Showing papers by "John Asker published in 2013"
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, the state-space/MPNE assumption is relaxed, and the authors consider three instances in which the entrant can play the same exclusionary tactic as the incumbent post-entry.
Abstract: In this appendix, we begin by providing formal treatments of three instances in which the state-space/MPNE assumption is relaxed: first, when the entrant can play the same exclusionary tactic as the incumbent post-entry; second, when the manufacturer can collude post-entry; and, third, we consider an example of a retailer cartel being present. Following these extensions of our analysis, we review several historical accounts of RPM being used to induce an exclusionary effect. An NBER working paper, Asker and Bar-Isaac (2010), also works through these (and other) extensions, including downstream retailer differentiation, albeit in a model specifically directed at the RPM case. That paper also has the feature of considering a model in which the entrant can undercut the incumbent for a period before inviting a competitive response. This makes exclusion harder as the entrant’s profits are increased. That said, all results are qualitatively the same.
8 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The vertical structure of an industry plays very different roles in the context of predatory pricing than it does in the case of exclusive dealing as discussed by the authors, and the vertical structure plays a different role in both cases.
Abstract: The vertical structure of an industry plays very different roles in the context of predatory pricing than it does in the context of exclusive dealing. John Asker (Stern School of Business, NYU) & Shannon Seitz (Analysis Group, Inc.)
1 citations