The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

The recent emergence of blockchains may be considered a critical turning point in organizing collaborations. We outline the historical background and the fundamental features of blockchains and pre...

/pdf/blockchain-governance-a-new-way-of-organizing-collaborations-5bigk8sd0e.pdf

Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?

Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between control and coordination functions of contracts, (b) separating goodwill-based and competence-based trust, and (c) evaluating the effects of contract structure on relational outcomes in the context of disputes. We find that control provisions increase competence-based trust, but reduce goodwill-based trust, resulting in a net decrease in the likelihood of continued collaboration. Coordination provisions increase competence-based trust, leading to an increased likelihood of continued collaboration.

Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: the effects of contract structure

Project governance and its role in enabling organizational strategy implementation: A systematic literature review

Coping with uncertainty: Knowledge sharing in new product development projects

Uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, and governance in construction projects: The efficacy of contracts

Construction contracts, such as FIDIC model contracts, are relatively complex and cumbersome, and their composition needs to be better understood. This research uses a multi-functional approach tha...

Understanding the multiple functions of construction contracts: the anatomy of FIDIC model contracts

This paper aims to explain how contractual complexity, including contractual control, coordination and adaptation, makes a difference to the task and relationship conflict, and then, to investigate the moderating roles played by both, total interdependence and interdependence asymmetry, in altering the association between the two types of conflicts.,This study obtained data through a questionnaire survey in the Chinese construction industry and the final sample consisted of 232 responses. The data were analysed using hierarchy analysis using SPSS.,The results are as follows: first, higher contractual control and coordination reduce the level of relationship conflicts, and higher contractual coordination also reduces the level of task conflicts; second, task conflict positively affects relationship conflict; third, task conflict mediates the relationship between contractual coordination and relationship conflict; and finally, when total interdependence is higher, task conflict induces more relationship conflict. On the contrary, high interdependence asymmetry weakens the positive relationship between task and relationship conflicts.,This study highlights the importance of contracts in conflict management. The findings can guide practitioners in drafting suitable contracts to deal with task and relationship conflicts more effectively.,This study differentiates the effects of distinct components of contracts on task and relationship conflicts, and then reveals the contingent effects of interdependence on the relationship between task and relationship conflicts in inter-organisational transactions.

The efficacy of contractual governance on task and relationship conflict in inter-organisational transactions

The number of “unicorns” worldwide—private VC-funded startups valued at a billion dollars or more—has risen dramatically in recent years. Since the main alternative to becoming a highly valued private company is to undertake an initial public offering (IPO), we relate the growth in unicorns to startups’ decisions to delay IPOs and only undertake them at high valuations. We focus on highly scalable ventures as an explanation for unicorns and examine how scalability, in combination with VC funding availability, affects IPO valuation and timing. We posit that becoming a public firm may have significant drawbacks for highly scalable ventures in executing their growth strategies, which may induce them to undertake IPOs later and at higher valuations, especially when more VC funding is available. Among U.S. VC-backed IPOs during 2010-2019, we find evidence that is largely supportive of our propositions. We contribute to the emerging literature on venture scaling and provide an explanation for the recent rapid growth of unicorns. 

Jingya You

Papers

Uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, and governance in construction projects: The efficacy of contracts

Understanding the multiple functions of construction contracts: the anatomy of FIDIC model contracts

The efficacy of contractual governance on task and relationship conflict in inter-organisational transactions

Why Unicorns Exist: Venture Scaling and the Valuation and Timing of Startup IPOs