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The concept of mind

Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”

LETTERS to the EDITORPhilosophy of science

In discussing the philosophical system put forward in PR, we need to point out that not only does Whitehead introduce a novel terminology, but the work itself is somewhat amorphous in character, and this despite his attempt to state a categoreal scheme — a general scheme of ideas in terms of which all our experience is to be described. There is also a considerable amount of overlap between the various parts of this book. It might have been a clearer and more effective work if Whitehead had engaged in some judicious pruning before publication.

Process and Reality

This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of nonrecurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti-reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels 'anomalous monism'. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the 'constitutive ideal of rationality', if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events. Essays on Actions and Events Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in In memory of Nancy Hirschberg I 2 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © in this collection Donald Davidson 2001 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 1980 This edition first published 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-924626-2 (Hbk.) ISBN 0-19-924627-0 (Pbk.) In memory of Nancy Hirschberg Intention and Action

Essays on Actions and Events.

Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.

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A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions

To determine whether dispositions are causally relevant, we have to get clear about what causal relevance is. Several characteristics of causal relevance have been suggested, including Explanatory Power, Counterfactual Dependence, Lawfullness, Exclusion, Independence, and Minimal Sufficiency. Different accounts will yield different answers about the causal relevance of dispositions. However, accounts of causal relevance that are the most plausible, for independent reasons, render the verdict that dispositions are causally relevant.

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Are Dispositions Causally Relevant

According to some philosophers, gender is a social role or pattern of behavior in a social context. I argue that these accounts have problematic implications for transgender. I suggest that gender is a complex behavioral disposition, or cluster of dispositions. Furthermore, since gender norms are culturally relative, one’s gender is partially constituted by extrinsic factors. I argue that this has advantages over thinking of gender as behavior, and has the added advantage of accommodating the possibility of an appearance/reality dissonance with respect to one’s gender.

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A dispositional account of gender

Acknowledgements 1. Introduction H. Kincaid & J. McKitrick. 2. Normality, Disease and Enhancement T. Benditt. 3. Holistic Theories of Health as Applied to Non-human Living Beings L. Nordenfelt. 4: The Spread of Disease: How to Understand and Resolve a Dispute About the Reality of Disease R. D'Amico. 5. Decision and Discovery in Defining Disease P. Schwartz. 6. Race and Scientific Reduction M. Risjord. 7. Towards an Adequate Account of Genetic Disease K. Smith. 8: Why Disease Persist: An Evolutionary Nosology R. Perlman. 9. Creating Mental Illness in Nondisordered Community Populations A. Horwitz. 10. Gender Identity Disorder J. McKitrick. 11. Clinical Trails as Nomological Machines: Implications for Evidence Based Medicine R. Bluhm. 12. The Social Epistemology of NIH Consensus Conferences M. Solomon. 13. Maternal Agency and the Immunological Paradox of Pregnancy M. Howes. 14. Violence and Public Health J. Kaplan. 15. Take Equipoise Seriously: The Failure of Clinical Equipoise or Community Equipoise to Resolve the Ethical Dilemmas in Randomized Clinical Trials F. Gifford.

Establishing medical reality : essays in the metaphysics and epistemology of biomedical science

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Jennifer McKitrick

Papers

A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions

Are Dispositions Causally Relevant

A dispositional account of gender

Establishing medical reality : essays in the metaphysics and epistemology of biomedical science

Manifestations as Effects