With the centenary of the publication of William James's Pragmatism (1907) fast approaching, this paper explores two questions. First: what role did James's volume play in the development of the Pragmatic movement?; second: how powerful a force was that movement within American academic philosophy? With regard to the first question, this paper suggests that Pragmatism was not the font of the movement, but in fact appeared near its end; with regard to the second question, this paper suggests that the Pragmatic movement, while of great importance in American society, was itself only a minor moment within professionalizing American philosophy.

One Hundred Years of Pragmatism

Miranda v. Arizona required that police inform suspects, prior to custodial interrogation, of their constitutional rights to silence and appointed counsel. It also required that suspects voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive these rights in order for any resulting confession to be admitted into evidence at trial. The rationale of Miranda as elaborated by the Supreme Court has evolved from encouraging suspects to resist police interrogation to informing suspects that they have a right to resist. Reflecting a fundamental tenet in American culture and law, Miranda today seeks to protect the free choice of a suspect to decide whether to answer police questions during interrogation. Two generations of empirical scholarship on Miranda suggest that the Miranda requirements have exerted a negligible effect on the ability of the police to elicit confessions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions. There is no good evidence that Miranda has substantially depressed confession rates or imposed significant costs on the American criminal justice system. The practical benefits of Miranda to custodial suspects may also be negligible. Police have developed multiple strategies to avoid, circumvent, nullify, or simply violate Miranda and its invocation rules.

The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: Embedded in Our National Culture?

The suite of problems peculiar to the late twentieth century and collectively
referred to as the 'ecological crisis' is similar in character to the problems of general
social collapse which confronted the thinkers of the early modern period At issue is
the inadequacy of established myths, values, knowledges and institutions in the face
of novel societal and, in the case of the late twentieth century, novel ecological
disturbances Given the problems of technological optimism and widespread
disappointment at the limited fulfillment of Enlightenment ideals, the thesis
speculates about alternative paths for modernity and suggests that a modest
scepticism relative to humanity's rational capacities is now a more fitting ethical,
cognitive and practical stance
The inadequacy of the defining myths, norms and institutions of modern life,
in the face of novel ecological and social crises, can be traced to a particular
conjunction of historical circumstance that demanded stability and certainty, qualities
which are now supplanted by the need for flexibility and adaptability in institutional
arrangements and in their supporting values and knowledges The deficiencies of
modern institutions may be explained in part by their failure to promote
responsibility as a core behavioural norm The rejuvenation of civil society and its
public spheres has been proposed as the site for potential radical social
transformation, which, it is argued, is implicit in the activity of new social
movements and in green movements in particular, since they are in a unique position
to integrate a radical critique of modernity with a radicalized ecological
consciousness 
The sustainability discourse raises fundamental questions about how humans
should dwell on the planet, and consequently sustainable development is examined as
an attempt to respond to this quintessential dilemma of human existence in the
context of generational inequity and global ecological decline As a keystone of
liberal capitalism, private property rights are found to have failed as an instrument of
autonomy and of environmental protection and arguments are advanced for a
different ethical basis for property ownership, one grounded in responsibility and
more fitted to contemporary social and ecological realities
Ecological theorists have proved to be strong on prescriptions for end-states,
but rather weak on how to get there, on praxis At various times in western history
the praxis paradigm has been useful in providing indications for proceeding in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties Given the enormity of the problems
presently confronting humankind and the apparent inability to respond to multiple
danger signals, it seems appropriate to draw on the paradigm once again in order to
frame a radical ecopraxis, a praxis of ecological restructuring which constitutes a
programme for ecosocial transformation, radical in its objectives but modest in its
means
In the disillusioned light of earlier utopian ideals, the question of whether
sustainability as a project of ecopraxis can facilitate the necessary ecological
restructuring, while avoiding the pitfalls of revolutionary change, is a relevant
consideration The further question of whether sustainability can rejuvenate the
political economy of liberal democracy, in the face of severe legitimacy problems, is
similarly germane

In search of the ecologically responsible society : sustainability as ecopraxis

It frequently is argued that the more the state plans, the more power is placed in the hands of the planners (1, pp. 761, 766). Social engineering begets power, and Lord Acton long ago warned us that power tends to corrupt. The classical response has been the celebration of the free market economy. Social engineering and planning are perceived as the very opposites of the free market; intervention is the opposite of nonintervention. The legal expression of social engineering is perceived as a set of commands directed by the state to various citizens. The legal expression of the free market is perceived as facilitative law, of which the law of contract is the archetype. As social engineering is the opposite of a free market, so command law is the opposite of facilitative law. We examine here these supposed dichotomies. We argue that they are based upon an unreal set of assumptions about how contract law operates. We first examine the theoretical issues posed and then turn to a brief analysis of two sharply contrasting colonial African economies, those of Kenya and of Ghana.

Contract Law, the Free Market, and State Intervention: A Jurisprudential Perspective

Publisher Summary In this chapter, the concentration is on trial by jury. It discusses the difficult interface between psychology and law and describes the numerous empirical studies related to individual differences in conviction proneness and/or punitiveness, extra-evidentiary factors in individual decision-making, and the dynamics of juror interaction that culminate in the verdict. The chapter provides an overview of the psychology and the law in the institution of trial by jury. It outlines the antecedents and historical developments in trial by jury. The jury in America, their competence, representativeness, and qualifications are discussed in the chapter; it also describes the determiners of fact versus interpreters of the law and court decisions and discrimination. The chapter explores demographics and jury verdicts, wherein it has described sex and race of juror or defendant; age, politics, and education of jurors; the characteristics of the defendant; the attitudes and personalities of jurors; jury selection—efficacy and ethics; and attitudes toward capital punishment. Influence and persuasion within the jury in two situations that is the person being the foreperson and the person being in the majority and minority is discussed in the chapter. The chapter reviews evidence related to recent changes in the operation of juries, for example, in the size of jury, the requirements of unanimity, as well as various proposed reforms.

John A. Gorfinkel

Papers

Law and the Social Order