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Using Multivariate Statistics

Agency and stewardship theories are prominent perspectives to examine myriad issues within family firms. Although considered opposing theories, both address the same phenomena: the individual-level...

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0894486515594292

Viewing Family Firm Behavior and Governance Through the Lens of Agency and Stewardship Theories

This article is the incoming editorial to the special issue "Review of Corporate Governance", which was published in 2016 in "Corporate Governance: An International Review". The Guest Editors summarise the articles published in the special issue and introduce several new research directions and issues to consider.

Advancing the Corporate Governance Research Agenda

This article examines whether agency or stewardship is the more effective form of managerial governance within family firms. Synthesizing arguments regarding the differential tendencies of nonfamil...

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0894486517717532

Is It Better to Govern Managers via Agency or Stewardship? Examining Asymmetries by Family Versus Nonfamily Affiliation:

Corporate governance is an important determinant of corporate performance. Poor corporate governance can damage the interests of shareholders, and may lead to business collapse. This paper expands the literature on credit risk management by assessing the effectiveness of aspects of corporate governance for predicting financial distress in a dynamic discrete-time survival analysis model. It is a comprehensive, up-to-date and thorough study, which uses a large range of corporate governance measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic variables in a panel data structure over a 17-year period. Furthermore, the paper addresses the relationship between government ownership and the risk of financial distress in China. The results suggest that although corporate governance alone is not sufficient to accurately predict financial distress, it can add to the predictive power of financial ratios and macroeconomic factors. In addition, the model provides insights into the role of state ownership, independent directors, institutional investors and some personal characteristics of the Chair of the board. Implications are made regarding them and the debt and bankruptcy problem in China and Asia.

/pdf/predicting-the-risk-of-financial-distress-using-corporate-ucrnp70hbp.pdf

Predicting the risk of financial distress using corporate governance measures

Manuscript Type

Empirical
Research Question/Issue

This study examines whether certain proxies for board incentives and board capital are linked with bankruptcy in unlisted firms.
Research Findings/Insights

Based on data analyzed over a five-year period with a sample of 232 matched pairs of unlisted firms, results reveal that firms with boards led by an independent Board Chair (vs. CEO duality), and including longer-tenured directors, and directors with fewer additional directorships on average, are less likely to become bankrupt. Results of analyses of board size and board change support a �reputation� hypothesis, i.e. that directors begin to flee firms in a downward spiral prior to bankruptcy.
Theoretical/Academic Implications

Results support an eclectic model of board incentives and board capital, which integrates elements of agency and resource dependence theories, and the group decision-making literature to explain governance antecedents of firms that went bankrupt. It builds on a model proposed by Hillman and Dalziel, while identifying important differences, including lack of support for predicted moderating effects between board incentives and board capital. Findings also support applicability of the threat-rigidity logic and reputation hypothesis in this context, and the importance of anchoring corporate governance research more precisely on prediction of certain levels of performance.
Practitioner/Policy Implications

Findings support governance recommendations to separate Board Chair and CEO leadership and limit a director's number of outside directorships. Negative effects of director tenure on bankruptcy contradict the notion of �term limits,� suggesting that benefits of firm-specific knowledge and experience may outweigh risks of entrenchment.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/CORG_CORG12078.pdf?abstractid=2490761&mirid=1

Jonas De Maere

Papers

Board Capital and the Downward Spiral: Antecedents of Bankruptcy in a Sample of Unlisted Firms