世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

MKT 6009 Marketing Internship (0 semester credit hours) Student gains experience and improves skills through appropriate developmental work assignments in a real business environment. Student must identify and submit specific business learning objectives at the beginning of the semester. The student must demonstrate exposure to the managerial perspective via involvement or observation. At semester end, student prepares an oral or poster presentation, or a written paper reflecting on the work experience. Student performance is evaluated by the work supervisor. Pass/Fail only. Prerequisites: (MAS 6102 or MBA major) and department consent required. (0-0) S MKT 6244 Digital Marketing Strategy (2 semester credit hours) Executive Education Course. The course explores three distinct areas within marketing and sales namely, digital marketing, traditional sales prospecting, and executive sales organization and strategy. The continuing convergence of the digital marketing and sales funnels has created a strategic continuum from digital lead generation to digital sales. The course identifies the current composition of this digital continuum while providing opportunities to evaluate sales and marketing digital strategies. Prerequisites: MKT 6301 and instructor consent required. (2-0) Y MKT 6301 (SYSM 6318) Marketing Management (3 semester credit hours) Overview of marketing management methods, principles and concepts including product, pricing, promotion and distribution decisions as well as segmentation, targeting and positioning. (3-0) S MKT 6309 Marketing Data Analysis and Research (3 semester credit hours) Methods employed in market research and data analysis to understand consumer behavior, customer journeys, and markets so as to enable better decision-making. Topics include understanding different sources of data, survey design, experiments, and sampling plans. The course will cover the techniques used for market sizing estimation and forecasting. In addition, the course will cover the foundational concepts and techniques used in data visualization and \"story-telling\" for clients and management. Corequisites: MKT 6301 and OPRE 6301. (3-0) Y MKT 6310 Consumer Behavior (3 semester credit hours) An exposition of the theoretical perspectives of consumer behavior along with practical marketing implication. Study of psychological, sociological and behavioral findings and frameworks with reference to consumer decision-making. Topics will include the consumer decision-making model, individual determinants of consumer behavior and environmental influences on consumer behavior and their impact on marketing. Prerequisite: MKT 6301. (3-0) Y MKT 6321 Interactive and Digital Marketing (3 semester credit hours) Introduction to the theory and practice of interactive and digital marketing. Topics covered include: online-market research, consumer behavior, conversion metrics, and segmentation considerations; ecommerce, search and display advertising, audiences, search engine marketing, email, mobile, video, social networks, and the Internet of Things. (3-0) T MKT 6322 Internet Business Models (3 semester credit hours) Topics to be covered are: consumer behavior on the Internet, advertising on the Internet, competitive strategies, market research using the Internet, brand management, managing distribution and supply chains, pricing strategies, electronic payment systems, and developing virtual organizations. Further, students learn auction theory, web content design, and clickstream analysis. Prerequisite: MKT 6301. (3-0) Y MKT 6323 Database Marketing (3 semester credit hours) Techniques to analyze, interpret, and utilize marketing databases of customers to identify a firm's best customers, understanding their needs, and targeting communications and promotions to retain such customers. Topics

Marketing for management.

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

https://ir.nctu.edu.tw:443/bitstream/11536/11597/1/000241644200052.pdf

Total-factor energy efficiency of regions in China

https://ir.nctu.edu.tw:443/bitstream/11536/11291/1/000242452600031.pdf

Efficient energy-saving targets for APEC economies

https://ir.nctu.edu.tw:443/bitstream/11536/10616/1/000247535400006.pdf

Renewable energy and macroeconomic efficiency of OECD and non-OECD economies

https://ir.nctu.edu.tw:443/bitstream/11536/16453/1/000305592300021.pdf

Ecological total-factor energy efficiency of regions in China

https://ir.nctu.edu.tw:443/bitstream/11536/9713/1/000253274200031.pdf

Jin-Li Hu

Papers

Total-factor energy efficiency of regions in China

Efficient energy-saving targets for APEC economies

Renewable energy and macroeconomic efficiency of OECD and non-OECD economies

Ecological total-factor energy efficiency of regions in China

Total-factor energy efficiency of regions in Japan