Scholars of the theory of the firm have begun to emphasize the sources and conditions of what has been described as “the organizational advantage,” rather than focus on the causes and consequences of market failure. Typically, researchers see such organizational advantage as accruing from the particular capabilities organizations have for creating and sharing knowledge. In this article we seek to contribute to this body of work by developing the following arguments: (1) social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital; (2) organizations, as institutional settings, are conducive to the development of high levels of social capital; and (3) it is because of their more dense social capital that firms, within certain limits, have an advantage over markets in creating and sharing intellectual capital. We present a model that incorporates this overall argument in the form of a series of hypothesized relationships between different dimensions of social capital and the main mechanisms and proces...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/259373.pdf

Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage

Agency theory is an important, yet controversial, theory. This paper reviews agency theory, its contributions to organization theory, and the extant empirical work and develops testable propositions. The conclusions are that agency theory (a) offers unique insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk and (b) is an empirically valid perspective, particularly when coupled with complementary perspectives. The principal recommendation is to incorporate an agency perspective in studies of the many problems having a cooperative structure.

http://strategy.sjsu.edu/www.stable/pdf/Eisenhardt,%20K.%20M.,%201989,%20The%20Academy%20of%20Management%20Review%2014(1)%2057-74.pdf

Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review

We build on an emerging strategy literature that views the firm as a bundle of resources and capabilities, and examine conditions that contribute to the realization of sustainable economic rents. Because of (1) resource-market imperfections and (2) discretionary managerial decisions about resource development and deployment, we expect firms to differ (in and out of equilibrium) in the resources and capabilities they control. This asymmetry in turn can be a source of sustainable economic rent. The paper focuses on the linkages between the industry analysis framework, the resource-based view of the firm, behavioral decision biases and organizational implementation issues. It connects the concept of Strategic Industry Factors at the market level with the notion of Strategic Assets at the firm level. Organizational rent is shown to stem from imperfect and discretionary decisions to develop and deploy selected resources and capabilities, made by boundedly rational managers facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intrafirm conflict.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2486548.pdf

Strategic assets and organizational rent

Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'

/pdf/comparative-economic-organization-the-analysis-of-discrete-2pqve3tqkn.pdf

Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives

Investigates the patterns of technological evolution and their impact on environmental conditions. Seven hypotheses are offered in order to demonstrate that technology is a central force in shaping the environments within which organizations operate. These hypotheses are: (1) technological change within a product class will be characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by discontinuities; (1a) technological discontinuities are either competence enhancing (build on existing skills and know-how) or competence destroying (require fundamentally new skills and competences); (2) the locus of innovation will differ for competence destroying and competence-enhancing technological changes. Competence-destroying discontinuities will be initiated by new entrants, while competence-enhancing discontinuities will be initiated by existing firms; (3) competitive uncertainty will be higher after a technological discontinuity than before discontinuity; (4) environmental munificence (i.e., resource availability and support for growth) will be higher after a technological discontinuity than before the discontinuity; (5) competence-enhancing discontinuities will be associated with decreased entry-to-exit ratios and decreased interfirm sales variability (thus strengthening product leaders and increasing barriers to entry). These patterns will be reversed for competence-destroying discontinuities; (6) successive competence-enhancing discontinuities will be associated with smaller increases in uncertainty and munificence; and (7) those organizations that initiate major technological innovations will have higher growth rates than other firms in the product class. Data were collected from U.S. firms in three product classes, domestic scheduled passenger airline transport, Portland cement manufacture, and minicomputer manufacture, from the year of the niche market's inception through 1980. Results indicate that after the three niche openings, there were six competence-enhancing technological discontinuities and two competence-destroying discontinuities in total. Each of these discontinuities had a far greater impact on a key measure of cost or performance than more incremental technological events. In addition, except for the period following the introduction of semiconductor memory in minicomputers, the ability of experienced industry observers to predict demand following technological disruptions was far worse than prior to the disruption. Demand growth following the discontinuity was significantly higher than it was immediately prior to the discontinuity, which had an enormous impact on product-class demand. Also, the ratio of entries to exits was higher in each of the five years before a competence-enhancing discontinuity than during the five subsequent years, though none of the differences is statistically significant. Though market variability in sales growth was expected, it was found that some firms' sales grew explosively while other firms experienced sales declines. It is also suggested that as technology matures, successive competence-enhancing discontinuities increase both uncertainty and munificence, but not as much as those discontinuities that preceded them in establishing the product class. Finally, early adopters of technology were found to experience more growth than other firms. Using three different product types, with a wide range of years from inception, it is shown that technology does evolve through long periods of incremental change punctuated by relatively rare innovations that radically improve the state of the art. Although these incidences of change are rare, they stand out clearly and have significantly altered competitive environments. (SFL)

/pdf/technological-discontinuities-and-organizational-yqzhlxgbc2.pdf

競田杉

Papers

経営者の役割 = The functions of the executive

競 田杉

Papers

経営者の役割 = The functions of the executive

競田杉