,	   the making	  of	  the	  sexual	  and	  gendered	  subject	  of	  Christian	  and	  European	  law. Ultimately,	   this	   thesis	   is	   an	   interdisciplinary	   account	   of	   Muslim	   sexual	   and	   gender diversity,	   and	   of	   the	   attempts	   of	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   legal	   systems	   at	   its regulation.

A history in the making : Muslim sexual and gender diversity between international human rights law and Islamic law

Similar to many parts of South Asia, hijras in Pakistan define themselves as a distinctive gender that is neither men nor women This article explores hijra identity in Pakistan by focusing

Spiritualising Marginality: Sufi Concepts and the Politics of Identity in Pakistan:

From ‘She-males’ to ‘Unix’

In this article, I offer both a critique of and alternatives to a recent proposal by Brazil to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) concerning sexual orientation persecution and discrimination.I begin my argument by demonstrating, as in the case of Egypt, how state persecution of gays, lesbians, and homosexuals around the globe is often steeped in claims of religiosity. I then go on to demonstrate, as well, that while it is certainly true that some homosexuals want to identify as gay, some do not wish to so identify. Moreover, some who do so identify don't necessarily understand gay as first and foremost a sexual identity at every point in time (if ever at all). For this latter set of persons, their gayness or homosexuality is deeply interwoven with personal experiences and understandings of religion. Accordingly, when such homo-sectuals - to use a neologism - are persecuted, they understand this persecution as religious persecution. Thus, as formulated and understood by many governments and persons - but not, as I argue, by enough international human rights activists - persecution of the sexual can often actually be persecution of the religious.Given this reality, and using a subsequent discussion of a related set of religious and sexual politics in India, I demonstrate how international human rights norms and practices can and should do a better job of respecting persons' diverse self-identifications and self-understandings. These international norms and practices can demonstrate such respect, I argue, by more seriously deploying existing human rights protections concerning religious persecution and discrimination, instead of insisting that the forms of persecution and discrimination discussed in this article must now be understood as sexual for all people, no matter where located. The particular international human rights norms and practices whose reform I discuss in this respect are those which deal with states' persecutory anti-sodomy laws, as well as those which concern international law's treatment of the gay refugee.

Human Rights and Homo-Sectuals: The International Politics of Sexuality, Religion, and Law

In the summer of 2009, the Supreme Court of Pakistan ordered the Government of Pakistan, and also the governments of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the Northwest Frontier provinces to better provide for Pakistan's transgendered citizens. This intervention by the Supreme Court into the social situation facing Pakistani transgendered citizens came as a surprise to many casual observers of Pakistan's political and legal landscape, albeit one that was welcomed by many. For others however, including many progressives, the Supreme Court's intervention resulted in as much puzzlement and consternation as it did relief. The Court's finding, for example, that transgenderism is a kind of "gender disorder" - as a predicate for the Court’s action on behalf of transgendered individuals - was just one of several aspects of the Court’s 'benevolence' that gave people cause to worry about what the Court was up to.While the legal and social issues raised by the Supreme Court of Pakistan's recent actions vis-a-vis transgendered individuals can be examined in many different ways and for many different purposes, in this chapter I will analyze how and why different conceptions of gender and identity circulated in the events surrounding the Supreme Court's actions. Specifically, I want to examine not only how state actors involved in this litigation articulated, at various times and spaces connected to the events surrounding this litigation, different conceptions of Pakistan’s transgendered citizens' gender, but also why these conceptions changed across time and space. Even more specifically, I aim to analyze how and why the gender of the transgendered individuals whose welfare was at issue in the Supreme Court changed from the time they were arrested in a police raid on a wedding party in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, until the time they and their brethren were 'liberated' by the Supreme Court in Islamabad, Pakistan. At different moments in this inter-urban and inter-institutional journey, these transgendered individuals were considered to be anything from 'she-males, to 'unix,' and also other things as well.

From 'She-Males' to 'Unix': Transgender Rights and the Productive Paradoxes of Pakistani Policing

In May 2018, Pakistan’s Parliament approved the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2018. The law was enacted following nine years of concerted judicial activity, public discussion, and activism by transgender people in Pakistan. This article surveys the major features of the 2018 Act, explaining where and how they realise significant changes to the official ‘law of gender’ in Pakistan, and also identifying where provisions of the Act create room for confusion or even worry. In the course of this analysis, some background will also be given on the discussions concerning transgender rights in Pakistan that preceded this landmark legislation, as well as the global discussions on transgender rights that are being shaped by developments in Pakistan. This article concludes by suggesting areas where the 2018 Act will have to be amended (or new legislation introduced altogether) to address key rights issues that remain outstanding in Pakistan.

The Pakistan Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act of 2018 and Its Impact on the Law of Gender in Pakistan

In 2005, a private attorney filed suit in the Supreme Court of India asking the Court to take action against a non-state, Muslim civil dispute resolution system that has been operating in parts of India for nearly 90 years. Specifically, the petitioner in this suit, Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India, demanded that the Supreme Court "[d]eclare that the… activities being pursued by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board… and other similar organizations for establishment of Muslim Judicial System (Nizam-e-Qaza) and setting up of Dar-ul-Qazas (Muslim Courts) and Sharia Court[s] in India is absolutely illegal, illegitimate and unconstitutional." While the Supreme Court of India has yet to decide or even hear the petitioner's claims, and thus the outcome of the petitioner's case is uncertain, there are many reasons to doubt the strength or even plausibility of the petitioner's claims. This Article will discuss specific weaknesses with the petitioner's arguments. However, it will also confirm the overall importance of the petitioner's institutional arguments, as well as the institutional counter-arguments (in favor of non-state, Muslim civil dispute resolution institutions) that the petitioner's arguments have elicited. As this Article argues, both the arguments and counter-arguments made in Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India indicate an institutional turn in arguments for (and against) legal pluralism. This new institutional pluralism not only has different social and political antecedents than (liberally-grounded) pluralisms of old, but also different prospects. At the very least, institutional pluralism calls for different goals and strategies by feminists and other progressives who have traditionally been interested in (and concerned about) legal pluralism.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1648945_code1090388.pdf?abstractid=1648945&mirid=4

Jeffrey A. Redding

Papers

From ‘She-males’ to ‘Unix’

Human Rights and Homo-Sectuals: The International Politics of Sexuality, Religion, and Law

From 'She-Males' to 'Unix': Transgender Rights and the Productive Paradoxes of Pakistani Policing

The Pakistan Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act of 2018 and Its Impact on the Law of Gender in Pakistan

Institutional v. Liberal Contexts for Contemporary Non-State, Muslim Civil Dispute Resolution Systems