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Showing papers by "Jonas Tallberg published in 2003"


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TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda shaping: agenda setting, agenda structuring, and agenda exclusion, is presented.
Abstract: Existing literature is overwhelmingly skeptic about capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The Presidency’s ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited and, typically, the Presidency is depicted as a ‘responsabilite sans pouvior’. This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda shaping: agenda setting, agenda structuring, and agenda exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining and decision-making developed in International Relations and American Politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the Presidency within each form of agenda shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how Presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999-2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden, and Belgium.

227 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda exclusion, is presented.
Abstract: Existing literature is overwhelmingly sceptical about the capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The Presidency's ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited and, typically, the Presidency is depicted as a "responsabilite sans pouvior'. This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining and decision- making developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the Presidency within each form of agenda-shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how Presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999- 2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium. (Less)

210 citations


Book
29 Jul 2003
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the influence of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in the political and legal enforcement of member state compliance in the EU and show how the EU's supranational institutions have played an independent role in the creation of a European enforcement system that is exceptionally effective compared to that of other international organizations.
Abstract: This book examines the influence of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in the political and legal enforcement of member state compliance in the EU. The authors show how the EU's supranational institutions have played an independent role in the creation of a European enforcement system that is exceptionally effective compared to that of other international organizations.

100 citations


01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: In this article, a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda exclusion, is presented.
Abstract: Existing literature is overwhelmingly sceptical about the capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The Presidency's ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited and, typically, the Presidency is depicted as a "responsabilite sans pouvior'. This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining and decision- making developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the Presidency within each form of agenda-shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how Presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999- 2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium. (Less)

15 citations



01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: In this article, Fragan et al. describe the platsen for a stort politiskt experiment in Europe, i.e., "a set of platsens for ett stort political experiment".
Abstract: Europa ar i dag platsen for ett stort politiskt experiment. Fragan ar om det gar att skapa ett medborgarnas Europa. Uppgiften ar att samtidigt demokratisera, konstitutionalisera och effektivisera Europeiska unionen. 2003 ars rapport fran Demokratiradet diskuterar med utgangspunkt fran EU:s framtidskonvent den pagaende reformprocessen och Sveriges bidrag till denna europeiska framtidsdebatt.

3 citations


01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: In this paper, Fragan et al. describe the platsen for a stort politiskt experiment in Europe, i.e., "a set of platsens for ett stort political experiment".
Abstract: Europa ar i dag platsen for ett stort politiskt experiment. Fragan ar om det gar att skapa ett medborgarnas Europa. Uppgiften ar att samtidigt demokratisera, konstitutionalisera och effektivisera Europeiska unionen. 2003 ars rapport fran Demokratiradet diskuterar med utgangspunkt fran EU:s framtidskonvent den pagaende reformprocessen och Sveriges bidrag till denna europeiska framtidsdebatt.

2 citations


01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions, and the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions.
Abstract: Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.

2 citations