Since the 1960s, successive protest movements have challenged public policies, established modes of political participation and socio-economic institutions in advanced industrial democracies. Social scientists have responded by conducting case studies of such movements. Comparative analyses, particularly cross-national comparisons of social movements, however, remain rare, although opportunities abound to observe movements with similar objectives or forms of mobilization in diverse settings.

Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies

Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making (‘Politikverflechtung’) in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a ‘problem-solving’ (as opposed to a ‘bargaining’) style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the ‘bargaining’ style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory joint-decision systems. This ‘joint-decision trap’ is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub-optimal policy output, seem to represent ‘local optima’ when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration.

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The joint‐decision trap: lessons from german federalism and european integration

Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' ‘negativity bias’: their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, ‘passing the buck’ and defection (‘jumping on the bandwagon’) that are different than those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claiming opportunities.

The Politics of Blame Avoidance

Observers of the European Community have criticized “intergovernmentalist” accounts for exaggerating the extent of member-state control over European integration. This article grounds these critici...

The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) has generated considerable interest among European policy scholars. This article summarizes some of the more important findings concerning, and changes to, the ACF since the last major revision in 1993. These include: (1) a much clearer model of the individual; (2) a clearer, more integrated concept of ‘policy subsystem;’ (3) much greater attention to the problematic nature of collective behavior among people who share policy beliefs; and (4) some suggestions concerning methods of ascertaining the existence and membership of advocacy coalitions. The article also briefly addresses the ACF's applicability to parliamentary systems, to the countries of Eastern Europe, and to the dynamic politics of the European Union.

The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe

Much of the British and European literature on the role of interest groups in the policy process focuses on their participation in policy networks of various types. Possibly reflecting the original...

Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change:

PART 1 STATE BUILDING, DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION AND A MULTISPEED EUROPE 1 The EU as a policy-making state: a policy system like any other? Jeremy Richardson 2 The EU as a system of differentiated integration: a challenge for theories of European integration? Frank Schimmelfennig and Berthold Rittberger 3 The politics of multispeed integration in the European Union Christian B Jensen and Jonathan B Slapin PART 2: INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSING 4 The European Commission Arndt Wonka 5 The EU's multilevel parliamentary system Berthold Rittberger and Thomas Winzen 6 The Councils of the EU: intergovernmental bargaining in a supranational polity Daniel Naurin 7 The shadow of case law: the Court of Justice of the European union and the policy process Susanne Schmidt 8 The distribution of power among institutions Robert Thomson 9 The EU budget: which fiscal capacity at the European level? Henrik Enderlein , Ole Funker, and Johannes Lindner 10 EU agencies Berthold Rittberger and Arndt Wonka PART 3: VARIEGATED POLICY-MAKING 11 EU enlargement Frank Schimmelfennig 12 The EU as an international actor Michael Smith 13 European regulation Mark Thatcher 14 European macroeconomic governance Erik Jones and Gregory W Fuller 15 Covert integration in the European Union Adrienne Heritier 16 Implementation Christoph Knill PART 4: CHANNELS OF REPRESENTATION 17 European elections and the European voter Mark Franklin and Sara B Hobolt 18 Shooting where the ducks are: EU lobbying and institutionalized promiscuity Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson 19 Bypassing the nation state? Regions and the EU policy process Michael Keating, Liesbet Hooghe, and Michael Tatham 20 Political Representation and democracy in the EU Sandra Kroger

European Union: Power and Policy-Making

Part 1 The European lobbying process: introduction - transference of power, decision rules and rules of the game, S. Mazey and J. Richardson pressure groups and the EC - an overview, W. Grant the role of the National Civil Service and European lobbying - the British case, D. Spence the structure of the European Commission and the policy formation process, M. Donnelly. part 2 Sectoral Studies: Europe of the regions? territorial interests and European integration - the Scottish experience, S. Mazey and J. Mitchell the rationality of lobbying in Europe - why are Euro-groups so numerous and so weak? some evidence from the car industry, A. McLaughlin and G. Jordan groups and the process of European integration - the work of the federation of stock exchanges in the European Community, J. Knight et al defending and promoting a sectoral interest within the European Community - the case of the textile polyolefins industry, J.P. Peckstadt et al lobbying in Europe - the experience of voluntary organizations, B. Harvey the confederation of British industry and policy-making in the European Community, R. Eberlie business lobbying in the European Community - the union of industrial and employers' confederations of Europe, L. Collie the corporate benefits of lobbying - the British case and its relevance to the European Community, J. Sargent conclusion - a European policy style?, S. Mazey and J. Richardson.

Jeremy Richardson

Papers

Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change:

European Union: Power and Policy-Making

Lobbying in the European Community

Policy Styles in Western Europe

Governing under pressure : the policy process in a post-parliamentary democracy