Publisher Summary This chapter reviews the supply chain coordination with contracts. Numerous supply chain models are discussed. In each model, the supply chain optimal actions are identified. The chapter extends the newsvendor model by allowing the retailer to choose the retail price in addition to the stocking quantity. Coordination is more complex in this setting because the incentives provided to align one action might cause distortions with the other action. The newsvendor model is also extended by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand. Coordination is challenging because the retailer's effort is noncontractible—that is, the firms cannot write contracts based on the effort chosen. The chapter also discusses an infinite horizon stochastic demand model in which the retailer receives replenishments from a supplier after a constant lead time. Coordination requires that the retailer chooses a large basestock level.

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts

Many companies have embarked on initiatives that enable more demand information sharing between retailers and their upstream suppliers. While the literature on such initiatives in the business press is proliferating, it is not clear how one can quantify the benefits of these initiatives and how one can identify the drivers of the magnitudes of these benefits. Using analytical models, this paper aims at addressing these questions for a simple two-level supply chain with nonstationary end demands. Our analysis suggests that the value of demand information sharing can be quite high, especially when demands are significantly correlated over time.

The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain

Perspectives in supply chain risk management

Remaining useful life estimation - A review on the statistical data driven approaches

This paper presents a polynomial dimensional decomposition (PDD) method for global sensitivity analysis of stochastic systems subject to independent random input following arbitrary probability distributions. The method involves Fourier-polynomial expansions of lower-variate component functions of a stochastic response by measure-consistent orthonormal polynomial bases, analytical formulae for calculating the global sensitivity indices in terms of the expansion coefficients, and dimension-reduction integration for estimating the expansion coefficients. Due to identical dimensional structures of PDD and analysis-of-variance decomposition, the proposed method facilitates simple and direct calculation of the global sensitivity indices. Numerical results of the global sensitivity indices computed for smooth systems reveal significantly higher convergence rates of the PDD approximation than those from existing methods, including polynomial chaos expansion, random balance design, state-dependent parameter, improved Sobol’s method, and sampling-based methods. However, for non-smooth functions, the convergence properties of the PDD solution deteriorate to a great extent, warranting further improvements. The computational complexity of the PDD method is polynomial, as opposed to exponential, thereby alleviating the curse of dimensionality to some extent. Mathematical modeling of complex systems often requires sensitivity analysis to determine how an output variable of interest is influenced by individual or subsets of input variables. A traditional local sensitivity analysis entails gradients or derivatives, often invoked in design optimization, describing changes in the model response due to the local variation of input. Depending on the model output, obtaining gradients or derivatives, if they exist, can be simple or difficult. In contrast, a global sensitivity analysis (GSA), increasingly becoming mainstream, characterizes how the global variation of input, due to its uncertainty, impacts the overall uncertain behavior of the model. In other words, GSA constitutes the study of how the output uncertainty from a mathematical model is divvied up, qualitatively or quantitatively, to distinct sources of input variation in the model [1].

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of the prices in each channel. We model each channel as a newsvendor problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In addition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for each channel and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for the system. We compare this equilibrium solution to the solution for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer owns both the online store and the retailer. To enable supply chain coordination, we then propose two contract schemes: a modified revenue sharing contract and gain/loss sharing contract. We show that such contracts enable the manufacturer to maintain price discrimination, selling the products in different channels at different prices. Finally, we perform a comprehensive numerical study to consider the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium and to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination contracts. We conclude that coordination is most critical for products which are highly price sensitive and for systems in which the online and traditional retail channels are not viewed as close substitutes.

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Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model under Price Competition

Replacement Decisions With Imperfect Condition Information

Problem definition: We study profit allocation for a sourcing network, in which a buyer sources from a set of differentiated suppliers with limited capacity under uncertain demand for the final product. Whereas the buyer takes the lead in forming the sourcing network and designing the contract mechanism, due to their substantial bargaining power, the suppliers take the lead in determining the terms of the contract. Academic/practical relevance: We identify contracting mechanisms that will ensure the stability of the sourcing network in the long term, where a stable sourcing network requires an effective profit-allocation scheme that motivates all members to join and stay in the network. Methodology: We apply methods from game theory to model the network and analyze the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game under a proposed contracting mechanism. We then use a cooperative game model to study the stability of the resulting equilibrium. Results: We show that the optimal network profit, as a set function of the set of suppliers, is submodular, which allows us to demonstrate that the core of the cooperative game is not empty. We also establish a set of conditions that are equivalent to, but much simpler than, the original conditions for the core. We use these results to demonstrate that the proposed fixed-fee contracting mechanism can implement a stable network in the competitive setting by achieving a profit allocation that is in the core of the cooperative game. We also demonstrate that the grand coalition is stable in a farsighted sense under the Shapley value allocation. Managerial implications: Under the fixed-fee mechanism, the buyer’s decisions maximize the network profit, and each supplier earns a profit equal to its marginal contribution. When the aggregate capacity of the supplier network is high relative to demand, or demand is more likely to be small, the fixed-fee mechanism is likely to outperform the Shapley value allocation from the perspective of the buyer.

http://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstreams/ec687af5-7c75-5874-ba49-0394c32f52ac/download

Jennifer K. Ryan

Papers

Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model under Price Competition

Replacement Decisions With Imperfect Condition Information

Contracting Mechanisms for Stable Sourcing Networks